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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation examines the relationship between (inter)subjectivity, normativity, and 
politics in Emmanuel Levinas and Karl Marx. At first sight, Levinas’ depiction of a singular and 
unique relation to others—a bond which prohibits even the slightest trace of historical, 
hermeneutic or political context—appears not only at odds with the basic philosophical and 
political insights of Marx but the whole of the Continental tradition (spanning from, at least, 
Fichte and Hegel to Heidegger and Foucault). This much is evident from the numerous political 
critiques and appropriations of Levinas, which condemn him on the grounds that his 
epistemology, ontology and ethics are needlessly naive, insular, individualistic, and pseudo-
theological. Against such readings I argue that if we are to retain the normative kernel of his 
thought while overcoming such politically limited interpretations we must radicalize and 
theoretically deepen this impulse to deworld the other.  
 This interpretation opens Levinas’ thought to a new field of new possibilities which are 
explored through Marx and related thinkers, such as Fichte, Hegel, Hediegger, and others. I 
claim that a dialogue with Marx is particularly instructive because it can push Levinas beyond 
his limited conception of politics and alienation, while, at the same time, provide a better 
foundation for normative and political questions that were under- or poorly-theorized by Marx. 
Together, Levinas and Marx can further an understanding of subjectivity and politics that 
comprehends the importance of mediation, history, collectivity and universality without ceding 
the profound rootlessness of subjectivity, which, at every moment, retains the asymmetrical 
structure of the one-for-the-other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 My first encounter with Levinas was the essay “Useless Suffering,” assigned in an 
undergraduate philosophy class. At the time I considered Levinas (more on reputation than 
anything else) to be representative of the kind of pathologies that I typically associated with a 
certain philosophical milieu. Though I had often found a certain kinship with the critical 
dimensions of thinkers like Foucault, Derrida, and Butler, I found that they too often 
downplayed—even wished away—larger economic and political questions. Their skepticism of 
meta-narratives, the state, history, authenticity and totality were not, in my estimation, off the 
mark so much as they were premature. One could not simply forgo an analysis of systems and 
structures under the pretension that they are, in reality, fragmented, incomplete, or illusory. My 
fear was that such analyses confused normative principles with the reality of the situation: if one 
wanted to be free from totalization it meant, in my opinion, confronting rather than shying away 
from questions like capitalism, imperialism and the state. Thus, to proclaim the end, or at least 
decline, of meta-narratives was to deepen, rather than subvert, the totalizing aspirations of 
capitalist social relations. The Levinas I encountered in “Useless suffering” seemed to more or 
less fit this mould, at least well enough not to force me to reconsider. Accordingly, I concluded 
the semester with a paper that juxtaposed conceptions of good and evil in Levinas and 
Augustine, where I argued that Levinas’ conception of the good (which I interpreted as a reaction 
to a prior evil) precluded an adequate conception of solidarity and collectivity.   
 Three years later I somewhat hesitantly enrolled in a graduate seminar on Levinas. 
Almost immediately I experienced a sudden and surprising change of heart. After reading 
Totality and Infinity, Otherwise than Being, and essays such as “The Ego and Totality,” I 
concluded that I was wrong about Levinas: rather than a formidable skeptic, anti-rationalist or 
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deconstructionist, he was, in fact, much closer to a right-Hegelian. For all his talk about 
“totality” and the irreducibility of the “other,” I believed Levinas to be a deeply conservative 
thinker committed to illuminating the ethical substrata of the status quo. I will always remember 
the look on Professor Horowitz’s face (always more thoughtful and measured than my own) 
when I cynically asked him if there was “inherent content” in Levinas’ philosophy. After all, I 
thought, of what value could Levinas’ version of intersubjectivity contain if his conception of 
“responsibility” or “ethics” was blind to perception, history, and context—an apparent 
transcendental condition totally indifferent to the social designations that already inscribe the 
“other” as “neighbour,” “stranger,” “master,” or “slave.” 
 At the same time, as I continued to explore the relationship between subjectivity, history 
and politics the spectre of Levinas persisted. Whether I was engaging with Fichte’s depiction of 
the relationship between the ego and the “not-I,” the various dimensions of Heidegger’s “being-
with,” Althusser’s theory of “interpellation,” or even Freud’s hypothesis that the “oceanic 
feeling” of oneness with the universe was a remnant of a time when the ego could not 
differentiate itself from the external world, I found myself returning to Levinas in order to re-
examine fundamental questions I had previously considered to be long settled. From this 
perspective I turned to the history of philosophy to re-interrogate the nature of the relationship 
between interiority/exteriority, autonomy/heteronomy, self/other, individuality/sociality, and 
activity/passivity.   
 One of the crucial developments I had explored in post-Kantian thought was the shift to 
consider the material and social dimensions of subjectivity. From Fichte and Hegel to Heidegger 
and Foucault, consciousness was increasingly understood as socially mediated, and, therefore, 
already an expression of a particular form of practical engagement within the world. As such, 
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even the most private experiences were already implicated in larger questions of society, power, 
representation, politics, and economics. Never questioning the merits of this mode of 
intersubjective inquiry (which still are, in my opinion, beyond reproach), I began to pay closer 
attention to the normative impulses that animated such investigations. Despite the fact that all 
such inquires were, in very general terms, universal in scope (i.e. they set out to illuminate the 
underlying broad structures and processes through which consciousness comes to be a “self”), 
they often came to radically different conclusions about the nature of the world and the role of 
the subject within it. I began to probe this phenomenon with a naive question: what is the 
relationship between one’s analytical understanding of the world as it is, and how one theorizes 
their place within the world understood as such? Does the fact, for example, that, in theorizing 
society, Hegel speaks of Spirit and history, Marx of modes of production and capitalism, 
Heidegger of Being and language, and Foucault of epistemes and power, simply indicate a 
difference in understanding the world (as it is), or, do such (seemingly analytical) differences 
already speak to an underlying conception of what it means to be a subject, or at least a subject 
proper. Put differently, why exactly does a given thinker study what they study and, moreover, 
how is this inquiry framed as they pursue their object of thought. And, to complicate matters 
further, the force of the tradition begged one further question: what is the relationship between 
this (often implicit) background normative orientation and the material conditions in which said 
philosophers are situated.  
 While Levinas was ill-suited to answer all of these questions, he did seem extremely 
relevant to address the concern that seemed to me to be central: in what way do others concern 
me, and, moreover, how is this understanding relevant to theorizing questions of subjectivity and 
politics. What became immediately clear was that Levinas had forced me to reconsider whether 
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this philosophical tradition had adequately progressed beyond the normative foundations it had 
outstripped. Despite the fact that a succession of philosophers had effectively dismantled (or “de-
centred”) the sovereign atomistic subject, it seemed to me that the fundamental orientation of 
egoism persisted. Because conceptions of self-mastery, self-unity, and autonomy could no longer 
be taken for granted (as they had so often been in liberalism where they were simply gifted as a 
priori) they had to be reinstated as regulatory ideals to be achieved by the subject-yet-to-be. 
While philosophy presented many notable moments of exception, it also seemed to struggle in its 
attempt to re-orient our fundamental understanding of what it means to be a social and historical 
being. Subjectivity was often expressed as a return to self, or as a challenge to master ones 
contingent circumstances and disparate drives in order to fashion oneself as a unified free being. 
This manifested itself myriad of ways, from engendering new forms of egoism and individualism 
to grounding subjectivity itself within the expansive horizons of a particular form of life.  
 While these articulations contained immense insights, even when the category of the 
“other” figured prominently, such analyses seemed to misapprehend the nature, structure and 
significance of the inter-human relation. The relation to the other qua other was typically 
relegated to a secondary concern, something to be considered after the long after the self has 
recollected itself in and through society. The otherness of the other was thus placed under the 
rubric of its generic function (or role it is assigned in and through society). Perhaps most 
importantly, in the many instances where philosophy had indicated a path beyond this limitation, 
it seemed unable to seize upon or even find the conceptual vocabulary to articulate this impulse. 
Levinas thus represent a missed opportunity, a chance to better understand the sociality of 
subjectivity in radically new terms rather than from the standpoint of how to regain what had 
been theoretically lost. Even though more traditional thinkers of intersubjectivity far surpassed 
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Levinas’ theorization of society, politics, and history, I became increasingly convinced that, 
despite his limitations (which are indeed significant), Levinas’ depiction of a subjective 
entanglement with an other uprooted from the world had something very important to offer.  
 The primary challenge facing such a project was how to read Levinas’ philosophical 
impulses in a way that preserved its critical import while, at the same time, being careful not to 
devalue the importance of history, difference, negativity, referential totalities, symbolic fields, 
hermeneutical horizons, and so on. While I believed (contrary to many of Levinas’ interpreters) 
that this had been Levinas’ original intent, it was in any event clear that by grossly under-
theorizing the relationship between totality and infinity, he had invited a justifiable amount of 
criticism and confusion. In fact, my initial oscillation—which, I would later discover was fairly 
common among Levinas’ detractors, who similarly oscillate between critiques which require 
theoretically inconsistent interpretations—was, at least in part, symptomatic of Levinas’ own 
ambiguity with respect to history and politics. Levinas’ limited engagement with politics (or any 
facet of intersubjectivity outside of the radically singular relation to the other) certainly raises 
more questions than it answers. For example: where exactly does Levinas draw the line between 
description and prescription; what is the relationship between philosophical and political totality 
(defined by the instrumentality of the situation); can his theory of generic alienation be given 
particular content; and can his definition of society as a “radical multiplicity” be conceived of in 
terms of a positive political project.  
 For many reasons Marx seemed like an obvious interlocutor. Although Levinas had 
indicated, in scattered sentiments, possible points of intersection, he had never engaged in a 
sustained dialogue with Marx. With a few recent exceptions, this lacuna was also present in the 
secondary literature, where the names Levinas and Marx were only invoked in order to preach 
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the fundamental incompatibility of their thought. This was especially unfortunate because the 
more I studied their respective thought not only did I discover a strong kinship between them 
but, despite these commonalities, they each had a particular clarity about dimensions of the 
intersubjective experience where the other remained confused or unnecessarily vague. I was thus 
convinced they each had something significant to offer the other that could push both of them 
beyond their respective limits.   
 At the core of both of their philosophies (even if it appeared in a slightly different 
register) is an expression of a rootless subjectivity, that manifests itself in the refusal to 
subordinate the inter-human relation to the generic socio-historic forces that inevitably mediate, 
at every moment, that very relation. As a result both articulate a universal aspiration that is 
skeptical of any attempt to ground the community within a specific culture, tradition, lineage, 
way of being-in-the-world, or particular “mode-of-life.” Marx has value for Levinas insofar as he 
indicates the material and political possibilities (or better, necessities) of such an expression. 
Where Levinas finds paradoxes and dead-ends within the generic experience of human 
alienation, Marx describes the socio-historic contours of “totality” and signals not only what 
obstacles need to be overcome if Levinas’ normative aspirations are to find material expression 
but the political means with which to do so. At the same time, Levinas’ framing of the problem 
of intersubjectivity, specifically the nature of the inter-human relation, further elucidates Marx’s 
emancipatory possibilities which become frustrated, even distorted, as he grapples with the 
immensity of the task at hand. In pursuing the material conditions of liberation Marx, at times, 
elevates those conditions themselves over the inter-human relation. As a result, without crucial 
insights provided by the other, the revolution sought by both Levinas and Marx remains partial 
and incomplete.   
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 This effort at a rapprochement between Levinas and Marx is broken down into four 
chapters. In the first chapter I turn to Levinas’ most ardent critics in order to outline the 
theoretical challenges facing any attempt to establish a relationship between Levinas and Marx, 
which is another way of saying between Levinas and politics in general. According to his critics 
Levinas’ political pathologies follow directly from his unwavering eschewal of any dimension 
through which the experience of the “Other” is necessarily mediated (be it history, context, 
structure, politics, symbolic order, etc.). Levinas’ attempt to deworld the other is understood 
(somewhat understandably) as philosophically regressive and politically reactionary. I conclude 
the chapter by clarifying the philosophical steps that such critiques relies upon and begin to 
examine their insufficiency, while taking serious the challenges presented by Levinas’ critics and 
what they might mean for thinking Levinas with Marx.  
 Picking up from the first chapter I demonstrate that much of the “third wave” of 
Levinasian scholarship proceeds from a similar interpretation offered by Levinas’ critics. 
Defenders of the Levinasian legacy thus often proceed to engage with radical politics by re-
thinking the very foundation of his thought, which is still considered unnecessarily austere and 
hyperbolic. After exploring their attempt to set Levinas on better philosophical footing, while 
retaining the moral force of his general argument, I argue that, in contrast to both the critics and 
the “third wave” interpreters, the deworlded other is the very characteristic of Levinas’ thought 
that must be preserved if we are to rethink the relationship between Levinas and politics. To this 
end I analyze the philosophical “depth” at which Levinas is operating, which is the essential 
problem around which political appropriations hinge. Here I claim that both neo-Marxist 
critiques and ‘third wave’ applications of Levinas’ work rely on interpretations that are overly 
prescriptive, and thus reach the corresponding conclusion that his thought is needlessly naive, 
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hyperbolic, theological, provincial, and apolitical. In order to extrapolate the depth at which the 
“social relation” is operative in Levinas, I conclude with a close reading of his essay “Meaning 
and Sense” which affirms the interpretation that Levinas is well aware that our conscious 
everyday experience of the other is already mediated through society and history, and that he is 
aiming at a specific dimension of this relation which he takes to be crucial. This opens up new 
possibilities of how we might think these two kinds of relations together.   
 Having reframed the abstract nature of the relationship between the “other,” context, and 
politics, the third chapter begins to delve into the philosophical substance of subjectivity. In 
order to begin to bridge the divide between Levinas and Marx, I return to Fichte, who is posited 
as the point of origin for modern theories of intersubjectivity. Fichte’s novel modifications of 
Kant necessitate an exploration of the social and material dimensions of subjectivity. Fichte is 
crucial because he not only opens up the theoretical possibility of understanding experience in 
intersubjective terms but, in doing so, he outlines the tensions and contradictions that go on to 
define the philosophical tradition. Through Fichte I continue to explore the relationship between 
the Levinasian dimension of subjectivity with the increasing focus on activity, sociality, 
language politics and institutions. One of the main themes to emerge is the tendency to conceive 
of the intersubjective relation retroactively, that is, from the standpoint of its closure or return to 
self, rather than from the perspective of its entanglement with exteriority. To further prepare for 
Marx I conclude with a brief discussion of the relationship between Levinas and Hegel.    
 The Fourth and final chapter is a sustained dialogue between Levinas and Marx. I begin 
by outlining the insufficiency of the relationship articulated between totality and infinity. 
Levinas too often portrays society as an indiscriminate field of alienation and thus the “betrayal” 
articulated fails to indicate a proper path forward. As a result Levinas’ blanket eschewal of all 
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social relations aside from the sui generis relation to the other paradoxically lends itself to a 
blanket acceptance of the status quo. I then turn to Marx to find a way to articulate this 
relationship with the material world in a new way while maintaining its critical import. In doing 
so I draw out the significant similarities between Marx and Levinas and why these (often 
overlooked) dimensions are of vital importance. This leads to a discussion of the tension within 
Marx’s conception of alienation and politics, and how Levinas, without offering any simple 
solutions, can help resolve problems that Marx could not see clearly enough. Having addressed 
the tensions in Marx I turn to how Marx’s critique of instrumentalization and capitalism can 
compliment Levinas’ critique of totality and, moreover, clarify the relationship between 
philosophy and politics which is otherwise ambiguous in Levinas. I conclude by examining the 
implications of this dialogue for a theory of liberation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 The Deworlded “Other”: Levinas’ Neo-Marxist Critics 
 
 
 The gulf separating Marx and Levinas today is vast, to say the least. The relative 
consensus surrounding the meaning of Levinas’ work has put more distance between him and 
Marx than just about any other two thinkers from the continental tradition. Given the general 
thrust of continental thought over the past two plus centuries, Levinas’ depiction of a singular 
and unique relation to others—a bond which prohibits even the slightest trace of historical, 
hermeneutic or political context—will no doubt sound strange to modern philosophical ears. The 
post-Kantian continental tradition, for all of its differences in scope and ambition, is nothing if 
not an attempt to critique what is readily apparent by situating it within a larger context. Whether 
it be Hegel’s example of a “tree” or “night” which begin the great dialectic of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Marx’s analogous “commodity” at the beginning of Capital, 
Heidegger’s famous “hammer” from Being and Time, or Foucault’s example of the apparent 
“unity of a book” in the opening chapter of The Archaeology of Knowledge, philosophical 
inquiry is synonymous with illuminating the complex of historical relations, networks and 
practices which are presupposed within a seemingly given object or concept.  
 Within this trajectory Marx is considered a particularly important watershed moment in 
our philosophical understanding of subjectivity. While the likes of Fichte, Feuerbach and Hegel 
paved the way, it is with Marx that we have the complete inversion of the Cartesian subject—
where the subject is no longer directly posited as a res cognitans but rather understood on the 
basis of its embodied activity within a historical world of structures, fields and horizons. It 
should be stated at the outset that, for all my disagreements with the critics of Levinas, I am 
sympathetic to the spirit which animates their antipathy. The advances made in continental 
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thought represent a remarkable step forward in our philosophical understanding of subjectivity 
and it is thus for good reasons that Levinas may appear to many of us who stand in the long 
shadows cast by Marx (not to mention Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt, Lacan, Althusser, and 
Foucault) as philosophically regressive—either wholly theological in nature or else a return to a 
strange form of postmodern idealism, empiricism or liberalism. And from here the path from 
philosophically regressive to politically ineffectual is, as we shall momentarily see, well-worn 
and requires little effort. Levinas is thought by his critics to be naive, religious, and, most likely, 
an ideological symptom of capitalism’s total victory over our imagination. While these same 
commentators find time to to perform impressive theoretical feats in order to resuscitate the 
subversive dimensions of other so-called “class ideologues” like Plato, Aristotle, St. Paul, 
Aquinas, Kant, and Hegel, the legacy of Levinas, it would seem, is irredeemable.1  
 While the theoretical disjoint between Levinas and the continental tradition may preclude 
a broad reception from the outset, it is precisely this feature which has made Levinas attractive to 
an eclectic mix of post-structuralists, liberals, conservatives, and scholars of religion. What is 
appealing here (even if for radically different reasons) is how Levinas conceives of a sphere of 
intimate human interaction which lies at an apparent remove or “interstitial distance”2 from the 
totalizing aspirations of history, politics and the state. Whether invoked to affirm or condemn the 
socio-political background which mediate our perceptions, identities and interactions, citing the 
name “Levinas” effectively permits one to bracket such features out of the analysis (at least 
temporarily). 
                                                 
1 The three most prominent critics examined in this chapter, Eagleton, Badiou and Zizek, have engaged with many 
“unorthodox” (at least from a Marxist perspective) thinkers in their respective critiques of capitalism and 
corresponding ruminations on the idea of communism. For example, Badiou is fond of the universality found within 
Plato, Zizek is interested in recovering the lost subversive legacies of German idealism, Eagelton is keen on 
highlighting Marx’s aristotelean roots (a point less endorsed by Zizek and Badiou), and all three are especially 
partial to the philosophical importance of the Christian legacy. 
2 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding (London: Verso, 2007), p.113. 
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 Given this consensus it would seem that the names Marx and Levinas may in fact be 
linked, but only if serving as antipodal markers staking out the distance of this theoretical chasm. 
 In the following chapters these themes will be traced back to their origins to provide an 
alternate path between Marx and Levinas, but before undergoing such a task it is perhaps prudent 
to preface such an analysis by outlining the ramparts erected on both sides of this theoretical 
divide. As already intimated, regardless of which interlocutor we set before Levinas, there is 
really only one genus of criticism, though it acquires its species forms as it is taken up under 
different names and various causes. Whether philosophical or political in nature, virtually every 
critique stems from Levinas’ attempt to posit the singularity of the “other,” who transcends every 
context, defies every category and resists every attempt to apprehend. In this odd analysis the 
relation to the other is increasingly de-worlded the more it is embedded—two processes which 
should not typically coincide, and which are diametrically opposed in thinkers like Heidegger. In 
contrast to Heidegger, for whom penetrating the veneer of consciousness meant exposing the 
shared horizons of referential meaning, Levinas’ aims at a level of embodiment beneath 
signification and still deeper than the familiarity with the world that already pushes and pulls the 
subject in one direction or another.  
 While we will pay special attention to thinkers that are more closely associated with 
Marx, Marxism and the radical left, these objections reverberate more broadly throughout the 
aether of continental thought. This also means we are equally interested in how certain 
philosophical impulses are heightened, muted, developed, negated and carried forward in the 
Continental tradition as Marx is refracted through other philosophical prisms like 
phenomenology, existentialism, critical theory, structuralism, and psychoanalysis. If we are to 
settle the outstanding accounts between Levinas and Marx we cannot not help but settle them, at 
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least in some small way, with the whole tradition. We will thus seek to identify various nodal 
points which need to be loosened, refashioned, even traced back so as to untie, so that we can 
push Marx and Levinas not only beyond their individual horizon but also beyond the trajectories 
which have carried them toward the present. To this end, the purpose of this chapter is somewhat 
akin to the role played by Ivan’s famous tale of the “Grand Inquisitor” in the Brothers 
Karamazov, through which Dostoyevsky welcomes the most formidable expressions of doubt 
and skepticism in his exploration of faith. In the same way, by outlining the following critiques 
we will attempt to set for ourselves the highest possible challenge to overcome. 
 
Levinas’ Critics 
 For many on the radical left Levinas is an important philosophical figure insofar as he 
marks a key juncture, a kind of theoretical wrong-turn, which led us directly to our present 
predicament—a situation where so-called critical thought operates in service of (or at the very 
least, is powerless to disturb) the ideological edifice of late capitalism. “Whether they know it or 
not,” Badiou explains, “it is in the name of [Levinas’] configuration that the proponents of ethics 
explain to us today that it amounts to ‘recognition of the other’…‘the ethics of differences’… 
‘multiculturalism’…Or, quite simply, to good old-fashioned ‘tolerance.’” This contention, that 
Levinas’ philosophy engenders a liberal political malaise, is ubiquitous among his political 
critics. Levinas is described as, at best, inspiring the kind of political quietism typical of 
“postmodern” thought and, at worst, providing the ethical facade of capitalist imperialism.  
 However, before we analyze the specific function Levinas may serve in today’s 
ideological constellation we must first investigate the philosophical dissonance between Levinas 
and his critics which, as we already suggested, is at root. After all, Levinas is typically 
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implicated only indirectly in the failures of the New Left, as he never reached such political 
conclusions directly (in fact, as we will see, quite the contrary). In any case, we need to analyze 
things at a deeper theoretical level to get to the heart of the matter. While the conclusions 
reached by Levinas’ many critics may be deemed here insufficient, the question which inspires 
them is certainly germane; the political remains an undeniable lacuna in Levinas’ thought. 
Through such an exercise we hope to shed light on why and how Levinas’ thought has, to quote 
Asher Horowitz, “remained open to being assimilated to liberalism—a view that his philosophy 
is far from endorsing, if not essentially opposed.”3 
 
The philosophical critique 
 Terry Eagleton’s treatment of Levinas is in many ways paradigmatic, exhibiting the 
breadth of criticism and confusion that ensues from Levinas’ odd phenomenologically inspired 
description which eschews—at bottom—any effort to situate the “other” within a context. As 
Eagleton laments, Levinas’ relation to the other “occurs in some pre-reflective, pre-historical 
depths of the self, prior to knowledge, intention, commitment, consciousness or free decision.”4 
Levinas’ “Other” is thus “troublingly eternal, existing outside all social or historical context, 
denuded of all definitive cultural markers, transcending all moral or psychological factors.”5 
Eagleton, and here he is certainly not alone, is not quite sure what to make of this (thus far 
accurately described) philosophical orientation, where Levinas seemingly (and all too hastily) 
seeks to undo centuries of philosophical labor from Hegel and Marx to Freud and Heidegger by 
indiscriminately tearing away every garment which had been meticulously constructed and 
                                                 
3 Asher Horowitz, Ethics At A Standstill (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 2008), p. ix. 
4 Terry Eagleton, Trouble With Strangers (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell Pub., 2009), p. 227. 
5 Ibid., p. 227.  
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layered over the subject. Lacking any typical reference point in which to ground such a 
philosophy, Levinas’ becomes a catch-all for Eagleton, an easy target for all the frustrations and 
pathologies of the modern age, regardless of how contradictory these interpretations might be. 
Levinas’ ethical theory is at once: “hyperbolic”6 and “authoritative,”7 yet, at the same time 
“abstract,”8 “aloofly indifferent,”9 and “portentously hollow”10; Levinas is described as 
politically impotent,11 “characteristically backwoods, anti-enlightenment,” and the great 
homogenizer of difference,12 yet somehow also responsible for today’s “tediously familiar brand 
of multiculturalism,”13 and all the while masquerading as a “champion of Zionism”14 (which 
might, Eagleton suspects, in fact be the secret telos of his philosophical project).  
 In Levinasian scholarship much has been made of the “Levinas effect”—where, the 
philosophy of Levinas is emptied of any positive content and thus become a kind of universal 
vocabulary through which the author gets to “say whatever we wanted to say in the first place.”15 
Much like Marx’s famous example in the German Ideology of the unalienated individual who is 
able to hunt, fish, and criticize as they please without becoming a “hunter” “fisherman” or 
“critic,” Levinas, can similarly be a feminist in the morning, a deconstructionist in the afternoon 
and a theologian in the evening (and perhaps even a Marxist after the children are put to bed). 
What is especially apparent in Eagleton’s analysis is that the inverse is also true, Levinas’ 
unorthodox approach not only makes him easily co-opted for one project or another but also 
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8 Ibid., p. 227. 
9 Ibid., p. 241. 
10 Ibid., p. 237. 
11 Ibid., p. 243. 
12 Ibid., p. 235. 
13 Ibid., p. 241. 
14 Ibid., p. 236. 
15 C. Fred Alford, Levinas, The Frankfurt School And Psychoanalysis (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 1. 
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makes him susceptible to functioning as a repository or catch-all for whatever critique one might 
wish to level against the state of contemporary theory. Does his emphasis on subjectivity make 
him a humanist; his devaluation of consciousness and intentionality an anti-humanist; his focus 
on transcendence religious; his concern for the uniqueness of the other a liberal; his emphasis on 
the passivity of the subject an empiricist (as Derrida playfully suggests in Violence and 
Metaphysics16); his emphasis on the neighbour a Zionist, or at the very least a conservative?  
 Eagleton is, of course, absolutely correct that Levinas begins with an “other” beyond the 
grasp of history, politics and other socio-psychological factors. However, everything depends on 
how one interprets this moment. Absolutely crucial here is what one makes of the passage from 
Levinas’ dichotomous relation to the “other” to the relation with “the third.” While Levinas uses 
the term “the third” in more than one way (a literal third person, a social plurality, a universal or 
third person perspective), for the time being it is sufficient to note that it signifies the transition 
from a primordial relation to a unique other to the subsidiary realm of “totality” which includes 
everything from self-consciousness, language and representation to society, politics and the state. 
For Levinas to put the “other” before “the third” is to fall outside the sway of a tradition that has 
understood subjectivity on the basis of the totality of socio-psychological processes (be they 
synchronic or diachronic). This move triggers a visceral reaction in Levinas’ critics, who assume 
(perhaps understandably?) that such a re-ordering is tantamount to a full scale rejection of the 
philosophical tradition constructed to combat the philosophical (and often political) 
individualism found in liberalism, empiricism, etc. As Eagleton explains, with reference to 
Lacan:  
If Lacan writes the other as Other, it is to insist that there can be no unmediated relation 
with it – no liaison with the ‘unique’ other which does not pass through the refractions 
                                                 
16 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” in Writing And Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978), p. 190. 
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of the symbolic order as a whole. What Levinas would call the ‘third’ is thus inscribed 
within any face-to-face encounter from the outset, as an estranging dimension of that 
rapport.17  
 
Similarly, Zizek argues that Levinas’ depiction of the “ethical relation” is (over and above being 
wrong politically) “wrong in its own terms, as a phenomenological description, since it misses 
the way the Third is always-already here…a paradoxical background-face…a formal-
transcendental fact…a positive condition of ethics, not simply its secondary supplement.”18 
Simply put, Levinas, to his peril, naively eschews the various matrixes which are presupposed in 
any act of perception or singular encounter.  
 This philosophical critique is, of course, neither new nor unique to our neo-Marxist 
critics. Derrida, in his essay, Violence and Metaphysics, which would introduce Levinas to a 
wide audience, was explicit in his skepticism that one could de-world the other in such a way. 
Invoking giants like Heidegger and Hegel, Derrida deconstructs Levinas’ claim that the other is 
“infinitely other,” a “positive infinity” who is able to maintain its status purely in-itself, apart 
from any relation or any negativity. 
The infinitely other, the infinity of the other, is not the other as a positive 
infinity…would not be what it is…if it did not maintain within itself the negativity of 
the indefinite, of the apeiron…Can one respect the Other as Other, and expel 
negativity—labor—from transcendence, as Levinas seeks to do? The positive Infinity 
(God)—if these words are meaningful—cannot be infinitely Other.19 
Such a description of unsullied exteriority, Derrida claims, is self-defeating, a performative 
contradiction; any attempt to announce such a presence would, paradoxically, require one to first 
“renounce all language, and first of all the words infinite and other.”20 Echoing Wittgenstein’s 
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19 Derrida, Violence, p. 142. 
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famous dictum that “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence,” Derrida 
concludes that, while Levinas may indeed point to something beyond “Being and Logos,” that “it 
must not be possible either to think or state this call.”21 Again, even for Derrida, Levinas is 
admonished for violating the fundamental lesson of the continental tradition—demonstrated for 
Derrida by Hegel’s concept of “negativity” or Heidegger’s notion of “being-in-the-world”—that 
identity can never be posited directly, it is always preceded by difference. The only way for any-
thing to appear as a some-thing is if it is differentiated from every-thing else. Thus appearance as 
such always presupposes a prior background, where every-thing is brought together into a single 
horizon but expressed as a field of differentiation.  
 The typical philosophical critique of Levinas is thus not what one might initially suspect. 
It is not that Levinas’ ruminations on the other are critiqued for myopically fetishizing 
difference, on the contrary, the standard charge is that he lacks any awareness of difference at all. 
The purported trouble with Levinas is that, because he has eschewed all difference (traditionally 
understood), when he attempts to articulate difference qua other, it is too strong and the other is 
quite literally posited as out of the “world” (in the Heideggerian sense). The other is not different 
the same way that a cat is different from a dog or chalk from a pencil. Sharing no common or 
mediating referent, the other is indescribably different. This is why Paul Ricoeur, like Eagleton, 
will label Levinas’ philosophy “hyperbole,” not in the sense of a “literary trope” but rather 
referring Levinas’ “systematic practice of excess in philosophical argumentation.”22 What 
Ricoeur is attempting to describe by the term “hyperbole” is, for us, a crucial philosophical 
distinction. Hyperbole typically indicates the exaggeration and stretching of context, where, for 
the sake of emphasis, one extends a claim beyond practical or observable means. For example, 
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one might say “you are the most unique person in the world” or “that is the best coffee in the 
world” which implies hyper-comparison, that one has surveyed all the people in the world or 
tasted all the coffee in the world before reaching their conclusion. Levinas is hyperbolic, for 
Ricouer, in the exact opposite way. He is not participating in hyper-comparison but rather 
situating the other completely outside of context and beyond comparison. Possessing no 
discernible attributes, no differences or similarities, the other is simply stands in for difference as 
such. For these reasons, the epiphany of the other must be “something different than 
phenomenon”23 because in Levinas there is “no middle ground, no between,”24 nothing to 
mediate my experience of the other. The common sentiment in all these critiques of Levinas, 
irrespective of the political or ethical commitments in which they are embedded (for Ricoeur this 
asymmetrical structure of selfhood makes it difficult to think reciprocity and recognition), is that 
the problems Levinas will encounter stem from his commitment to this deworlding.  
 
The political critique 
 In the hands of our neo-Marxist critics, this philosophical misstep takes on a special 
political significance. The antinomy created between “ethics” and “politics” a priori 
circumscribes Levinas’ philosophical analysis within a non-politics. “Ethics” implies, for 
Levinas, my asymmetrical relationship to the deworlded “other.” “Politics,” one the other hand, 
describes the exact opposite procedure where individuals are counted, compared and classified, 
according to some third person or universal perspective. To oppose ethics and politics in this 
way, Zizek claims, is to already become “postpolitical” because this philosophical dichotomy 
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necessarily excludes “the properly political dimension.”25 Reinhard, writing in the same volume 
on the “neighbour,” puts the problem succinctly: 
“there can be no relationship between ethics and politics in Levinas’s theory. This 
fundamental disjunction between the conditions of ethics (and the neighbor) and politics 
(and the citizen, on the model of “fraternity”) should preclude any attempt to draw 
political consequences from Levinas’s theory of the neighbor…ethics is inherently 
apolitical, must willfully ignore what would be fair or for the general good. To shift the 
other as neighbor into mediation with the other in the polis is precisely to give up on 
ethics; moreover, to try to bring politics to the immediate level of the singular face of 
the other, to see the other as a singularity, can only mean to give up on politics.26  
 
To counter such a position, Reinhard continues, we must accept that “[t]he political is the 
condition of the ethical…the two can only be created by passing through the three.”27 It is not 
any particular content of Levinas’ political views, but the very distinction between ethics and 
politics that is deemed the true political content of his philosophy (unbeknownst to him)—one 
which can only elevate the intimate, unique and singular by disavowing the political background 
(which is, for Reinhard and Zizek via Lacan, closely connected with the symbolic order). 
 This putatively Manichaean distinction in Levinas between ethics (the two) and politics 
(the three) actually impinges our ethical duties which, for Zizek, should aspire to universality and 
justice. If we “deny” the priority of the three and “stick to the postulate of a final translatability 
of the Third into a relation to the Other’s face,” then for Zizek we “remain caught in a vicious 
cycle of ‘understanding.’”28 Because the “Third is not secondary” but “always-already here,” 
Zizek continues, our “primordial ethical obligation is toward this Third who is not here in the 
face-to-face relationship, the one in shadow, like the absent child of a love-couple.”29 This re-
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orientation from the two to the three leads us to Zizek’s “radical anti-Levinasian conclusion: the 
true ethical step is the one beyond the face of the other, the one of suspending the hold of the 
face, the one of choosing against the face, for the third.”30 To choose the other, to attest to the 
apparition of the face, displaces the “elementary gesture of justice” which is to “not to show 
respect for the face in front of me, to be open to its depth, but to abstract from it and refocus onto 
the faceless Thirds in the background,”31 that is, to “disregard the privileged One whom I “really 
understand.”32  
 Here we must briefly take note of the theoretical sleight of hand operative in such 
criticisms, a theme we will return to at the end of the chapter. The link between the philosophical 
critique and the political critique is not adequately explained, namely, it is never explicitly 
demonstrated how we are to transition from the “other” as radically incomprehensible to the 
“other” as the neighbour, who is familiar, the one I “really understand”? Eagleton makes the 
same transition (equally without explanation) noting that (supposedly despite the fact that he 
refuses to place the other under any rubric) Levinas 
has trouble with strangers – not, to be sure, with those of them who are ‘proximate’, but 
with the anonymous masses who at any given moment happen not to be so. (The case is 
even worse when the masses in question are non-European: witness his deep distaste for 
what he calls the ‘yellow peril’ in Les Imprévus de l’histoire.)33 
 
Implicit in such critiques is the notion that, for Levinas, the radical “other” who exists beyond 
difference and outside of history can—through some unexplained process of theoretical 
metamorphosis—become my neighbour (who has a name, recognizable features, personality 
traits, citizenship, an occupation etc.) without first passing through the “third” (be it symbolic, 
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political, psychological or otherwise). Though Levinas often appears to have an all or nothing 
approach to context (which admittedly has its own problems, though they are different problems 
than the ones articulated here) where the other is either altogether foreign or already fully 
immersed in the world, many of his interpreters (and this is equally true of many Levinasians) 
subtly imply that the passage between these worlds unfolds slowly, where the “other” undergoes 
a transmutation from unknown to known which seems to progress from those close by to those 
far away. This unacknowledged slippage between levels of analysis would seem to account for 
Eagleton’s earlier noted oscillation, where Levinas always says too much and somehow not 
enough: when considered from the perspective of the first position (deworlded other) Levinas is 
hyperbolic, demanding and overly authoritative, but when considered from the second 
perspective (other as intimate neighbor) Levinas is politically impotent, hollow, propping up the 
status quo or acting as a theoretical apologist for Zionism. This slippage between levels of 
analysis is particularly noteworthy because it names the primary difficulty faced with dealing 
with the ethical and political implications of Levinas’ work. Eagleton’s objection, for example, 
that Levinas’ concept of asymmetrical responsibility is “ridiculous,” akin to Hegel’s “bad 
infinity,” because it would seem to imply that I am “responsible for the secret police who are 
torturing me” or that I should remain just as open to “those who traffic heroin to schoolchildren” 
as to those who “beg us for bread,” is prototypical of such a misreading in-so-far as it fails to 
address or even acknowledge the different levels of analysis.34 These kinds of arguments, which 
are widespread both in critical and positive appraisals of Levinas’ work, take the various terms 
that Levinas uses to describe the pre-conscious/de-contextual relationship to the “other” (like 
“ethics” “responsibility” “hospitality” “apology”) as having the same implications and meaning 
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as they would on this side of “totality,” where one relates to the other through deliberation, 
understanding, reason, and in the context of institutions, projects, etc. For the time being it is 
sufficient to note that this tension will be the major theme in the further chapters as we chart an 
alternative course for Levinas’ relationship to politics.  
 At any rate, while these arguments, often written in Lacanese (where the hidden/excluded 
element is what grounds the universal background which structures difference as such), may 
appear more nuanced than the standard leftist critique, it is functionally tantamount to the same 
objection one would expect from the more traditional Marxist/historical materialist position: the 
politico-historical context is not neutral, is not a secondary concern, and it certainly cannot be 
bracketed out—it structures every aspect of the battle ground on which these inter-personal 
dramas (no matter how intimate) play out. Hegel’s dictum “the true is in the whole” still holds. 
To believe that we have escaped the realm of politics and ideology is, to the contrary, indicative 
that we are mired so profoundly in its depths that its outer limit has ceased to be visible. With his 
emphasis on subjectivity over structure, ideas over material conditions, ethics over politics, 
individuality over collectivity, Levinas represents nothing more than yet another naive liberal 
dressed up in post-modern garb.  
 Here we can return to Eagleton, who is even more pointed and precise in his political 
criticisms of Levinas. Similarly emphasizing the centrality of Levinas within our modern 
constellation, Eagleton furnishes him with the distinction as “one of the earliest postmodern 
thinkers,”35 even boldly claiming that the far more prominent Derrida is but “an extended 
footnote to Levinas’ own meditations.”36 Levinas is emblematic for Eagleton because he 
provides us with the general formula for understanding the political quietism of our times. In 
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Eaglton’s reading, Levinas (who is representative of the more general 
postmodern/poststructuralist position) represents a one-sided and reactionary theoretical response 
to the political catastrophes of the first half of the 20th century. Perceiving there to be a straight 
line “from the generic to the Gulag” these philosophies have, in both theory and practice, 
indiscriminately pathologized all forms of collectivity. For whatever gains have been made in the 
struggle against totalization, this myopic focus on the “other,” for Eagleton, is ineffectual and 
self-defeating because it cannot distinguish between those forms of solidarity and struggle which 
enslave and those which liberate. As Eagleton explains: 
No more sophisticated notion of human fellowship is permitted. When Levinas thinks of 
solidarity he thinks of fascism, not of the resistance movements which fought to 
overcome it...At its most negative, it is the sign of the gradual atrophy of the sense of 
society. Politics is now the problem, not the solution.37 
 
According to Eagleton the theoretical strategy of avoiding violence by precluding all forms of 
solidarity bars, from the very outset, a proper solution to the worst forms of violence. With a 
mocking tone Eagleton proclaims that it was not “jealous singularity which put a stop to 
Stalinism,” nor were the armies who defeated Hitler “suffused by an experience of transcendent 
otherness.”38  
 Again, for Eagleton the philosophical maps out perfectly onto the political: Levinas’ 
refusal to accept the foundational pillar of the continental tradition—that “Otherness” cannot 
appear ex nihlo because “it is constituted by our dealings with each other, and is therefore bound 
up with identity and reciprocity”39—makes him blind to the increasingly global processes of 
exploitation, domination and marginalization which engender “otherness” in reality. Instead of 
forming alternative forms of global solidarity suitable for such challenges, Eagleton’s Levinas 
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precludes any such form of collectivity or alliance. The political upshot of such “postmodern” 
thought is thus impotent from the beginning, paralyzed by its fear that virtually every dimension 
of life (from language, thinking and reason to culture, politics and the state) is, regardless of 
content, ipso facto on a secular trend towards a violent totality:  
What one might loosely call post-structuralist or postmodern ethics reflects among other 
things a failure of political nerve on the part of a European intelligentsia confronted not 
only with the formidable power of global corporate capitalism, but still languishing 
guiltily in the long shadow of the Gulag and the gas chambers… A cautious liberal 
pragmatism, coupled with a salutary skepticism of grand narratives, may thus appear the 
order of the day. But though such pragmatism can valuably contest dogmatic 
irrationalism, it is powerless to transform the conditions which give birth to it.40 
  
The impotence of the todays left—who today prefer to play in the shallow waters of the 
fragmentary narratives, intimate yet sectarian politics, and idiosyncratic notions of self-creation, 
rather than wade into waters deep enough to confront problems like global capitalism—can thus 
be easily traced back to Levinas’ prohibition of any attempt to bind individuals together under a 
collective gaze. Echoing Zizek and Reinhard’s concerns, Eagleton concludes that Levinas’ 
insistence on framing the ethical in “such full-bloodily non-social terms” which remains a priori 
“aloofly indifferent to community, consensus, equality, civil rights, legality, universality, 
reciprocity, natural qualities, the generic and so on” means that it is “impossible” for Levinas to 
“conjure a politics…beyond the most banal variety of liberal pluralism” an opinion which, 
Eagleton boasts, is “almost universally acknowledged among his commentators.”41 The lesson is 
painfully clear—regardless of where it enters back into the philosophical analysis—if we 
renounce history, context, and structure in the first instance, we are doomed to be passive 
observers watching the spectacle of global capitalism unfold.  
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 It is particularly germane to our present study that Eagleton goes on to contrast such a 
view of politics with Marx. In a turn of phrase that would no doubt make Marx proud, Eagleton 
proclaims that such a Levinasian “view of the polis as a place of alienation reflects an alienated 
view of politics.”42 The problem for Eagleton is that politics, according to Levinas’ formulation, 
is incapable of generating positive values. At best we can hope for the occasional interruption of 
ethics into the political arena, but such a moment must recede before it can fundamentally 
transform politics.43 Politics means the precise opposite for Marx than it does for Levinas: rather 
than tarnish the individual, politics (or better, “socialism”) names the kind of “human 
community,” which takes into account various talents, abilities and needs, which would be 
required to develop the “unique, richly evolved individual” in the first place.44 The problem with 
Levinas, Eagleton asserts, is that his skepticism of the generic (including concepts, reciprocity 
and politics) “assumes a bourgeois notion of equality as abstract equivalence” which Eaglteon 
contrasts with Marx, for whom equality “must be incarnate in human difference, rather than 
riding roughshod over it.”45 Because Levinas insists on indiscriminately locating all politics 
under the generic rubric of domination, no amount of theoretical devotion to the other’s 
singularity will prevent such aspirations from ringing hollow. What is required, Eagleton thus 
concludes, is that we find alternative theoretical conceptions which actually help us differentiate 
between those forms of social and political life which are steeped in domination and those that 
cultivate the growth of genuine human capacities.  
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 Badiou will state his objections to Levinas’ in even stronger terms than these previous 
critics. At the level of philosophy Badiou’s critique is by now familiar (Levinas misses the 
Lacanian dimension of the I/other relationship and, because it is unmediated, Levinas’ “other” is 
essentially religious in character, where the “Altogether-Other” is an obvious stand in for 
“God”46) but politically, Badiou will argue that Levinas-inspired discourses play a more 
fundamental role in the ideological edifice of capitalist imperialism. Not only do such 
commitments to “the Other” and “difference” displace “the late class struggle”47 but they contain 
a more authoritative injunction than the one they purport to critique. What is silently implied by 
a theoretical focus on “otherness,” according to Badiou, is that a set of Western prerequisites 
(liberal values, parliamentary democracy, free markets) must first be accepted—thus this 
philosophical commitment to openness delivers, in practice, the “final imperative of a 
conquering civilization: ‘Become like me and I will respect your difference.’”48 While Badiou 
will, “[f]or the honour of philosophy,” place distance between “Levinas’s actual conception of 
things” and “this ideology of ‘a right to difference,’”49 the very fact that this discourse of 
“otherness” could be so easily inculcated within capitalist imperialism is damning evidence that 
Levinas’s ethics (which is essentially, in Badiou’s estimation, “decomposed religion”) offers us 
nothing more than “a dog’s dinner.” 
 The challenges presented here for the prospects of thinking Levinas within traditions of 
radical politics are significant. For many theorists of politics thought, to which we could add 
                                                 
46 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (London: Verso, 2001), p. 21-3. 
47 Ibid., p. 23. 
48 Ibid., p. 25. 
49 Ibid., p. 20. 
 
 28 
Wolin,50 Wood,51 Malabou,52 Halward,53 and Rothenburg,54 Levinas’ philosophical inversion of 
the continental tradition is symptomatic of the ideological hegemony of late capitalism. To begin 
an analysis with a relation to a deworlded other is, for these critics, to accept defeat in advance. 
The theoretical limitations of such a framework—which posits ethics in an antithetical relation to 
politics, which conceives of the social world (from concepts and representations to unions and 
political parties) as the generic field of indiscriminate alienation, which privileges the intimate at 
the cost of the universal, which recognizes the neighbour only by ignoring the structural, which 
placates revolutionary impulse by confining ethical action to periods of brief “interruption”—are 
simply too numerous, too essential, and too interconnected to be overcome. Levinas’ 
fetishization of the “inconvertible” trace, as Malabou puts it, makes it impossible to “distinguish 
cosmopolitanism rigorously from hypercapitalism.”55 It would seem that there is as much 
sympathy for Levinas’ critique of “totality” as one would expect for Thatcher’s claim that 
“society does not exist” or Hayek’s critique of central planning (which similarly caution that 
even a modicum of organization leads down the road to totalitarianism, or, “serfdom” to use 
Hayek’s famous phrase).  
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Prolegomena to a Radical Levinasian Politics 
 Are things really so simple? The upcoming chapters will be devoted to reexamining the 
relationship between Levinas, the “other,” and “the third” in order to open up a new path 
between Levinas and Marx, one that speaks as much to their fundamental convergences as their 
differences (which are also important). However, we can note at the outset is that Levinas does 
not plot easily on this traditional philosophical spectrum which places structure, shared horizons 
and forms of collectivity at one end and freedom, autonomy, and rupture at the other. The 
dimension of the intersubjective relation that Levinas is describing is neither expressed in the 
totality of relations that “interpellate” the subject, nor in those moments of rebellion, where the 
subject is able to master its circumstances and break free from its horizon. As a result, Levinas’ 
thought does not easily conform to the frameworks that construe subjectivity as a tension 
between the particular and the universal. This does not of course mean that this traditional 
schema fails to capture important dimensions and tensions of the human experience, it is merely 
insufficient to capture (at least) one specific dimension of experience, one which permeates all of 
Levinas work. 
 As a result, Levinas is easily dismissed, interpreted as a step away from, rather than a 
deepening of, theories of intersubjectivity. Because Levinas does not begin his analysis of the 
inter-human relation from a position oriented within a world already in motion, flooded with 
meaning and with a history, his philosophy is “forced” into a direction—the image of an intimate 
relation between two fully self-consciousness beings not yet sullied by the onslaught of society, 
history and politics—that he is resisting if not outright precluding. As we have seen, if we take 
Heidegger or Lacan to be the primary point of departure, one will understandably oscillate 
between extremes in trying to interpret Levinas, because his theory does not lend itself easily to 
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kinds of questions they are asking. Levinas is not against these philosophies but he sits at 
perpendicular angle, he cuts across their thought, is prior to, above and beyond their insights 
(which is also not so say superior or inferior). So the first thing we must acknowledge is the 
difficulty of certain myopic attempts to apprehend Levinas strictly through Lacan, Heidegger, 
Derrida, or whomever, without paying heed to the inertia of such frameworks, which tend to 
obfuscate more than they illuminate with respect to Levinas. Our first task will thus be to clarify 
Levinas’ description of the “social relation” and how it differs from other accounts of 
(inter)subjectivity. 
 The second pillar is very much related to the first. If we are successful in clarifying the 
meaning of what we have been referring to as the relationship between “the two,” we have an 
opportunity to rethink its relation to “the three” and thereby rethink Levinas’ place within the 
contemporary politico-philosophical constellation. It is rather an uncontroversial fact that 
Levinas is utterly hostile to “differences” articulated in the traditional sense of comparing and 
contrasting. How then do we then go from this hostility towards difference to the (seemingly 
equally uncontroversial) claim that Levinas is the guru for the “cult of social differences”56 who 
remains trapped in a “cycle of understanding”? The Levinasian “other” is not the one whom I 
recognize or is in any way familiar to me. This means, above all, that “responsibility” (a term we 
will further unpack) is not contingent upon the “other” possessing this or that attribute. In many 
ways Levinas’ thought is antithetical to the kinds of difference traditionally articulated within 
philosophy. What is ironically overlooked by Levinas’ many neo-Marxist critics is that Hegel 
and Heidegger are perhaps the greatest philosophers of difference while Levinas is the great 
obliterator of difference. In fact, the difficulty of extracting a politics out of Levinas (who is 
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anything but blameless in this regard) is that he obsesses about the first difference (the relation to 
the other qua other) without any analysis of the second kind of difference (where the other is 
assigned a set of designations through the complex web of socio-historical relations)—beyond 
the fact that the first difference makes the second possible, or, in his terms, it is “evidence which 
makes evidence possible.”57  
 The first task is thus not to think Levinasian difference as if it is already an attempt to 
think difference in the second, more tradition, sense. To do so would be to interpret Levinas as 
offering a theory of the subject that is necessarily hostile to politics, and, accordingly, comprised 
by a constellation of moral platitudes which are theological, austere and hyperbolic. The problem 
thus arises when these two kinds of inquiries into the inter-human relation are collapsed as if 
they are competing answers to the same question. There is, as I hope to demonstrate, an immense 
gap between the Levinasian “other” and the “other” that appears to us refracted through the 
world of “totality” (where the other is situated in a symbolic universe, with a history, and the 
bearer of politics and power). The task is thus not immediately to criticize the Levinasian other 
from the standpoint of “the three” but to think the relation between these overlapping dimensions 
of experience. It is within this distance between the two “others” that we find the most 
interesting political and philosophical questions. In what way can the other be both known and 
unknown? How can the other bear the scars of power, stand under the weight of politics, be 
delivered to me through history, and yet be also remain exterior to all such forces? It is thus 
crucial if we are to rethink the relationship between these two worlds (of which Levinas are 
Marx are important representatives) that we do not traverse the gap separating them too quickly. 
We now have our initial questions to begin our dialogue between Levinas and Marx: On what 
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basis can we justify the priority of the “two” over the “three” and, moreover, what alternative 
consequences can we draw from such a formulation? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Levinas, Politics and the Question of Depth:  
A Response to the “Third Wave” of Scholarship 
 
 In the previous chapter we outlined some of the philosophical and political challenges 
posed by Levinas’ critics in thinking Levinas together with Marx. We concluded with two 
questions to guide our inquiry: how can we understand, and ultimately justify, Levinas’ 
insistence on the priority of a relation to a singular other abstracted from representation, society, 
politics and history (what we called “the problem of the two”), and, if we accept this priority, 
what consequences might this hold for thinking the historical and structural dimensions of 
subjectivity as well as attempts to conceive of new forms of collectivity, solidarity and struggle. 
In this chapter we will begin to answer these questions through a critical investigation of how 
this pursuit has been taken up by others. While the neo-Marxist critics seek to drive a theoretical 
wedge between Levinas and the possibility of a radical politics, there have been an increasing 
number of sympathetic interpreters who have articulated a positive relationship between these 
two seemingly antithetical impulses. In what has, following Atterton,58 been described as a “third 
wave” of Levinas scholarship, thinkers have surpassed the commentary and exposition, 
characteristic of the “first wave,” as well as the “poststructuralism” and “deconstructionism,” 
which defined the “second wave,” in order to explore Levinas’ relevance for explicitly political 
issues including post-colonialism, feminism, ecology, nationalism and economic inequality. 
 While I certainly affirm the impulse to think Levinas along these political lines, the 
present work diverges with many of these important efforts in one significant respect. The very 
way in which these thinkers seek to surpass the political modesty of the previous “waves” of 
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scholarship all too often relies upon the same interpretation of the deworlded other as the one put 
forth by our neo-Marxist critics. According to this re-imagining of Levinas, the task of the 
radical Levinasian is to overcome Levinas’ inherent limitation by replacing, rather than 
expanding, his supposed abstract, hyperbolic, pseudo-phenomenological, notion of the other with 
a less austere and more nuanced and concrete approach. Thus the very feature of Levinas’ 
philosophy which I hope to underscore as the foundation for a radical politics, is once again 
posed as the primary obstacle to be overcome. While such a reorientation may lend Levinas more 
easily to a given political context, I argue that such gains come at a high price. Such an approach 
risks losing the essence and critical import of Levinas’ philosophy and, moreover, tends to 
obscure, rather than solve, our central problem of how to understand the nature of the 
intersubjective relation. In order to provide an alternative path forward for Levinas (and 
ultimately set the stage for our dialogue with Marx and related thinkers) I emphasize the 
centrality of questions of “depth” when it comes to interpreting what Levinas means and what 
consequences might follow.  
 
Universality, Particularity, and the Limitations of Levinas 
 John Drabinski’s Levinas and the Postcolonial: Race, Nation, Other is one of the most 
in-depth and sustained efforts to re-think Levinas’ relationship to radical politics. In the same 
way that Eagleton provided us with a blueprint for our critics, Drabinski’s important work 
outlines the central questions and concerns guiding many of the “third wave” approaches to 
Levinas. Like other radically minded Levinasians (such as Simon Critchley, who laments that, 
despite an “explosion of interest,” the scholarship still does little more than pay “homage”59) 
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Drabinski is deeply dissatisfied with the state of Levinasian scholarship. Though Levinas’ legacy 
has progressed considerably (no longer concerned merely with exposition and exegesis nor 
strictly confined to Derrida’s deconstructive influence) it retains, for Drabinski, too much of a 
“conservative edge.”60 This is in part because of the dogmatic and insular approach taken by 
commentators who “have little interest in reading outside the text’s internal references”61 but is 
also, and more germane for our purposes, symptomatic of a tension present within Levinas’ 
philosophy itself. According to Drabinski there are two opposing impulses directing Levinas’ 
work. On the one hand Levinas’ work “aspires to a certain kind of universality,”62 as it seeks to 
uncover the conditions for ethics as such. As much is evident in Levinas’ indifference to social 
or political particulars, preferring instead to describe the relationship to an other who is 
“uprooted from all roots.”63  
 However, in-spite of this grand theoretical ambition, Levinas’ philosophy is, according to 
Drabinski, thoroughly steeped in the particularity of his own socio-political context. This is 
implicit in Levinas’ fixation on Europe (where he remained largely indifferent to global affairs) 
and is explicit in those rare moments when Levinas actually did find the time to comment on 
matters beyond his own provincial concerns. Levinas’ now infamous statement in an interview 
with Raoul Mortley that “humanity consists of the Bible and the Greeks. All the rest can be 
translated: all the rest – all the exotic – is dance,”64 is indicative, for Drabinski (as it is for 
Critchley65), of Levinas’ overall Eurocentric posture, which, as we shall see, cannot be easily 
isolated from his attitudes on philosophy, politics, and theology. On this matter Drabinski could 
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have also pointed, as Howard Caygill does, to Levinas’ occasional and shocking appeals to “the 
worst kind of universal history” where he, in contemplating Russia’s geopolitical positioning vis 
a vis the “Asiatic world” and “Europe,” states that: “In abandoning the West, does not Russia 
fear to drown itself in an Asiatic civilization which, it too, is likely to carry on existing behind 
the concrete appearance of dialectical resolution?”66 This is followed up by arguably Levinas’ 
most embarrassing and loathsome statement: “The yellow peril! It is not racial, it is spiritual. It 
does not involve inferior values; it involves a radical strangeness, a stranger to the weight of its 
past, from where there does not filter any familiar voice or inflection, a lunar or Martian past.’”67 
Such assertions, Caygill claims (in my opinion accurately) are so disturbing because they posit a 
“European identity that must be protected against a culture that is a stranger to its history” which, 
by any plausible interpretation “consigns a phantasm of Asia to the moon or another planet” and 
in doing so effectively strips “Asians of their humanity.”68 
 Such sentiments are especially troubling for Drabinski because such “xenophobic” and 
“racist” sentiments have inflected much of the Levinasian scholarship. This includes the typical 
apologist positions which simply ignore Levinas’ bigotry and thus fail “to take seriously the idea 
that Levinas might have very deep, well-established grounds for indifference to issues of nation 
and race,” but also the far more troubling attempts by conservatives, like Nemo and Finkelkraut, 
to heighten and extend such Levinasian impulses in mounting a defence of “the West.”69 This 
trend is also apparent in the “revitalization of the religious dimension of Levinas’s thought” 
which Drabinski describes as the “most peculiar and difficult turn in Levinas’s work” as it often 
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reproduces the Levinas’ Eurocentrism, though now in a seemingly more innocuous form as an 
exaltation of monotheism.70  
 This touches on an interesting meta-philosophical problem, one that is certainly not 
unique to Levinas (and here Heidegger, especially with the emergence of the Black Notebooks, 
would be front and centre in this debate): what is the relationship between the “universal 
content” (or, if that term is considered too bombastic, perhaps we can settle for something more 
modest like: “the content which exceeds the bounds of the given context”) of a philosophers 
thought and the various prejudices and limitations which inevitably arise out of the particularity 
of their situation? Put differently, can we interpret the idiosyncrasies of a thinker which we might 
find undesirable, or even despicable, as merely anomalous particularities which can be easily 
attributed to the inevitably flawed and finite human experience, or, conversely, do these missteps 
indicate something more profound, perhaps even comprise the “real” content in-so-far as they 
illuminate the pathological tint of a perspective. For example, one might be tempted (much like 
Marx) to dismiss outright the assumptions of modern bourgeois economists (such as the notion 
that, at base, humans are autonomous rational utility maximizers) because these ahistorical 
“universal” declarations are so steeped in the particularity of their situation that once they have 
been subtracted from these historical prejudices there is little if anything of interest to be 
recovered. The question we must answer is how ingrained are Levinas’ biases (which are 
certainly real and troubling) within his overall philosophy? 
 For his part, Drabinski initially hesitates on this question. Levinas can be understood as 
both “critic and willing cultural operative;” does this mean that he enables, even makes possible, 
the reactionary thought of Nemo and Finkelkraut, or, on the contrary, should we see such 
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applications as “a perversion of Levinasian ideas”?71 Drabinski, here, seems to be attempting to 
navigate a middle ground here between those (like Zizek, Eaglteon and Badiou) who believe that 
any revolutionary potential of Levinas is subverted from the outset, and those who would 
uncritically adopt the Levinas’ philosophical tenants. To this end Drabinski will place less 
emphasis on what we could think of as the “essence” of Levinas (as if it is a neutral or objective 
matter) and instead stress the important role that commentators have in carrying a thinker. While 
this has too often included an embrace of Levinas’ more conservative moments, this need not be 
the case. However, this will take a fundamental rethinking of the ethical relation as it stands. To 
accomplish this task we must “decolonize”72 Levinas’ thought by placing it in dialogue with 
postcolonial thinkers and thereby pushing Levinas “across borders of history, culture and 
experience.”73  
 While I certainly agree with Drabinski that it is more productive to focus our attention on 
how we should carry a thinker over obsessing about what a given philosopher “really” thought, 
at some level such an effort to explore Levinas’ relevance within “politicized space”74 must 
decide on how to what in Levinas should be discarded, preserved or transformed. Thus if we are 
to carry Levinas forward with more explicitly political aims we must present an answer to the 
question of which elements are to be highlighted in service of a political project and which 
elements are to be discarded because they impede such efforts (such as those inextricably bound 
to the prejudices and particularities of his specific context). It is here, where we are forced by the 
exigencies of interpretation to persevere and discard, where the rift begins to emerge between 
many of the critical engagements with Levinas and the one I am attempting to establish. 
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 It is not surprising then that Drabinski will quickly shed his ambivalence and assert that 
there is indeed a deeper connection between Levinas’ eurocentrism and his philosophy than 
many apologists would like to believe. As he states: 
Levinas’s human prejudices are odd and jarring when they appear, not because his work 
sets some sort of standard up to which he fails to live (though that is often the tone of 
polemical critics), but because part of Levinas’s racism or anxiety about national difference 
proceeds from an explicit articulation of the Other’s difference.75 
 
For Drabinski we are not talking about a clear (and embarrassing) violation of ones publicly 
avowed stance (like the evangelical preacher getting caught in a brothel) but a kind of violation 
made possible by and through and Levinas’ philosophical articulation of difference. What is 
especially problematic is that Levinas’ expresses his bigotry in the very language which is 
supposedly inoculated against such attitudes. This is Puzzling for Drabinski: how can Levinas, 
on the one hand, strip the “other” of all social, political and cultural signifiers and, on the other, 
still meet certain “others” with “cultural prejudice and chauvinism.”76   
 In Levinas we are thus dealing with two distinct “others,” the other to whom I’m 
responsible and what Drabinski calls “the other Other,” the one who “appears as radical and 
alien, but does not register as obligating. An Other who is other than the meaning of the Other in 
Levinas’s writings; epistemological distance is opened up, then responsibility fails to arrive on 
the scene.”77 This is, according to Drabinski, above all evidenced in Levinas’ “Zionism,” which 
leaves him “indifferent to the displacement of and violence against Palestinians.”78 The question 
which haunts Drabinski is: how Levinas can decry a responsibility which is utterly 
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indiscriminate only to rebuke such an ethics at the first sign of radical difference in the actually 
existing world?  
 The possibility of a hierarchy between two distinct “others” in Levinas’ is central 
philosophical problematic for Drabinski. While accepting that there is something 
“transformative” in his ethics of obligation, Levinas still “remains tied to a kind of metaphysics, 
and so also a kind of epistemology of alterity, both of which block Levinasian thinking from the 
sorts of geographical wanderings with which it ought to be engaged.”79 According to such a 
formulation there is something inherent in Levinas’ theoretical edifice which actually prohibits 
Levinas from extending the sphere of responsibility beyond a certain bound.  
 Here I would like to briefly pause over the important “ought” in the above claim that 
Levinas is prevented from the “geographical wanderings with which it ought to be engaged.” 
The ambiguous nature of this “ought” is important for our considerations of the relationship 
between politics and ethics in Levinas. Is Drabinski here stating that Levinas sets an imperative 
in motion that he cannot simply live up to because of some analytical/philosophical failing, or, is 
he implying that Levinas cannot possible conceive of a sufficient imperative because his 
epistemology and metaphysics prohibit such a formulation? Such distinctions are vitally 
important as we continue to outline what is purged and what is retained in the attempts to carry 
Levinas forward.  
 In such condemnatory assertions Drabinski is far from alone. On a strikingly similar note, 
Caygill claims that Levinas’ “Zionism” (and overall apathy towards the Palestinian people) does 
not, in fact, obfuscate is notion of difference but, on the contrary, allows us to understand his 
philosophy of responsibility with greater clarity. While Levinas is typically accused of stacking 
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the theoretical deck in a way that precludes political questions, Caygill states that his peculiar 
philosophical choices are actually condition by his political views: 
This introduces the notion of a political choice between others, one framed in terms of 
such others as ‘my’ family and people and those who are the third or the stranger. Such 
an understanding of the other puts into crisis the universal and foundational claims of an 
ethics of alterity, but, as noted in the discussion of Otherwise than Being, it is a 
restriction intrinsic to Levinas’s thought on the relationship between other and third 
rather than a contingent lapse in its application.80  
What Caygill is claiming is that the “political choice” between an in-group and out-group is 
already present in the way Levinas formulates his (supposedly) universal foundation. If these 
oddities in Levinas are not lapses or missteps and there is indeed something inherent to Levinas’ 
thought that makes such a distinction between these two “others” possible, even necessary, then 
what is the precise nature of this connection between (as Drabinski put it) Levinas’ 
“metaphysics,” “epistemology,” and eurocentrism?  
 To answer the question of how “deeply wedded” Levinas’ philosophy is to “the idea of 
Europe”81 we must return to the central question guiding our present inquiry: what we make of 
Levinas’ insistence on, and justification for, the deworlded other? “Does the de-culturized notion 
of the face,” Drabinski astutely asks “posed in a normative register (Levinas famously goes so 
far as to say one ought not notice the color of the Other’s eyes), compromise the radicality of his 
thinking, de-linking the thought of the Other from the cultural, national, racial, and so political 
significations?”82 With this Drabinski re-states the question posed by Levinas’ neo-Marxist 
critics, does Levinas’ radical philosophical move —which eschews all socio-historic context—
require or preclude the project of a radical politics? While I will insist on the former, many of 
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those in the third wave argue that this is the nodal point which must be refashioned if we are to 
open up a possible dialogue with any radical politics.  
 
The Question of “Depth”: Implicit Normativity and Prescriptive Normativity 
 The logic articulated in Drabinski’s thoughtful engagement with Levinas reverberates 
throughout much of the “third wave” literature, all of which is on sure footing once the initial 
theoretical ground is conceded. For this reason, before we analyze the consequences and 
proposed solutions from such a framing of the relationship between Levinas’ philosophical and 
political limitations, I would like to take a closer look at the theoretical underpinnings of such 
interpretations. Here we must begin by analyzing how the relation to the infinite other is 
understood and, more specifically, what philosophical presuppositions are operative in such an 
interpretation.  
 My claim is that every interpretation of Levinas hinges on where one places the line 
between description and prescription in the relation to the other. The question which must be 
addressed (even if only tacitly) is, to what degree is Levinas describing a situation which he 
takes to be constitutive of human subjectivity as such, and, to what degree is he positing an 
“ought,” akin to an ethical imperative or guiding principle. Of course this is not to say that such 
distinctions between description and prescription are obvious. Levinas aside, the vast majority of 
interpretive labour in philosophy (at least the continental tradition) is typically spent on this 
precise issue. Think, for example, of the famous debates around Heidegger’s discussion of “the 
they” and “authenticity” in Being and Time (is he simply describing the dimensions of 
conformity necessary for any and all human expression or is the nature of the inquiry framed in 
such a way so as to implore us to master and ultimately break free from the fetters of tradition) or 
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Marx’s analysis of capitalism (is “exploitation” purely a technical term or is it already indicative 
of his moral commitment to humanism), and what becomes clear is that, even at the best of 
times, there is no easy solution to such queries. Despite the difficulties involved, it is the task of 
every interpretation to wade into these murky waters.  
 It is worth stating at the outset that the point of this exercise (which will emphasize the 
“descriptive” nature of the deworlded other) is not to fetishize the difference between 
“description” and “normative,” where the former is portrayed as pure objectivity and the latter as 
an explicit moral imperative. Our goal is to complicate the relationship between these two 
categories, while not altogether abandoning them. The predominant thread running throughout 
this dissertation is that there is a strong sense of normativity already built into the world. One of 
the fundamental lessons of history is that, while they often appear (or intentional portrayed) as 
inert, given, neutral, or inevitable, the background bureaucracies and institutions, economic 
structures, hierarchies, and symbolic and linguistic relations that mediate social interactions are 
normative in so far as they represent a constellation of congealed power relations (with a history 
of dominance, exclusion, solidarity, competing values, etc.,) which inevitably nudge humans in 
one direction over another. In the same way we can go even further and describe the “natural” 
world in terms of normativity, in the sense that the phenomena of which existence is comprised 
(be it the wind, trees, constellation of stars, or humans) have developed in such a way that certain 
possibilities are opened while others are foreclosed. Even though it would be strange to label 
these developments “good” or “bad” it can be helpful to recognize the push and pull of what 
simply “is.” The fact that, for example, we evolved to have arms and lungs instead of wings and 
gills, or that was it commonly understood as the experience of human consciousness cannot be 
derived in isolation, matters a great deal for how and where humans relate to one another (even if 
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these facts do not themselves contain a narrow prescription of how exactly one ought to act 
towards one another, these broad considerations notwithstanding). 
 This is all the more true of written works. Even if an author seeks to bracket out explicitly 
prescriptive concerns they have already deemed their topic (and not some other) a valuable area 
of study, a decisions no doubt consciously motivated by a given set of concerns, and, perhaps 
more importantly, an interest that is, regardless of the authors intensions, already bound up and 
framed in such and such a way by the discursive flows (taken in the broadest possible sense) of 
their society, which means that they must appeal to certain conventions (even if negatively) if 
their treatise is to be intelligible to their readers. I am thus all too happy to concede that even the 
most descriptively minded work, like, for example, Darwin’s “Origin of the Species,” has an 
implicit normative dimension.  
 However, if we are to properly understand what exactly an author is saying, in this case 
Levinas, I think it is equally important to note the difference between this implicit sense of 
normativity and where thinkers are making overtly prescriptive statements. It would be a 
mistake, for example, to read Heidegger as simply advocating that one should unflinchingly 
conform to, or, alternatively, rebel against, the various customs of the day—even if one could 
legitimately argue that either is the normative thrust motivating his exploration of Dasein. By the 
same token, the line between prescription and description is what makes Darwin’s legacy so 
complicated and controversial. In hindsight it is obvious that his scientific attempt to describe the 
evolutionary origins of humanity is thoroughly contaminated by the particular bias’ of his day 
(racism, sexism, etc.). At the same time, despite these limitations he was able to reveal a fact 
about natural history that was not only true, but one that fundamentally challenged previous 
explanations about who we and how we got here. However, because this insight related to a 
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general theory of what it means to be a human, rather than a prescriptive theory of what being 
human should be, its content is far more ambiguous. On the one hand, Darwin is thought to be 
one in a great line of thinkers (along with Copernicus, Marx, Freud, etc.) who helped relativize 
human existence (or, in philosophical terms “de-throne the subject”) which no longer stood at the 
centre of universe or at the beginning of history. On the other hand, Darwin’s work was also 
taken up by the likes Herbert Spencer, who, with the help of economic theory, appropriated such 
insights in a prescriptive register and created Social Darwinism under the banner “survival of the 
fittest.” A theory of evolution can thus foreclose possibilities, to be sure, but it would seem to be 
rather silent on whether this revelation should make one feel humble or superior.  
 At any rate, if it is important to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive 
normativity for even the most “objectivity” minded thinkers, I would say that it goes double for 
Levinas’ peculiar analysis. The difficulty in raising these questions with Levinas is in many 
respects exponential, as he is attempting to go behind and problematize the possibility of such a 
clear demarcation between description/prescription, a fact evident in aphorisms like “ethics is an 
optics.”83 So in what follows I will try to be clear where I want to draw the line, why this is the 
case, and what is ultimately at stake. 
 How we interpret the precise nature of the intersubjective relation in Levinas has massive 
implications for how we understand his philosophical contribution and, crucial for our purposes, 
how it may relate to political appropriations. Specifically, where we situation the relation to the 
deworlded other with respect to consciousness and the totality of relations of which it is 
comprised, will have a dramatic impact on what political options are available to us. This 
relationship is especially difficult and confusing because Levinas is describing a relation that is 
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prior to and beyond the possibility of prescription, consciousness and agency. However, to 
articulate this relation he must utilize the very themes and language which he is intending to get 
behind. It is thus far from obvious when Levinas is using terms (which are thoroughly steeped in 
prescriptive normativity) prescriptively and when he is using them descriptively. This not only 
makes the division between prescription and description more confusing but it also makes it 
more theoretically important because prescription itself presupposes the very faculties 
(consciousness, agency, deliberation, reason, etc.) which Levinas is attempting to preclude at this 
fundamental level of the analysis. As a result, any residue of prescription or agency will 
obfuscate the very thing he wants to explain.  
 This is exemplified in the way Levinas defines “ethics.” Traditionally “ethics” is all about 
prescription, that is, explicitly constructing a theory of rules and norms which we believe 
individuals or groups should use to govern their behaviour. But this not what Levinas means 
when he says “ethics.” Instead Levinas uses “ethics” to exclusively refer to an intersubjective 
relationship that is irrespective of context and prior to consciousness. Thus “ethics,” defined this 
way, not only precludes our capacity to reason and deliberate about how others should be treated 
but further brackets out how others become registered within consciousness. For this reason, if 
we are to better appreciate the “depth” of the ethical relation, I think it is helpful to make a sharp 
distinction between the precise inter-subjective phenomena he is attempting to describe (the “X”) 
and what Levinas believes the normative implications of this description (why “X” is important, 
or what we should do in light of “X”). Such a distinction can help us locate the various levels of 
abstraction with which Levinas is using and, as a result, better situate the “ethical relation” with 
respect to the other important aspects of (inter)subjectivity. While the line of demarcation 
between description (X) and prescription (why X is important) is often less than obvious in the 
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continental tradition (just as we noted for the likes of Heidegger and Marx), what is unique about 
Levinas is that it is especially tempting to mistake the prescription (why X is important) for the 
description (X) itself, which, in turn, completely inverts Levinas’ intended insight (thus we risk 
losing the X itself).  
 We are dealing with several levels of normativity operating at the same time so I want to 
absolutely clear about what I am proposing. One of the tenants of Levinas’ philosophy is that the 
other-as-such contains a normativity that cuts across historical, social, political context. Although 
related, this is sense of implicit normativity is altogether different from the implicit normative 
aspirations which inspire inevitably frame Levinas’ decision to undertake such theoretical 
endeavour (most obviously the events of the Shoah) and the kind of prescriptive forms of 
normativity, which appear in those moments where Levinas explicitly points to what he believes 
to be the ethical and political upshot of his analysis. My claim is not that these moments can 
easily be separated (as I will later address, Levinas has a hard time getting out of his own way in 
this respect) or that some are less or more important (one can no doubt find value at all of these 
levels). Rather, my argument is that if one makes no attempt to distinguish between the various 
levels of analysis, it will not only lead to confusion but can risk losing the subversive kernel of 
Levinas’ philosophy and misconstruing the theoretical relationship between ethics and politics.  
 This is why questions of “depth” are absolutely central in Levinas. The ethical relation is 
“always already,” “prior,” “before,” and “beneath,” concepts like agency, hermeneutics, 
semiotics, reason, intentionality, freedom, performativity, and interpellation because these 
categories—which he places under the umbrella concept “ontology”—either presuppose a sense 
of subjective momentum which could grasp, desire, will, intend, comprehend or negate the other, 
or, they assume a category of generic intersubjecitivty (like culture, language, reason etc.) which 
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would similarly intercede by positing a third term which would mediate the normative impact of 
the other. Thus Levinas’ first and most foundational claim is not the prescriptive declaration that 
it is morally wrong to mediate, reduce or annul the relationship to the “other.” Rather, the fact 
that we, in this very precise sense, cannot mediate, reduce or annul the relationship to the other is 
what defines our experience of subjectivity; this passivity is what makes the subject and “I.” This 
is why Levinas seeks to bracket out history, perception, reason, freedom, intelligibility—not 
because they are “bad” but because they, in a descriptive sense, obscure, or at least fail to 
illuminate, the nature of the very dimension of experience he is attempting to expose. In the same 
way, Levinas is not claiming that we should deworld the other for the sake of our moral duty 
(where, presumably, we mentally abstract the other from all context). Rather, he is claiming that 
the other first comes to us in a dimension of (pre)experience which is (again, in this precise 
sense) indifferent to consciousness and context.  
 For this reason, I believe it is important to “delay,” so to speak, the prescriptive 
dimensions of interpretation, not because I think they are unimportant, naive or unattainable but 
because if we put prescription too early in the analysis it completely changes the X that Levinas 
believes to have critical import. Simply put, if we take Levinas as giving us an ethics in the 
traditional sense of imperatives and platitudes it undoes his sole ambitions to get behind, beyond 
and beneath ontology. In this sense I agree with Derrida, when he states that Levinas should be 
thought of as a meta-ethics (an “Ethics of Ethics”)84 and Critchley, when he claims that Levinas 
need not have used predicates like “goodness,” though I would add that their own orientations 
(Heideggerian, Lacanian or otherwise) often reinsert the priority of ontology and thus similarly 
comprise Levinas’ potential.  
                                                 
84 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics” in Writing and Difference (London: Rutledge Classics, 2001), p. 
138. 
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  In this attempt to distinguish between the elements of Levinas’ philosophy we inevitable 
run into what he has referred to as the “methodological problem.”85 The possibility of using non-
ontological language which would still be intelligible is not an option available to Levinas, and, 
for this reason, he is “forced” to use language which presupposes an already active subject in 
relation to a predicate. This task is made all the more difficult because of Levinas’ penchant for 
using terms borrowed from religious and moral lexicons to describe the passivity of the subject, 
such as “hospitality” “religion” “hospitality” “ethics” “election” “responsibility,” “shame,” 
“unworthiness,” “goodness,” “being-for-the-other,” “teaching,” “infinity,” “non-allergenic” and 
“apology.” While these terms are effective in illuminating the asymmetrical structure of 
intersubjectivity they have so much prescriptive momentum it is difficult to strip these terms of 
the meaning they carry on this side of ontology. Given my concerns relating to depth, I prefer the 
“darker” metaphors like “hostage” and “host” invoked in Otherwise than Being. While many 
have stressed a crucial difference in the understanding of subjectivity between Totality and 
Infinity and Otherwise than Being I am less convinced. In attempting to describe the relationship 
on the hither side of ontology there is no semantic difference between “hospitality” and 
“hostage” because the faculties needed to establish such a difference are barred from the outset. 
The other enters before there is an “I” who can welcome or refuse their presence. This is why I 
think “hostage” is a more effective metaphor because it is less tempting to misread it as a 
prescriptive category (to my knowledge no one has yet used Levinas to advocate the taking of 
hostages), and thus highlights the implicit pre-ontological (as Levinas puts it) normative 
dimensions which I take to be essential.  
                                                 
85 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1981), p. 7. 
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 Of course none of this is to deny the explicitly prescriptive dimensions of Levinas’ 
philosophy. Levinas believes that the asymmetrical structure of intersubjectivity has massive 
implications for how we should live our lives and how we ought to structure our society.  
This will be further unpacked in the coming chapters but what I would like to highlight here is 
that how we understand Levinas will have equally important consequences for what we take 
these ethical and political implications to be or what Levinasian impulses we choose to mute or 
highlight. Such demarcations will, as we shall momentarily see, have dramatic impact on how 
understand subjectivity and what kind of political solutions are available to the questions posed 
by Levinas. 
 
Third Wave Appropriations 
 Many of the “third wave” arguments have been crafted as a response to the insufficiency 
of previous attempts to think through the ethical and political implications of Levinas. We have 
already noted Drabinski’s objection to conservative applications of Levinas, but this new wave 
of scholarship is also indicative of a shift away from other “liberal” and “postmodern” 
interpretations. As noted the radical bifurcation between the pre-subjective, anti-historical, and 
trans-political world of “infinity” and that of “totality” leaves Levinas open to radical ambiguity. 
While right-Levinasians feel politically content, comforted in their knowledge of the ethical 
foundations of their society, liberal and post-structuralist interpretations have equally shied away 
from radical politics, even if for dramatically different reasons. The Manichean distinction 
between totality and infinity can also lead to a kind of political skepticism which is characteristic 
of many liberal and post-structuralist approaches (a sentiment which, as we saw, is readily 
pounced upon by our neo-Marxist critics). Here the relationship between “totality” and “infinity” 
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is read as a paradox, where any and every ontological congealment - be it a symbol, word, army 
or institution - was conceived equally as a betrayal of the ethical. For many liberal minded 
interpreters Levinas’ description of the other as a “singularity” non-reducible to history, politics 
and any collective banner, resonates in perfect harmony with the philosophical notes played by 
the likes of Mill and Locke. While the theoretical underpinnings are, in many ways, at odds with 
post-structuralist positions, such interpretations of Levinas have emphasized the same problems 
inherent in collectivities and radical politics. The liberal state then is left to itself in order to 
begin the undertaking of ethics at the level of the face-to-face. 
 For some post-structuralists this emphasis was heightened in the wake of prominent 
thinkers like Derrida and Foucault who sought to foster a ruthlessly self-critical spirit. The latter, 
especially, was, equally suspicious of “global” projects of emancipation as he was of the 
oppressive regimes represented in the status quo. Such a suspicion was thought to be justified 
because, in Foucault’s estimation, the previous and impetuous attempts to “escape from the 
system of contemporary reality” have, like a repressed memory, only led to “the return of the 
most dangerous traditions.”86 In this vein Levinas was seen as a source of major inspiration for 
deconstructive projects focused on the pathology inherent in politics and other less obvious 
forms of discursive practices. Levinas gave many a valuable resource with which to eschew the 
realm of politics proper in favour of immediate, local, contingent, “non-totalizing” and often 
highly idiosyncratic revolts.  
 While the vast majority of “third wave” thinkers are deeply influenced by thinkers like 
Derrida and Foucault they seek to push Levinas beyond interpretations which shy away from 
historical and structural analysis or preclude new forms of collective struggle. While I share a 
                                                 
86 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment” in The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 46. 
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deep affinity with this general ambition, the course I will chart takes a much different route. 
Similar to the neo-Marxist critics, our radical interpreters similarly believe Levinas’ anti-
historical and apolitical point of origin make him especially susceptible to ills of excessive 
individualism, moralism, idealism, Eurocentrism, and religiosity. These cluster of critiques are 
all related, I claim, to the question of “depth” raised above.  
 This is most in the overt “liberal” interpretations of Levinas. For example, C. Fred Alford 
favourite analogy for extrapolating the ethical relation is that of a person sitting alone in their 
apartment who becomes startled when somebody rings the doorbell.87 In this scenario the person 
is interrupted, even slightly annoyed with the disturbance, but soon has a pleasant interaction and 
realizes that their (literal) neighbour has opened up a new world to them. Although Alford 
occasionally notes the pre-subjective “depth” of the ethical relation, as this illustration suggests 
he repeatedly blurs the line of demarcation set up by Levinas. The narrative attributed to Levinas 
by Alford, which is representative of the vast majority of interpretations on Levinas, is that the 
autonomous sovereign individual is an undeniable ontological fact. We must, therefore, also 
recognize that with such freedom comes a range of pathological elements which seek to reduce 
difference to the same (which is akin to a “selfish” desire). Thus, from the perspective of 
morality, we should make room for altruism, hospitality and difference to counter balance our 
tendency towards sovereignty; a point which illustrates well the fact that the individualistic 
reading and the moralistic reading are two sides of the same interpretative coin. Read this way, 
Levinas is stating that we can, in the realm of consciousness, have a face to face encounter which 
is not necessarily mediated by history, politics and all the rest. Once this fantasy of pure ethical 
encounter in concrete experience is accepted it requires little effort to bracket out political 
                                                 
87 C. Fred Alford, “Levinas and Political Theory,” in Political Theory 32:2 (April, 2004), p. 150. 
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questions (which involve collectivities) from ethical ones (which involve individuals). Out of the 
necessity of this formulation Levinas is somewhere between apolitical and anti-political, and a 
moralizing idealist in either case. Thus it should come as no surprise that Alford concludes that, 
while Levinas’ emphasis on responsibility over freedom makes him a strange kind of liberal, he 
would indeed “leave the institutions of liberal individualism much as they are, so that everything 
else might change.”88 This is why political questions hinge on the question of “depth.” If, rather 
than understanding the ethical relation as a dimension of experience, we take the subject proper 
in all her capacities for reason, perception and reflection—to be the same “subject” who 
encounters the other, then Levinas offers little more than empty ethical platitudes which not only 
ignore but disbar the historical-politico context from consideration. 
 While the “third wave” is, in part, motivated by the inadequacy of such readings, the way 
they seek to transcend such limitations re-affirms rather than problematizing the tenuous 
theoretical basis on which the liberal readings proceed. Though less obvious than Alford’s 
apartment analogy, we can perceive a similar dynamic in the virtually ubiquitous sentiment that 
Levinas’ ethical relation is “hyperbolic” and “excessive.” This common objection relies on a 
specific interpretation which views the relation to a deworlded other as indicating some kind of 
utopian moral fantasy, exposing either Levinas’ naivety or willful ignorance. Similar to 
Riceour’s objection noted in the previous chapter, Drabinski casts doubt that “such a detour from 
being and worldliness is possible,”89 before affirming Derrida’s stance that:  
Ontology cannot be simply swept away by the hyperbolic rhetoric of height and 
separation. Language cannot be critiqued by a few evocative words about excessive 
expression alone. Rather, being and language haunt Levinas’s every attempt to think 
difference without identity, alterity without sameness, and so singularity without 
comparison.90 
                                                 
88 Ibid., p. 168. 
89 Drabinski, Levinas, p.40. 
90 Ibid. 
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What is repeatedly put into question by such assertions is the philosophical credibility of 
Levinas’ account of experience, as if the purity of his moral ambition impairs his 
phenomenological judgement. Critchley, whose sympathies also lie with Derrida in this respect, 
consistently derides Levinas on similar grounds stating that: “What Levinas says is hyperbole. 
Furthermore, it’s a hyperbole that feeds an excessive masochism.” 91 Despite the fact that 
Critchley is otherwise aware that “ethics is always already political…a relation to humanity as a 
whole,”92 masochism, is a common theme in Critchley’s interpretation of Levinas, which he 
finds needlessly imprudent because Levinas provides no possibility of relief or avenue for 
sublimation.93 If Levinas is going to be mobilized to concrete ends, what is needed, according to 
such thinkers, is that we temper Levinas’ extreme tendencies.  
 The obvious problem with such interpretations is that they burry the very question that I 
wish to bring to the surface. While all of these theorists repeatedly acknowledge Levinas’ 
ambition of getting beneath totality they, like the previously noted neo-Marxist critics, tend to 
oscillate back and forth between worlds without much awareness or explanation. Trauma, to use 
Critchley’s example, may be a useful metaphor, but only insofar as we remove it from a sense of 
pain or “masochism,” which implies that something is being done to an already someone. 
Similarly, hyperbole already implies that we are operating at the level of conscious deliberation, 
where Levinas is giving us a framework of moral judgement. One does not, for example, 
consider the sun on a cloudless day, or the bluster of a hurricane, “hyperbolic” because this 
would presume agency, intention and deliberation. While humans, unlike the sun and the wind, 
have agency and intellectual powers, such faculties are not the basis for the relation that Levinas’ 
                                                 
91 Simon Critchley, The Problem with Levinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 88. 
92 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 226. 
93 See also Simon Critchley, “‘Das Ding’: Lacan and Levinas,” in Research in Phenomenology 28 (1998), pp. 72-90. 
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intends to describe. It is in fact possible that, on this question of passivity, Levinas might be 
wrong, however, the critique of hyperbole still misses the mark because it skirts the very issue by 
presuming that Levinas’ claim relates to the world of from conscious deliberation. A clear 
example of this is found in Mari Ruti’s dialogue between Levinas and Lacan, where she chastises 
(again, much like Eagleton) Levinas for failing to distinguish between the guilt of the offenders 
and the victims:  
As a consequence, if the Ku Klux Klan burns a cross on my yard, a multinational 
corporation poisons my water supply, or a gay-hating gang assaults me in a dark alley, 
my stance of unconditional generosity toward my persecutor would only feed power 
structures that have historically made some lives unbearable while simultaneously 
justifying various social atrocities.94 
 
What is apparent in such a complaint is that, for Ruti, Levinas is positing (like Kant or Rawls) a 
context-neutral ethical imperative (which would turn out to be excessive to the point of absurdity 
and meaninglessness) rather than pointing to the passivity (a “passivity more passive than all 
passivity”95) at the heart of the human condition. This is not to say that Levinas does not make 
prescriptive claims. There are many instances where Levinas (especially in interviews and his 
religious writings) will directly deliver concrete ethical statements, but even then—and this point 
is absolutely crucial—these follow from his theory of intersubjectivity and not the other way 
around. The value of Levinas is not primarily found in the solutions he poses for how one should 
act but in the understanding he fosters of the conditions under which we must make such 
decisions. 
 Another variant of this strain of interpretation is that Levinas’ “hyperbolic” language is 
not just indicative of his overindulgent moral sensibility but evidence of the theological biases of 
his philosophy. Tom Sparrow, for example, claims that, in order to think Levinas in concrete 
                                                 
94 Mari Ruti, Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics. (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), p.30. 
95 Levinas, Otherwise, p. 146. 
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ethical and political terms, we need to undo such exaggeration which, for him, consist of the 
dispensable dregs left over from his theological influence: 
The notion that “the face of the Other” gains its ultimate significance by revealing the 
presence of divinity is seen as needless hyperbole. I think Levinas need not be so radical 
in his account of the face, that his ethics could retain its force even if it abandoned its 
theological foundation for a secular one.96 
The sentiment already present in Drabinski is made explicit in Sparrows critique. Levinas is 
moving in the wrong theoretical direction: instead of going into concrete experience he is taking 
us out of the world. Not unlike the religions that Marx was so critical of, Levinas wants to lift 
our gaze to the heavens instead of directing it down towards the earth.  
 This dichotomy set up between abstract and concrete is crucial. A central passage utilized 
in Drabinski’s critique (already witnessed above) is Levinas’ statement from an interview where 
he remarked: 
The best way (meilleure manière) to encounter the Other is to not even take notice of 
the color of his eyes. When one observes the color of the eyes, one is not in the social 
relation with the Other. The relation with the face can certainly be dominated by 
perception, but what is meant specifically by the face cannot be reduced to the 
perceptual.97 
 
For Drabinski such a claim is emblematic of Levinas’ “excessive” and “austere” tendencies of 
Levinas’ philosophy which “always leaves the world.”98 While Levinas is not innocent in this 
respect (as we will discuss later) what is key is that Drabinski takes this as evidence that 
Levinas’ fundamental orientation leads us away from concrete existence rather than penetrating 
its veneer. To illustrate the point that Levinas is, first and foremost, prescribing a way of thinking 
about the other, Drabinski states that: “Levinas’s proclamation regarding the color of eyes is, 
after all, in the normative register. This is the best way, the way one should encounter the Other.” 
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97 As quoted by Drabinski, Levinas, p. 39. 
98 Ibid. 
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While it is, in a sense, true that Levinas is speaking about a prescriptive ways of thinking about 
and perceiving the other, this does not mean that this is an accurate summation of his 
philosophical edifice. While I believe this to be theoretically misleading, even if we stick to the 
level of prescription, it is far from clear what Levinas means by such a statement. Is Levinas, for 
example, positing a regulatory ideal that we should transform the material conditions of society 
to such a degree that the color of one’s eyes (or skin) are more or less irrelevant? Or, conversely, 
is Levinas really suggesting that, in our present conjuncture, we should ignore structure and 
systemic oppression in our intellectual and moral pursuits? While we cannot address these 
important questions till we have inspected their philosophical foundations, at this point I merely I 
merely wish to highlight that such nuances matter a great deal when we get to the realm of 
prescription and politics.  
 While Drabisnki will readily acknowledge the profound depths intersubjectivity,99 the 
thrust of his general argument is clear: for all its anti-intellectualism and anti-rationalism, 
Levinas’ critique of being and ontology, takes Levinas further away from a “sufficiently 
material” sense of embodiment, where the other’s actual existing differences are taken into 
account.100 Thus the radical alterity of the subject which presupposes the equally radical 
passivity of the subject is not taken as a description of a deeper pre-conscious level of 
embodiment (where sensation is not yet information) but something more abstract, ideal, 
normative which can only be accomplished by the will of the intellect and the strength of 
morality. Not only does this reinstate a third term that mediates, from the start, the terms of the 
relation but it opens up Levinas to the obvious philosophical and phenomenological critique 
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Drabinski oscillates between the other that appears in perception and the other that makes perception possible.  
100 Drabinski, Levinas, p. 40. 
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outlined in the previous chapter: by precluding the social, historical and political topography on 
which we actually encounter concrete human beings, Levinas offers us nothing more than a 
difference-blind ethics which are at best represent one of the worst forms of naive liberalism and 
at worst provide the ethical facade of colonialism.  
 
Familiarity, Heidegger and the other-as-neighbour 
 We can now return to the tension between Levinas’ universalizing ambitions and his 
particular prejudices. Once the groundwork for this overall interpretation is established by such 
critics, they can look back at Levinas’ individual prejudices they no longer stick out as 
aberrations. To recall, Drabinski and Caygill claimed that Levinas’ philosophy can be seen more 
clearly when refracted through the prism of his Eurocentric and Zionist prejudices. This was 
because Levinas’ epistemology and phenomenology, rather than universalizing the other, creates 
a gap between the familiar other and the strange other; a distance too vast for responsibility to 
bridge. Having analyzed the importance of depth we can now better understand how Levinas’ 
sense of radical alterity allegedly transforms into familiarity, over the more expected or intended 
result of universality (that is, a responsibility indifferent to difference). 
 There is a decidedly Heideggerian logic in how Drabinski and Caygill establish a 
relationship between radical difference and familiarity. For Heidegger, the richness, context and 
innumerable specificities and differences of our experience occurs in the background, not really 
invisible but not really noticed either. This is because, in our everyday existence, we tend to 
occupy a mode of existence characterized by its “familiarity.” No matter how intentional or 
idiosyncratic one’s actions are, the majority of our experience is withdrawn into the background 
horizon. We open the door, catch the subway, use an idiom, give a hug, sleep in on weekends, 
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say a prayer, use a toilet, get married all without reflecting intensely on the material and 
symbolic context which preexists our individual use of it and on which these actions rely. We 
can only swim, so to speak, because the world is already flooded with meaning. Thus, for 
Heidegger, the ignorance with respect to the particular features of the other is not indicative of 
transcendence and alterity but, on the contrary, a situation where such differences are so 
superfluous and taken for granted that they no longer signify something striking, new, or at odds 
with our expected perception of the world. We ignore the color of one’s eyes for the same reason 
we typically fail to remember the color of shirt worn by a bank teller or the pattern of a bus seat 
we use everyday: such features fail to carry any significance or meaning which is pertinent to the 
exigencies of a given task or project. That such features are so easily bracketed out is thus 
evidence that we are immersed within our life-world to such a degree that certain differences can 
be forgotten or relegated to the background. The colour of somebody’s eyes or skin can thus go 
unnoticed in the same way we can take the door handle, the reliability of the elevator, the 
appropriate amount of personal space, for granted as we move about our day. Such particulars 
only become noticed or relevant when something goes wrong, when there is what Hediegger 
calls a “breakdown” (the door doesn’t open, the elevator doesn’t work, somebody violates our 
tacitly assumed personal space, etc.). This is politically relevant because the ability to occupy a 
decontextualized body is not a luxury shared by those whose eyes, skin, hair, might stand out 
apart from expectation. For some, the colour of their skin, hair or eyes might be the first thing 
noticed because their bodies are subject to a set of discursive power relations which render 
certain features germane which, in others, go otherwise unnoticed. There is an odd dialectic at 
play in such interpretations which invert Levinas’ stated goals: the other subtracted from context 
is symptomatic of familiarity, entrenchment and finitude and not radical alterity, uprootedness 
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and infinity. The deworlded other presupposes a fictive homogeneity and is therefore evidence of 
yet another false universal claim—perhaps akin to calling a pink crayon “skin colour” or using 
the term “all men” because it is tacitly understood that to specify “white” “property owning” 
“protestant” and “male” would be redundant.  
 Along these lines Bernasconi questions whether the “abstractness of the face” does not 
“mark a certain continuity with abstract humanism and its complicity with homogenization.”101 
Drabinski, highlighting the underbelly of homogenization, writes: 
This Western-ness is perhaps the most important enigma here, an operative concept 
whose near-invisibility helps make sense of Levinas’s normative claims about a proper 
encounter with the Other. The familiar stranger is the stranger in the singular. That 
familiarity conceals the historical weight of the encounter.102 
 
Here the “stranger in the singular” indicates the disavowal of real substantive difference rather 
than the unconditional acceptance of radical difference. Levinas’ universalizing aspirations are 
thus putatively self-defeating, the more he attempts to think the other abstracted from 
particularity the further he becomes trapped within the insular bounds of his community. 
Drabinski expresses the same conclusion of the neo-Marxist critics but in even more damning 
terms: Levinas’ can only profess this kind of ethics by repressing the political history of the 
marginalized. Thus “the context-neutral life of the face-to-face” is symptomatic of “a certain 
privilege of thinking in the European context alone.”103 This is why Drabinski believes that the 
colonial legacy continues to “haunt” Levinas like a repressed memory because one cannot speak 
about Europe, the familiar, the homogenous without speaking of the violent foundation upon 
which it rests.  
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 61 
 These are difficult issues to disentangle to be sure. If Levinas offers little more than a 
difference-blind ethics, then the full force of these critiques are welcome and justified. However, 
my wager is, not only that this is not an accurate depiction of Levinas, but that Levinas has much 
critical insight to offer our present socio-political conjuncture. The cluster of concepts used to 
describe Levinas which we have outlined above—hyperbolic, excessive, abstract, immaterial, 
theological, moralistic, masochistic, individualistic, familiarity, Eurocentric—not only fail to 
capture, but cannot be reconciled with what I take to be essential in Levinas. This is why I am so 
anxious to point out the important ramifications that follow from issues of depth. To conclude 
this section, we will briefly outline the answers provided to the ill-posed questions before 
considering how a different reading of Levinas might pose alternative questions, which will, in 
turn, provoke a different set of answers.  
 
Recontextualizing the other: third wave solutions 
 We now have a better understanding of how, exactly, the challenge of Levinas and 
radical politics has been framed and, specifically, Drabinski’s claim about the inherent 
connection between Levinas’ metaphysics and epistemology and his eurocentrism. What is then 
required to “decolonize” Levinas, is to replace his abstract, idealistic, verging-on-religious, 
philosophical foundation with a more “material” account of embodiment. “The Other,” in 
Drabinski’s terms, “needs to be re-situated in a wider political context. After all, are we not 
addressed by the Other in our own, and so the Other’s, skin? Does that skin not carry with it 
wide and deep political significations?”104 This philosophical re-orientation towards a concrete 
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phenomenological approach has crucial implications for responsibility and for ethics, as 
Drabinski further states: 
The problem of the body, as we shall see, exposes Levinas’s work – and so any future 
Levinasian thinking – to the sense in which the body carries memory and history into 
the encounter. If the body carries memory and history into the encounter, then the 
ethical cannot be described, as Levinas describes it, as entirely outside being. In this 
register, being intensifies and widens responsibility, rather than, as Levinas would have 
it, neutralizing the for-the-Other of subjectivity. The task of methodology lies in 
demonstrating the concreteness of this claim so that being is no longer understood as a 
construction and invasive, neutered force.105 
 
To use the terms “neutralizing” and “neutered” to describe Levinas’ philosophy is evidence of 
just how radical Drabinski intends his critique to be. “Neutralize” and “neuter” are perhaps the 
two most common term Levinas uses in Totality and Infinity to illustrate the various ways 
philosophy - regardless of its specific orientation, be it freedom, autonomy, biology, being-in-
the-world, materialism or another variant of intersubjectivity - has sought to anticipate, and 
thereby cushion, the impact of the other. The stark difference between these philosophical claims 
cannot be overstated: for Levinas it is cognition and the referential totality upon which it relies 
that obfuscates the normative relation to the other (which cuts across all differences and every 
horizon) while for Drabinaski it is this abstract procedure which, by neutralizing every particular, 
deprives the other of a world, which, in turn, strips responsibility of any particular meaning or 
duty. Of course it behooves me to mention what is hopefully becoming increasingly obvious, that 
what we are dealing with are two different understandings of “abstraction” or “context.” The first 
is (at least according to my interpretation) meant to awaken our understanding of the ethical 
relation by going back beyond the “natural attitude,” or hermeneutical facade that accompanies 
our experience of others in perception, while the second understands Levinas as engaging in a 
mental exercise, where, for the sake of moral duty, he implores us to erase every attribute of the 
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other until nothing remains but an abstract form - much like the chalk outline of a dead body. 
This is all too apparent in Drabinski’s statement that “when we notice the color of the Other, so 
to speak, our responsibility takes on particular, specific characteristics that, without that 
worldliness, might have remained simply empty – even if profound – senses of ethical 
obligation.”106 While we may agree with the first part of this claim (that, for the sake of ethics 
proper and politics eye color etc. is important) the assertion that responsibility (traditionally 
understood) might have otherwise “remained empty” is problematic insofar as it assumes that the 
condition of “worldlessness” on the plane of totality (consciousness, perception, history, etc.) is a 
possibility for Levinas. The deworlded space that Levinas invokes is not, and cannot be (for all 
the reasons mentioned earlier), an actual socio-political space somehow mysteriously sheltered 
from the world. Given Drabinski’s assumption that this empty space is what Levinas is actually 
advocating, his alternative—and not supplementary—phenomenology is politically relevant 
because it can actually incorporate actual concrete difference, which opens a theoretical door for 
through which we can begin to consider a deeper analysis of signification, language, politics, 
history, namely everything Levinas brackets out.  
 Drabinski is far from alone in such an ambition. Enrique Dussel similarly views Levinas’ 
“neutralizing” phenomenological account of the deworlded other as the main obstacle to be 
utilized for radical ends. Note the similarity of Dussel’s critique and re-appropriation of Levinas 
to Drabinski’s appeal for a phenomenology grounded in the politics of oppression: 
The face of the other, primarily as poor and oppressed, reveals a people before it reveals 
an individual person. The brown face of the Latin American mestizo wrinkled with the 
furrows of centuries of work, the ebony face of the African slave, the olive face of the 
Hindu, the yellow face of the Chinese coolie is the irruption of the history of a people 
before it is the biography of Tupac Amaru, Lumumba, Nehru, and Mao Tse-tung. To 
describe the experience of proximity as individual experience, or the metaphysical 
experience of face-to-face as lived experience be- tween two persons, is simply to forget 
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that personal mystery is always risked in the exteriority of the popular history of a 
people. The individualization of this collective personal experience is a European 
deformation derived from the bourgeois revolution. Each face, unique, inscrutable 
mystery of decisions not yet made, is the face of a sex, a generation, a social class, a 
nation, a cultural group, a historical epoch. 107 
and again: 
The other person—metaphysical alterity, exteriority on the anthropological level—is 
primarily social and historico-popular. This is why the faces that are taken care of with 
beauty aids and rejuvenated by face-lifts and cosmetics of the oligarchies, aristocracies, 
and bourgeoisies—be they of the center or of the periphery—are faces that, like 
mummies, want to escape the contingencies of time. The eternalization of the present, in 
terror of the future, is the obsession of every dominating group. On the contrary, the 
withered face of the Bedouin of the desert, the fur- rowed and darkened skin of the 
peasant, the poisoned lungs of the miner whose face never sees the sun—these 
‘apparently’ ugly faces, almost horrible for the system, are the primary, the future, the 
popular beauty.108 
Once again the question of Levinas’ political apathy is not phrased as a political question (that 
his political analysis fails to account for X issue) but rather as a philosophical one. This 
sentiment is also echoed by Bernasconi who asks if “Levinas’s account of the encounter 
with the Other as stranger sufficiently nuanced as to be able to welcome the Other in his or her 
ethnic identity beyond the prejudices that divide ethnic groups?”109 It is crucial to note that this 
disagreement is not about the specifics of class, patriarchy, colonialism, etc. but whether we have 
the necessary approach or framework to even incorporate such analysis. As Drabinski explicitly 
states (much like Zizek in the previous chapter), his “appeal here is not ideological, but simply 
phenomenological.”110 In tow with our neo-Marxist critics both Drabinski and Dussel depict 
Levinas as playing out some liberal philosophical fantasy which denies the way in which the 
singularity of the other is always refracted through the prism of “third”; that Levinas cannot 
possibly comprehend the mediating symbolic dimension which is, in turn, forged through various 
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politico-historical processes. The face bears signification, to be sure, but, for these critics, it only 
can signify singularity after or through the intersecting fields of colonialism, racism, class 
relations, internalized patriarchal notions of beauty, etc.  
 The requisite reorientation to a more concrete philosophical perspective is, for obvious 
reasons, political relevant for these interpreters of Levinas. For Drabinski such a shift in 
perspective has the potential to push Levinas beyond his insular Eurocentrism and reverse the 
relationship between the “familiar others” and the “unanticipated Others.”111 If we replace 
Levinas’ “colonial fantasy about the identity of Europe”112 a conception of “identity-as-
entanglement” we can better understand the way “Europe” is not conceivable without reference 
to its violent past.113 Taking such history into account allows us to come to the radical conclusion 
that, contra Levinas, Europe is not only “capable of responding to the Other” but rather that “one 
is a responsible being because one is European, made of the Bible and the Greeks.”114 Rather 
than be deterred by borders of Europe, responsibility would now be necessitated by them. If 
“Europe” presupposes colonization, hierarchy, exclusion, marginalization and subjugation then 
responsibility means responsibility to the one “separated from me, outside the community” or it 
means nothing at all. As Drabinski continues: “Outside the community becomes not just an 
occasion of, but something close to a sufficient condition for, the ethical.”115 While Levinas, in 
Drabinski’s estimation, makes such a formulation possible when it “comes to the role of 
Judaism” he—for the theoretical reasons mentioned earlier—cannot otherwise conceive of such 
a potentially subversive political stance.116  
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 In such a formulation the passage from the “familiar other” to the “alien other” is 
precisely the opposite route taken by Levinas. Taking, as a corrective, the likes of Derrida, 
Meleau-Ponty, Spivak, Glissant, Bhaba, and Fanon, Drabinski sets out on a project to overcome 
Levinas’ problem of familiarity by thinking re-establishing a notion of alterity predicated on 
difference. One can only reach, for these theorists, the radically “alien” other, by taking stock of 
difference, rather than by a process of empty posturing which claims to conceive of pure 
difference as such, indifferent to all particulars. These objections, raised in the previous chapter 
by Derrida and Ricouer, now become highly politicized: because all identities rely on an always 
prior differentiation between self and other, we cannot speak about responsibility to an other 
“outside of the community” without understanding the historical and political processes which 
mutually constitute identifies of colonizer and colonized. 
 As a result all of Levinas’ related problems—hyperbole, individualism, masochism, 
insularity, provincial chauvinism and seeming ignorance of structure and history—can be 
overcome if we retain the thrust of his moral injunction of responsibility while replacing his 
abstract, theological and idealistic epistemology and phenomenology with a more embodied and 
material one. This allows us to move rather easily from the intimacy and singularity of the 
ethical to the political. If the self can only emerge out of a complex process of differentiation, 
then every identity tacitly relies on an innumerable set of boundaries which demarcate it from 
everything else. The more we follow this trail of similarities and differences the more we can 
illuminate the broader political context that informs individuality. The particulars of our identity, 
no matter how personal or idiosyncratic, cannot be abstracted from broader questions of race, 
gender, class, heteronormativity, etc. Drabinski’s claim that a “common history” is the condition 
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of possibility for “the solely singular”117 is correct in the sense that, to take a personal example, a 
large part of my identity (the land I occupy, the language I speak, the education I received as a 
child, the food I eat, the hermeneutics of my body, my aesthetic tastes etc.) relies on the 
historical marginalization and subjugation of the indigenous population and other international 
communities, regardless of any beliefs or intentions I might have to the contrary. Thus, for 
Drabinski, Levinas’ call to responsibility, when inflected with this dimension, should help us 
think in larger political terms while retaining Levinas’ core philosophical categories (even if they 
are transformed). As he states:  
The host is constituted as the host, as the one capable of welcoming, by the refugee. The 
one excluded exercises a certain ontological gravitation, pulling the origin of the being 
of a city of refuge away from the self-constituting and self-legitimating state, and 
relocating the meaning of refuge, host, and welcome to the one excluded. The state is 
chosen by the excluded; the border marks, literally, the difference between refuge and 
refugee, and, in so doing, prescribes the flow of ethical, political, and ethical political 
meaning.118 
 
Drabinski moves Levinas forward through a conception of identity which does not shy away 
from but presuppose borders, difference and exclusion. As a consequence, Drabinski extrapolates 
the terms of the ethical relation into larger geo-political categories. The other is no longer 
exemplified by the neighbour but by the one who is excluded and marginalized in order to make 
space for both me and my neighbour. The other is the refugee, the political prisoner, the 
oppressed worker, and the victim of war. Perhaps analogous to Plato, who, in the Republic, 
found it useful to interrogate the conditions of the soul by projecting them onto the city, 
Drabinski takes the “curvature of the intersubjective space”119 characteristic of the face-to-face 
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and elevates its terms to describe the “asymmetrical political space of wealth, representation, and 
national and transnational violence.”120  
 Elevating the terms of the ethical relation into socio-political categories draws into focus 
our last issue related to the question of “depth”: what is the theoretical nature of the relationship 
between ethics and politics in Levinas? Does Levinas’ strict demarcation between ethics and 
totality—where all signs, works, collectivities and institutions are equally construed as a 
“betrayal” of the ethical moment—disabuse us of the hope that a substantive political vision 
might be constructed from out of the ethical relation? Caygill, through a juxtaposition of Levinas 
(specifically Otherwise than Being) with Hegel’s movement from subjective to objective 
freedom, outlines the political problems which are said to follow from Levinas’ skeptical 
formula. The “proximity” of the other “disturbs any mediation between subject and substance” 
and, as such, the inter-human relation “does not create a ‘result’, as in the Hegelian movement 
from subjective to objective freedom, but leaves marks of its disturbance -– the “trace” -– in the 
present.”121 Where the abstract relation to the primordial other, for Hegel, begins the great 
dialectical journey which leads to increasingly larger and more complex forms of social 
institutions (identity, language, property, family, culture, religion, civil society, corporations, the 
state, international law and finally world history) Levinas’ face-to-face encounter, unable to 
conceive let alone resolve an antagonism, remains caught in a perpetual cycle which fails to 
produce a positive remainder. The possibility of institutionalizing the ethical impulses contained 
within subjectivity, like that of Hegel’s “concrete universal” which succeeds in making the 
abstract freedom of the subject manifest within the larger politico-economic structures, is, for 
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Levinas, “excluded as an option.”122 However, while Levinas may, for the sake of ethics, 
indiscriminately eschew the various instantiations of social life, Caygill notes how such a rigid 
bifurcation reduces the possible impact of such ethics which implicitly “leaves intact the worst 
forms of state in the name of the other.”123 Here we arrive back at our original quandary of 
whether Levinas is, for all his radical altruistic jargon, a conservative when it comes to politics. 
In his summation of Levinas’ politics, Caygill again relies on an interpretation which equates the 
“other” with the “other” we experience in the everyday world (through perception and dialogue) 
which is distinct from “the third,” who represents the one far off or the one outside my 
immediate purview. As a result, as long as Levinas maintains an unconditional “precedence” for 
the other over the third, “it is hard to see that there is the importance that Levinas claims in the 
distinction between the state that proceeds from ‘a war of all against all, or from the irreducible 
responsibility of the one for all.’” Levinas’ “personalist argument”124 which conceives of ethics 
as interruption without the possibility of positive constitution, offers little more than a “muted 
hope”125 because it, at best, leaves the state intact while imparting us with a guilty conscience, 
and, at worst justifies the status quo. 
 This relationship between ethics and politics poses obvious challenges to any potential 
radical appropriations. Even if we accept the above critiques by Drabinski and Dussel and 
ground the categories of self/other in concrete experience and history (where the other is the 
exemplified by “the one excluded”126) the question still remains as to whether Levinas’ 
framework resigns us to the fact that “ethics” can never amount to more than a brief and fleeting 
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interruption of the political. On such questions Drabinski maintains the standard interpretation 
that: 
the ethical plays a primarily interruptive role in relation to politics. The tyrannical 
character of political life – the life of comparison, judgement, distribution of rights and 
goods – is both exceeded by the ethical (we are called to the Other outside political 
structures and prescriptions) and put in question by it (the fragility and precarious life of 
the Other expose the violence of politics, law, and the state). In that sense, we can say 
that the ethical resists politics and the political with the singular, though never in the 
name of an alternative political vision or ideology.127 
 
While this focus on the ephemeral and temporary structure of ethics is considered one of 
Levinas’ merits by commentators who are more skeptical of categories like essence, meta-
narratives, emancipation or revolution (be they liberal, poststructural or other) for thinkers like 
Drabinski and Dussel this represents the final challenge to overcome if we are to fully politicize 
Levinas. Thus the last modification of Levinas is to re-conceptualize the “ethical” in such a way 
that it “intervenes in a productive register, rather than simply interrupting, then withdrawing, 
from political life[.]”128 Appealing, once again, to Derrida’s modification of Levinas, Drabinski 
claims that if we begin with an acute awareness of borders, fracture and difference - rather than 
“being” as an undifferentiated totality explicitly opposed to “ethics”—we can better describe the 
way ethics can on and transform the socio-political terrain, an option which Levinas “himself 
could not conceive.”129 Such a modification allows us to replace Levinas’ abstract asymmetrical 
relationship with a conception of the “asymmetry of political space,” which enables us to 
overcome Levinas’ ineffectual conception of justice (defined as “abstract interruption,” 
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“betrayal” and “messianic deferral”) by focusing, instead, on a “concrete practice of welcoming, 
hospitality, refuge, and ethically infused cosmopolitanism.”130 
 Dussel takes a similar position, noting that Levinas “negative” and “critical” attitude 
towards totality necessarily “deconstructs politics.”131 While Dussel is more appreciative of the 
insight Levinas is able to achieve despite (seemingly unnecessarily) painting himself into a 
corner, he is also quick to point out the inherent limitations of such a position. Because Levinas 
only “philosophizes about an anti-politics of the Totality” he has nothing to say about “a politics 
of liberation” and thus for all the importance he places on ethics the “poor pro-vokes, but in the 
end, he stays poor and miserable forever.”132 To compensate for this glaring lacuna, Dussel 
attempts to set a dialectic between Levinas’ skeptical “anti-politics” and the “critical politics” 
espoused by thinkers such as Marx and Albert Memmi. Thinking Levinas with philosophers 
more attuned to the “appropriate political and economic categories,”133 Dussel outlines a 
dialectical movement between the revolutionary impulse to liberate the other and the inevitable 
degeneration of said moment:  
The liberation starts with the slavery of Egypt (negative aspect) and ends in the 
construction of Jerusalem (positive aspect). But when the dreamed ‘new’ Jerusalem is 
finally built, it slowly transforms itself into Egypt, the ‘second’ Jerusalem, the 
Jerusalem to be deconstructed ... and the history will continue, never repeating and 
always renewing itself, as the history of the politics of liberation.134 
Levinas is indeed important for Dussel, as he above all others can illustrate the multifarious ways 
a given regime will ossify in pathological ways which label, define, restrict and subjugate the 
other. At his best Levinas is emblematic, for Dussel, of the purity of a revolutionary upsurge 
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where “the new dominations are not visible yet; the unavoidable institutional ‘entropy’ has not 
yet shown its erosion.” This is before the “ambiguity” following the revolution when “the system 
is totalized, the Other is excluded, and politics transforms itself into ‘the art of foreseeing and 
winning the war by all means.’ It is the politics of decadence. Now we are facing Evil, the 
Empire.” The unsullied hope of ethical relation can help articulate the requisite spirit of political 
optimism, “the creative times when the emancipators have not yet contaminated their hands with 
their people’s blood”135 where “Trotsky and Lenin still work together; Stalin has not created a 
domination yet.”136 This dialectic is an attempt to correct Levinas for his lack of foresight to 
realize that the revolutionary moment must be structurally embedded for the sake of the other 
(the positive moment) but, on the other hand, welcomes the self-critical impulse (the negative 
moment) which puts even the most self-assured revolutionary on guard against the inevitable 
ossification which will, in turn, begin the cycle anew.  
 
Rethinking the Relationship Between (Inter)subjectivity, Ethics and Politics. 
 
 It is perhaps helpful here to clarify what I am not proposing by challenging the above 
critiques and re-appropriations. First and foremost, I am not claiming that we should clear 
Levinas of the charges of Eurocentrism or bigotry. Unlike many that come to Levinas’ defence, I 
completely agree with Drabinski, Caygill, Critchley, Bernasconi and many others, that when it 
comes to issues of concrete history, culture and politics, Levinas’ assessments are inconsistent 
and occasionally extremely problematic. I thus affirm their commitment to not simply pass over 
the “inconvenient” aspects of Levinas’ thought. Second, while I feel it is necessary to 
differentiate between the different kinds of normativity which appear in Levinas, I am not 
                                                 
135 Ibid., p. 89. 
136 Ibid., p. 90. 
 73 
claiming that we must forever exclude the prescriptive content which permeates throughout 
Levinas’ analysis. Finally, I am not claiming that, because Levinas’ “ethics” operates on a 
different plane than “totality,” it is somehow a misapplication to apply Levinas to concrete 
political issues. On the contrary, the very purpose of this study is to demonstrate that politics is 
much “closer” to the “ethical relation” than many would like to accept. I enthusiastically affirm 
the efforts to think Levinas with the critical engagements analyzing the structure of colonialism, 
patriarchy, heteronormativity, racism, fascism, capitalism, etc. However, for me, this desire to 
illuminate the socio-political terrain on which we meet (or are prohibited from meeting) the 
“other” does nothing to contest the value of Levinas’ core philosophical insight. If Levinas’ 
description of the relation to the deworlded other amounted to little more than another 
unfortunate attempt to masquerade a particularity (be it “Eurocentric” or “Zionist”) as a 
universal; if it represents nothing more than theology and masochistic altruism dressed up in 
postmodern jargon; if it precludes the possibility of collectivity and prohibits anything but 
skepticism; if it cannot deliver anything more radical than the most banal form of difference-
blind ethics which accepts the neutrality of society and actively discourages any and every 
attempt to analyze history and structure, then I would not only applaud the above criticisms 
levelled by the “third wave” scholars, but I would do so while sitting comfortably among the 
ranks of our neo-Marxist critics.  
 What I am challenging is that we can retain the force of Levinas’ insights if we get to the 
political by insisting on difference, exclusion, or any other theme or attribute as the basis upon 
which someone is conferred with the status of “other.” Instead of underemphasizing, diminishing 
or simply replacing Levinas’ (seemingly embarrassing, by today’s political standards) 
philosophical starting point, I propose that we fully appreciate, even radicalize, the depth of the 
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“ethical relation.” This not only allows us to retain the normative import of Levinas’ philosophy 
but, by accepting the pre-contextual/pre-conscious nature of the relation, we will also “arrive” at 
the political much earlier. If the Levinasian other is not, from the first, a proper noun—from such 
and such a place, whose language, skin, hair, genitalia, gestures, clothes, occupation, culture, 
political affiliations, class, etc. are rendered intelligible on the basis of a background referential 
totality of relations—but rather a radical singularity without referent, corollary, or concept, then, 
by the time we get to “Bob,” “Hoang,” or “Aakanksha” we have already traversed through both 
planes of existence.   
 A clear delineation between these two registers is crucial because the claim that there 
exists a primordial dimension of intersubjective experience which is radically indifferent to all 
particularity and difference is much different than the claim that, in my conscious experience of 
the world, I can experience the other as an unmediated singularity. The second claim would, to 
be sure, naively and impetuously dismiss the importance of history and politics. Hence, much 
like Drabinski, Dussel and others, I whole heartedly affirm the thrust of the philosophical 
tradition—from Hegel and Heidegger to Derrida and Spivak—that we are inextricably bound to 
each other through an innumerable set of overlapping historical practices, discursive fields, and 
social structures (even if I may or may not agree on how some of them conceive of the 
relationship between such practices, fields and structures). However, this in no way blunts 
Levinas’ fundamental claim that none of these generic phenomena can be the basis upon which 
we first relate to the other. We are held hostage, beholden to the other, before we are free or 
immersed within a lifeworld. Our neo-Marxist critics are, in a way, correct that “the three” 
precedes “the two,” but only if we understand the “two” as on the plane of consciousness. But 
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here Levinas would certainly agree that this version of “the two” already presupposes a 
mediating gaze capable of counting the terms. 
 This brings us to the most disingenuous aspect of the otherwise noble efforts to think 
Levinas in a political context. In setting Levinas up as fodder for the obvious critique that 
difference/context precedes identity, Levinas is portrayed as a hyper-individualist, seemingly 
wholly ignorant of his immediate philosophical milieu. It is incontestable that Levinas is fully 
immersed in Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Hegel and Marx and he repeatedly expresses 
the import these thinkers have for his understanding of intersubjectivity. Levinas is not, contrary 
to some liberal interpretations,137 attempting to construct some kind of state of nature argument, 
where a self-sufficient singular individual encounters other individuals and slowly takes on a 
social character, adding language, culture, trade, and eventually politics. What is ignored in such 
interpretations is that Levinas is taking the great thinkers of intersubjectivity as point of 
departure and asking the important question of whether there is another kind of social relation 
which is prior, or deeper, than Dasein, intentionality, perception, negativity and the “ensemble of 
social relations.” Drabinski’s question: “How does the experience of cultural mixture open up the 
complex interstitial or creolized space of an identity affirming, rather than obscuring, radical 
difference?138” would seem to oppose Levinas to theories of difference rather than viewing them 
as potentially supplementary. Levinas does not offer us a more detailed phenomenology, nor 
does he mean to. 
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 A similar confusion is readily apparent in attempts, exemplified by Sparrow, to set 
Levinas on alternative footing more appropriate to deal with the pressing political issues of his 
time. Here he states that: 
By refocusing his project on the sensuous aspects of faciality, Levinas is better prepared 
to confront criticism from potential detractors in feminist and critical race theory, or 
other fields that emphasize the corporeality of relations. For this, it must be shown that 
the material complexity of the Other is what places him/her beyond comprehension, 
without putting them beyond contact.139 
 
For Sparrow the solution to thinking the other as an empirical reality to whom I can respond 
while preserve Levinas’ sense of “beyond comprehension” is to intensify the process of 
traditional phenomenology and posit an innumerable amount of differences which makes the 
other both concrete and immeasurably complex. Sparrow here is doubling down on the critiques 
of Levinas; rather than shying away from difference what is needed is to translate Levinas into a 
hyper-awareness of difference which will turn into, at some point, an innumerable infinity. 
Presumably, according to such a logic, the other is singular because if you could add up the 
infinite number of variables—the creases in their skin, the mole on their back, their distinct 
laugh, their disdain for country music, their love of poetry, and on and on—the differences 
would distinguish this specific other as unique, different from all others. Like a snowflake you 
will never you can never encounter the same person twice. The obvious reply from Levinas 
would be that, not only does this abolish the passivity and asymmetry of subjectivity with respect 
to the other but conceives of the intersubjective relation as one where “I” must constantly affirm, 
even prove, the other’s status as unique; where I am implored to perpetually “chase” the other 
and inventory their attributes in order to add more and more signifiers to my collection and they, 
in turn, must keep “running” so as to never be completely understood by me. Such a formulation 
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is, without a doubt, the antithesis of Levinas. It is ironic that such interpretations typically chide 
Levinas for his religiosity or seeming altruism but, the way they proceed reduces Levinas to 
nothing more than an austere moral theory, begging the question of what they find so appealing 
in Levinas in the first place?  
 Similarly, Bernasconi surmises that Levinas’ “attempt to approach the Other as outside of 
culture” simply repeats “the violence, long since exposed, of a humanism that reduces the other 
to nothing more than a man.”140 Once again this apparent oversight is linked with the hegemony 
of “Western ethnocentrism” and, moreover, “ignore[s] the possibility that one of the ways in 
which the Other might challenge my self sufficiency is for the stranger to put in question my 
cultural identity.”141 Anticipating the objection that such a claim “confuses the distinction 
between levels” Bernasconi counters by arguing that “ethnicity” is central for Levinas’ thought 
and that:  
In the face to face relation I discover myself as other than the Other: the Other is what I 
myself am not. Could it not be that, where there is ethnic—or sexual—difference, then 
the ethnic—or sexual—identity of the Other belongs to his or her very alterity as the 
Other’s ‘alterity-content?’ And yet not in such a way as to confirm me in my own 
identity.142 
 
What is clear in such assertions is that, for Bernasconi, the most primary “level” of Levinas’ 
analysis still includes the prescriptive, phenomenological, and socio-historical concerns that I am 
claiming must be postponed to the second level. The very phrase “alterity-content,” the 
postulation that “the Other is what I am not,” and the normative presumption that this whole 
exercise is ultimately about challenging my “self-sufficiency” or “identity” makes it clear that, 
for Bernasconi, we are dealing with the subject proper, which, as I have attempted to 
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demonstrate, re-instates the priority of ontology/difference and simultaneously transforms the 
crux of Levinas’ philosophy into a moral theory predicated on guilt.  
 Of course this does not mean that, even if read as supplementary, Levinas does not leave 
the traditional philosophies of intersubjectivity untouched. This will be dealt with in more detail 
in the next two chapters but for the time being it is important to note that, for whatever he 
believes he has to offer, Levinas does not want to simply replace every theory of intersubjectivity 
with his specific insights. After all, he claims that ethics is “first philosophy,” not the only 
philosophy in town. This misunderstanding appears to create a lot of consternation and paranoia 
as if any and every mention of consciousness, history, or collectivity would draw the ire of 
Levinas. Littered through Drabinski’s analysis, for example, is the suspicion that Levinas or 
Levinasians would rebuke such an interlocution with postcolonial thinkers of history, politics 
and embodiment: expecting that they would as nothing more than “a return to perception”143; or 
that it would “of course” raise the “objection from Levinas” that “this sounds a bit too much like 
political community”144; or further that such concrete reflections are “the most difficult 
methodological pill for Levinasians to swallow” because they illuminates the “repressed 
historical thinking” that “ought to to inform our conceptualizing of methodological motifs like 
‘Europe.’”145 What is hopefully by now obvious is that such concerns are largely misplaced. If 
we begin from the proposition that Levinas is describing the structure of one kind of 
intersubjective relation, then it allows us to see that Levinas is not forever excluding such 
features from analysis but rather trying to explain why they should concern us in the first place. 
To speak about what is behind “perception” and “political community” is all-together different 
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from prohibiting or even diminishing the importance of such features. The needless antagonism 
set up between Levinas and politics, common throughout, is again evident in Drabinski’s 
conclusion when he attempts to anticipate how Levinasians might receive his work. Admitting 
that the ethical “orientation and methodology” of Levinas can lead us to a broader political 
critique he adds the important qualification that such an effort would still require “us to temper 
his critique of worldliness more than a little bit.”146 While Levinas’ wager is that a recognition of 
the priority of the being-for-the-other will transform what these social phenomena might look 
like, a “return to perception” is absolutely necessary, even demanded by Levinas—but this 
motivation is subverted if we “temper” Levinas’ insight so that it fits neatly into perception. It is 
as if we expect too much from Levinas, and such assertions repeatedly force Levinas into a battle 
over the substance of ontology and phenomenology, which can then only make Levinas’ claims 
of worldlessness seem ridiculous if not reactionary (“how can you say that the other’s skin has 
no signification?”). But of course Levinas is intending to get behind and beyond such concerns to 
explain that, while utterly essential to an ethico-political analysis, such features are insufficient 
to have the final word on normative matters.  
 
Meaning and Sense: Ethics, Relativity and Context 
 Levinas’ most lucid treatment of his relation to his other theories of intersubjectivity can 
be found in his essay “Meaning and Sense,” written two years before the publication of 
Otherwise than Being. Throughout Levinas systematically (at least as systematic as anything he 
does) addresses his work in relation to the thought of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Levi-Strauss, 
Husserl, and Bergson. Contrary to the impression one might get from reading many of “third 
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wave” scholars, Levinas deeply affirms the efforts of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to illuminate 
the invisible horizons which bestow meaning on the world. “This rectangular and solid opacity” 
Levinas states, “would become a book only inasmuch as it bears my thought toward other data 
still, or already, absent—toward the author that writes, the readers that read, the shelves that 
store.” In symmetry with Drabinski’s point about the entanglement of Europe and its colonies, 
Levinas states that “[t]hose absent contents confer a meaning on the given.”147 Paraphrasing 
Heidegger, Levinas further reflects on the referential totality of relations further implied by an 
object as simple as a book:  
It contrasts with the light, with the daylight, refers to the sun that rose or the lamp that 
was lit, refers to my eyes also, as the solidity refers to my hand, not only as to organs 
which apprehend it in a subject, and would thereby be somehow opposed to the 
apprehended object, but also as to beings that are alongside of this opacity, in the midst 
of a world common to this opacity, this solidity, these eyes, this hand, and myself as a 
body. There never was a moment meaning came to birth out of a meaningless being, 
outside of a historical position where language is spoken. And that is doubtless what 
was meant when we were taught that language is the home of being.148 
 
What Levinas finds interesting about such formulations is that they annul the possibility of “pure 
receptivity” where “no given could enter thought simply through a shock against the wall of 
receptivity.”149 As Levinas continues: “To be given to consciousness, to flicker for it, would 
require that the given first be placed in an illuminated horizon—like a word, which gets the gift 
of being understood from the context to which it refers. The meaning would be the very 
illumination of this horizon.”150  
 Levinas then connects the relevance of such philosophical articulations for normative and 
political questions. The “totality of being” implied in meaning is not a pre-given structure but 
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through specific historical processes of “arranging and assembling” it takes on a particular 
cultural form.151 Meaning is ascribed to expression differently in different circumstances, both 
within a given culture and across cultures. Such “diversity of expression” is not considered a 
betrayal of “being” because, for thinkers like Melreau-Ponty, being is not something that first 
exists and then is re-presented, it only comes to be through its illumination; thus the diversity of 
being is evidence of the “glitter of the inexhaustible richness of its event.”152  
 Levinas contrasts such a conception of “being” (common, for Levinas, not only in 
modern phenomenology but also in thinkers like Hegel and Bergson) with Plato, for whom “the 
world of meanings precedes language and culture, which express it; it is indifferent to the system 
of signs that one can invent to make this world present to thought.”153 What interests Levinas in 
this juxtaposition is that, for all his faults, Plato refuses to accept the notion that truth, meaning 
and intelligibility can be exhausted by their cultural form; there is always a remainder, something 
prior to, and outside of, the specific iterations of becoming. This is, of course, contrary to the 
“antiplatonism of contemporary philosophy,” for whom one must “traverse history or relive 
duration or start from concrete perception and the language established in it, in order to arrive at 
the intelligible.” Thus the particularity and diversity of history and culture are “no longer 
obstacles separating us from the essential and the intelligible, but ways that give us access to 
it…[t]hey are the only ways, the only possible ones, irreplaceable, and consequently implicated 
in the intelligible itself.”154  
 It would be, of course, a mistake to take such a comparison as a rejection of 
contemporary philosophy or modern phenomenology. What is clear in this essay is Levinas’ 
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admiration for thinkers like Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Bergson and even Levi-Strauss. 
Interesting for our purposes is Levinas’ discussion of Bergsons’ conception of freedom and 
history. For Bergson, Levinas notes, the freedom cannot be separated or abstracted from the 
concrete history in which the subject is immersed. Levinas continues: 
The meaning of the decision to be taken can be intelligible only for him who would 
have lived through the whole past which leads to this decision. The meaning cannot be 
understood directly in a fulguration which illuminates and dissipates the night in which 
it arises and which it leads to its denouement. The whole density of history is necessary 
for it.155 
 
What I hope to demonstrate is that Levinas is fully aware of the important ramifications and 
consequences of contemporary philosophy. Levinas is many things but he is not ignorant of, or 
hostile to, the importance of concrete signification, thematization, history, context or everything 
else that follows on the plane of “ontology.”   
 Levinas is, however, skeptical that, for all its progress, this conception of being is 
sufficient to capture the full spectrum or significance of subjectivity. Again, with reference to 
Bergson, Levinas begins to outline the potential limitations of such a position where: “a meaning 
cannot be separated from the access leading to it. The access is part of the meaning itself. The 
scaffolding is never taken down; the ladder is never pulled up.”156 It is interesting that such a 
formulation could equally apply to Kant. Of course the difference is that for Kant the faculties of 
apperception which organize the world into an intelligible structure are the possession of the 
individual, while for those following in the wake of Hegel, Marx and Heidegger such categories 
emanate from society (and thus constitute of the individual rather than the reverse). In either 
case, what is inconceivable in this strain of philosophy is a referent exterior to the ways in which 
we apprehend the world. Herein lies the difficulty of interpreting what exactly Levinas is 
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claiming: in what precise sense does he rejoin Plato in the search for a meaning beyond the flux 
of history, culture and politics?  
 We can begin to answer this question by examining Levinas’, somewhat clumsy, 
discussion on the potential normative and political implications of such philosophical 
articulations. Following his exposition on the state of contemporary philosophy, Levinas 
abruptly states that the “political work of decolonization” is attached to such an “ontology,” 
which establishes the equality between the “multiple and multivocal” expressions of culture. 
This thread is picked up a few pages later where Levinas begins to openly question whether such 
a philosophical orientation can deliver the final word on normative matters. Levinas is 
specifically responding to the notion that the plurality of cultural formations can only relate to 
each other “laterally,” and not (as Plato would have it) through a third perspective which, 
standing apart from the flux of culture, is capable of functioning as an arbiter. Utilizing the 
metaphor of language, Levinas states that such a proposition effectively eliminates the 
“possibility of a Frenchman learning Chinese and passing from one culture into another, without 
the intermediary of an esperanto that would falsify both tongues which it mediated.”157  
 There are many confusing and potentially troubling aspects of Levinas’ attempt to 
highlight some of the implicit difficulties of contemporary philosophy and (what he takes to be) 
its ethical correlative, cultural relativity. The first is theoretical. Levinas’ appears to be 
advocating for a third term which can mediate, and ultimately judge, between two terms (in this 
case cultures). This might seem confusing in light of his description of the face-to-face relation 
which outright excludes the possibility of a third term mediating the relation between “the two.” 
On account of such confusion, Drabinski misreads Levinas’ intention and assumes that the 
                                                 
157 Ibid., p.88. 
 84 
appeal to esperanto is to indicate yet another pathological example of how a third term 
necessarily “mediates, and so obliterates difference in the interests of instrumentalizing language 
and meaning.”158 But of course Levinas is not, in these pages, attempting to provide a sanctuary 
for the “contiguity of multiple expressions of being.”159 In fact, quite the opposite, which leads 
us to the second potential problem. Picking up on Levinas’ ambivalence to cultural diversity, 
Bernasconi misreads this text in the opposite direction. While Bernasconi correctly recognizes 
that Levinas is promoting the concept of a master tongue which can function at a distance from a 
particular cultural formation, he once again takes this as further evidence of Levinas’ implicit 
Eurocentrism—a seemingly plausible interpretation, especially in light of light of Levinas’ 
infamous comments that humanity is made up of “Europe and the Bible, everything else can be 
translated.” According to Bernasconi, “the Greek language came to serve Levinas as a kind of 
esperanto, providing the universal tongue in which everything can be said, unlike esperanto, 
without loss.”160 I think such confusion highlights the critical importance of questions of “depth” 
and the inevitable difficulties of simply transposing the pre- and post-ontological meanings of 
Levinas’ foundational concepts (which is presupposed in all such attempts to convert them into 
larger social categories). While Levinas is indeed in favour of a normative expression irreducible 
to culture, he is not advocating for a third term which could mediate or buffer the immediacy of 
the face to face relation. To the contrary, his concern regarding his philosophical milieu is that 
they only focus on “being,” which is, for Levinas, the mucilage secreted by the human-to-human 
relation, inevitably filling the interstitial gaps between individuals and binds them together 
within a horizon. Esperanto is thus a poorly chosen metaphor because, while Levinas recognizes 
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the ethical lacuna present in contemporary “anti-platonism,” he is not advocating for a non-
relational entity or category which stands outside of history and society. As he otherwise states 
with great clarity: “Infinity does not first exist, and then reveal itself. It’s infinition is produced 
as revelation, as a positing of its idea in me.”161 What is primary for Levinas is not a 
transhistorical substance or (contra Bernasconi) a particular cultural, philosophical or theological 
formation but the most basic “orientation and of an unequivocal sense in which humanity 
stands.”162 It is out of such an orientation that a plurality of human expressions arise; which also 
means that we can distinguish these iterations from the more “fundamental movement” of being-
for-the-other.163 
 Levinas’ overall compatibility with the intersubjective tradition out of which Drabinski 
and Dussel emerge is made explicit as he argues that “contemporary philosophy insists, and 
indeed rightly, on its hermeneutical structure and on the cultural effort of the incarnate being that 
expresses itself.”164 Signification has a structure, a horizon, a history, and a politics—such 
presuppositions are beyond reproach, as Levinas continues: 
The other is given in the concreteness of the totality in which he is immanent, and 
which, according to Merleau-Ponty's remarkable analyses, which we have drawn upon 
freely in the first section of this essay, is expressed and disclosed by our own cultural 
initiative, by corporeal, linguistic or artistic gestures.165 
 
What such quotes make perfectly clear is that Levinas’ analysis of singularity or the face-to-face 
has already accounted for the dimension of “being” which many of his critics and acolytes claim 
he is unable to think. This is again confirmed as Levinas argues that the “presence” of the other 
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“consists in divesting himself of the form which does already manifest him.”166 Key is that the 
other, in this formulation, is “already” refracted through the prism of “the third,” however, this 
does not encompass or erase the radical singularity of the other. What becomes abundantly clear 
is that, even if the dimension of singularity/alterity is always “prior,” it is contemporaneous (in 
what Heidegger would call “clock-time”) with how we actually experience the other in our 
everyday life.  
 What also becomes clear from Levinas’ discussion of Merleau-Ponty is that he is not 
attempting to avert our attention from materiality by outlining a highly abstract or idealized 
ethical theory. The sustained effort to deworld the other is an attempt to illuminate a “most 
ordinary social experience”167 which underlays the register of experience that contemporary 
philosophy is aiming at. To refer back to Sparrow’s critique and re-formulation, for Levinas, to 
place signification prior to pure receptivity is not to think more concretely. Rather, such a 
method necessarily abstracts from the immediacy of the social relation by inserting a concept or 
subjective momentum which, through the powers of cognition and perception, designate the 
other as “other.” We will later describe the logic of this movement in greater detail but for now it 
is sufficient to clarify Levinas’ intention, as he remarks that it is “[i]n the concreteness of the 
world a face is abstract or naked.”168 Levinas is attempting to move us toward, not away from, 
concrete experience. To begin before the beginning is not to deliver an abstract universal and 
austere moral theory, it is, however, to understand how my experience of subjectivity is “always 
already” an orientation toward the other.  
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 If “ethics” does not, for Levinas, describe an intimate relationship between two self-
conscious people (somehow sheltered from generic social processes) then how can we 
understand his insistence on its primacy? While Levinas is quick to flatter Merleau-Ponty he 
nevertheless continues to ask if such an impressive analysis has not forgotten the dimension of 
the “interlocutor.”169 To unpack the hermeneutical (or, better still, political) structure of 
intelligibility and signification is indeed impressive, but, according to Levinas, such an analysis 
readily obfuscates how “expression, before being a celebration of being, is a relationship with 
him to whom I express the expression, and whose presence is already required for my cultural 
gesture of expression to be produced.”170 Subjectivity is always intersubjectivity, not only 
because meaning presupposes a shared horizon but because it must be expressed to some-one. 
While the other is always situated within a horizon it does not, itself, make up the horizon, nor is 
it encapsulated by it. As Levinas puts it, the other is “not included in the totality of being 
expressed.”171 We are now better prepared to understand Levinas’ insistence of deworlding the 
other, which he aptly describes in Meaning and Sense:  
But the epiphany of the other involves a signifyingness of its own independent of this 
meaning received from the world. The other comes to us not only out of the context, but 
also without mediation; he signifies by himself. The cultural meaning which is 
revealed—and reveals—as it were horizontally, which is revealed from the historical 
world to which it belongs, and which, according to the phenomenological expression, 
reveals the horizons of this world - this mundane meaning is disturbed and jostled by 
another presence that is abstract (or, more exactly, absolute63) and not integrated into the 
world…Whereas a phenomenon is already, in whatever respect, an image, a captive 
manifestation of its plastic and mute form, the epiphany of a face is alive.172 
 
After justifying the primary of the other over and above “the world,” Levinas immediately 
addresses the two issues raised throughout the first two chapters. The first is the question of 
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where prescriptive normativity fits within his analysis. Once again, in unambiguous terms, 
Levinas highlights the pre-subjective and thus pre-prescriptive depth in which the subject is 
defined by its inability to “be deaf” or “forget” the call of the other. Levinas continues: 
Consciousness loses its first place. The presence of a face thus signifies an irrecusable 
order, a command, which puts a stop to the availability of consciousness…Being called 
into question is not the same as becoming aware of this being called into question. The 
‘absolutely other’ is not reflected in consciousness. It resists it to the extent that even its 
resistance is not convertible into a content of consciousness…A face confounds the 
intentionality that aims at it. What is at stake here is the calling of consciousness into 
question, and not a consciousness of a calling into question. The I loses its sovereign 
self-coincidence, its identification, in which consciousness returns triumphantly to itself 
to rest on itself.173 
 
Such a passage highlights my concern of bracketing the prescriptive implications of Levinas’ 
philosophy, not because they are unimportant or subordinate but because they miss the precise 
dimension of the inter-human relation at which Levinas is aiming. 
 This leads to a second concern which has been haunting Levinas in these first two 
chapters. We have demonstrated how Levinas acknowledge the multiplicity of ways in which the 
other is, at every moment, ensnared within a totality of relations, however, is it still not the case 
the “appearance” of the other (conceived as prior and indifferent to this very context) confines 
“ethics" to momentary or fleeting outbursts? This overwhelmingly popular interpretation has two 
sides, each of which is equally problematic. In the first concern is that the call of the face retreats 
before it ever “arrives” and thus cannot (unlike Hegel’s dialectic, for example) produce a 
positive instantiation of the ethical. The second complaint is that, as a consequence, Levinas is 
indifferent to the overall social and political configuration of a given society; the face comes and 
goes while the world of “totality” remains.  
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 In this essay, Levinas’ close attention to the question of depth offers a far more robust 
role for the deworlded other. Here he forcefully states that this dimension of the inter-human 
relation is “not reducible to a negative moment” because the “denuding” of the other is already a 
“a summons to answer.”174 Levinas continues that, “[t]he I does not only become aware of this 
necessity to answer, as though it were an obligation or a duty about which it would have to come 
to a decision.”175 The impetus of expression may be beyond/beneath/prior to representation but 
every expression will necessarily manifest itself in “ontological” terms. Although Levinas 
investigation of politics, culture, history, etc. is wholly inadequate, he is moved to extoll the 
exteriority or infinity of the other in order to make practical judgements about the world (and 
here we finally get to the prescriptive aspects of his thought). Levinas acknowledges that the 
critical move of the “anti-Platonists” (relativize cultures by severing meaning from 
transhistorical truth) was necessary to challenge the specific mode of “exploitation and violence” 
represented in the ongoing colonial period, nevertheless, he diverge from Merleau-Ponty, even if 
only slightly, by highlighting the limits of relativity.  
 This does not mean that Levinas hastily leaping to any hard and fast conclusions on 
ahistorical universal Truths (which have also served as cover for colonial violence). Ethical 
questions, according to Levinas, are not purely reducible to contingent socio-cultural formations 
because “meaning is situated in the ethical, presupposed by all culture and all meaning. Morality 
does not belong to culture: it enables one to judge it.”176 The remainder that lies outside and 
beyond all culture and meaning is the relation to the other qua other, which is not enacted after 
the scaffolding of society has been erected but the very catalyst of subjectivity itself. Without 
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this distance between the self/other relation and the horizons which make the relation intelligible 
critical reflection and judgment itself would be unthinkable. For this reason Levinas calls us to 
“return to Platonism in a new way” and “catch sight, in meaning, of a situation that precedes 
culture, to envision language out of the revelation of the other (which is at the same time the 
birth of morality) in the gaze of man aiming at a man precisely as abstract man, disengaged from 
all culture, in the nakedness of his face.”177 Levinas is thus not against meaning, signification, 
culture, politics or collectivities. He is, however, adamant they have neither the first nor the final 
word.  
 
Bridging the Divide Between Levinas and Politics 
 
 Of course such an interpretation is not without its difficulties. There are numerous 
instances where Levinas compromises the very aspects of his thought that I am seeking to 
radicalize and carry forward in various ways. In addition to the instances mentioned by 
Drabinski and Caygill, in the above mentioned essay, Meaning and Sense, Levinas will also 
bumble around the issue of decolonization with a surprising hint of nostalgia as he talks about 
the European legacy and the present state of “disorientation.”178 This sentiment is made explicit 
in numerous interviews where, to take one example, Levinas ironically struggles with the 
egalitarian indifference to culture exhibited by structuralism and (in his opinion) it’s political 
corollary, decolonization. Referring to Levi-Strauss’ seminal work “The Savage Mind,” Levinas 
states:  
I do not at all see where the target of his vision is.  It certainly responds, from a moral 
perceptive, to what one calls decolonization and the end of a dominating Europe, but my 
recant is primary—it is, I know worse than primitive: can one compare the scientific 
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intellect of Einstein with the “savage mind,” whatever be the complications, the 
complexities, that the “savage mind” may gather or accomplish?179 
 
The radical reading proposed here emphasizes the very indifference to culture (at this level of 
analysis) that Levinas otherwise maintains as a way of making such statements theoretically 
incoherent. What is so valuable in Levinas’ thought (and this will become more clear in the 
coming chapters) is the way it precludes any attempt to ground subjectivity within a conatus, 
cultural horizon or pre-established difference. And it is this understanding of the human, as 
already one-for-the-other, that not only enables us to make prescriptive claims but, because it is 
not simply just a moral code fetishizing the intimate relation between two self-conscious 
subjects, this aspect of sociality is necessarily enshrined within the totality of social relations 
(even if it is irreducible to those very relations). As a result, to think Levinas’ politically is (or at 
the very least, can be) altogether different than asking how one might extend, to a broader 
context, a moral code designed to navigate intimate relationships—as if socio-political mediation 
could be slowly added after the fact, as if they were garments that could be put on and taken off.  
 This reading is thus not an effort to “save the appearances,” reconcile what is 
irreconcilable, or ignore what is theoretically inconvenient. As Drabinski suggests, it is 
ultimately up to the interpreters to carry a thinker forward, however, contra Drabinski (and 
others) if we are to push Levinas not only beyond his individual prejudices and peculiarities but 
his overall ambiguous posture with respect to history and politics, we must emphasize rather than 
temper this very aspect of his thought. This is a sharp contrast to those claims that 
decontextualization was a way of privileging—at bottom—the neighbour, the familiar, the 
ethnic, national or the European. At the depth we are aiming, sensibility qua intersubjectivity is 
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defined by its open or unsutured quality, and, as such, Levinas’ unfortunate sentiments to the 
contrary are simply inadmissible to the conception of subjectivity that we wish to carry forward. 
These aberrant moments therefore still carry significance, not because they illuminate the “true” 
Levinas, but for the opposite reason, because they represent the dimension of his thought that 
must be thoroughly opposed.  
 While we cannot do this topic justice here, this is how we must approach Levinas’ ill-
fated attempt to establish sexual difference as the model of difference as such. This articulation 
of the ontological difference between the masculine and feminine (which slowly wanes after its 
most pronounced articulation in Time and the Other) famously led to De Beviour’s critique that, 
for Levinas, the woman “is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with 
reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the 
Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.”180 This has led to interesting debates within 
feminist interpretations of Levinas,181 the only point I would stress in this respect is that 
exteriority and difference, at this level, cannot be inscribed at the level of biology. Here I fully 
agree with Stella Sanford that (though he is not totally successful, as she demonstrates) Levinas’ 
explicit shift to a “kinship relation ‘outside of all biology’” indicates that the maternal metaphor 
should be understood as a “universal model” where, in this strict sense, “men might be 
mothers.”182 Levinas himself seems to recognize this very misstep in a later interview where he 
ponders whether “all these allusions to the ontological difference between the masculine and 
feminine would appear less archaic if, instead of dividing humanity into two species (or two 
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genders) they would signify that the participation in feminine and in the masculine were the 
attribute of every human being.”183 Even then he seems be blind to the way the very terms 
“masculine” and “feminine” might still obfuscate rather than illuminate the notion of difference 
he (often) struggles to describe, there is an interesting point in this insofar as Levinas is clear 
that, in looking at relations of sexual difference, love and, similarly in relations of filiation and 
friendship, he was attempting to show how one could be ensured within the relations of everyday 
life and still be radically other.184 While this affirms our stance that these are co-existent 
dimensions of intersubjectivity (and thus must be analyzed in relation to each other), the fact that 
Levinas recognizes this fact but still prefers to analyze its implications for the structure of love 
and family rather than power and politics is all the more frustrating. 
 Lastly, this is also why we cannot read Levinas’ preferred images of the “orphan,” the 
“widow,” the “poor,” or, (the less frequently invoked but crucial for our purposes) “proletariat” 
as ontological designations. Rather, such metaphors are useful insofar as they contain a sense of 
asymmetry, exclusion, and rootlessness. Put differently, just as we must reject an analysis which 
would posit “Europe” or “Greek Wisdom” as the basis for counting as an “other,” so to must we 
refuse the notion that one is an uncountable “one” (in the most primordial sense) because they 
are poor, hungry, excluded, or exploited (even if this conception of intersubjectivity has massive 
implications for how we think about the poor, excluded, exploited etc.). As Levinas in a moment 
of great lucidity states: “That the Other is placed higher than me would be a pure and simple 
error if the welcome I make him consisted in ‘perceiving’ a nature. Sociology psychology, 
physiology are thus deaf to exteriority.”185 
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 Underlying this whole discussion is the caution that we must be careful to not ask too 
much of Levinas. He does not intend to deliver a historical, political or sociological analysis, a 
comprehensive phenomenology, or even a robust ethical theory traditionally understood. This 
still means that we can and should criticize, as Dussel does, Levinas for having an insufficient 
political, historical and phenomenological account. However, it appears to me to be an untenable 
position to replace the ground of subjectivity with any of these concerns (where I recognize the 
other because of given feature) and still hope to glean anything of value from Levinas. To quote 
Levinas, the other does not, in the most primordial sense, concern us “in the collectivity of 
reason…nor by reason of his power and freedom…nor by virtue of the difference of his 
attributes which would have to surmount in the process of cognition…..but as other, independent 
on us: behind every relation we could sustain with him, an absolute upsurge.”186 Such an 
approach to Levinas is perhaps analogous to Kant’s analysis of reason, which sought to clarify 
the limits of reason so as to make room for faith. This initial treatment of Levinas is, in large 
part, an attempt to not only clarify but quarantine Levinas’ thought by exposing its limitations, so 
that we can make room for politics. Therefore, it is absolutely imperative to examine the various 
ways class domination, slavery, colonization, white-supremacy, patriarchy, etc. has shaped the 
way faces are perceived. This is indeed the impetus of the present dialogue between Levinas and 
Marx. At the same time, it would seem not unimportant to ask why politics, structure and 
violence concern us in the first place. If indeed concepts like freedom, equality, negativity, 
recognition, familiarity, and reason do not exhaust the meaning of being-with-others, as Levinas 
claims, then we must also ask if such concepts alone are sufficient for articulating a project of 
liberation. 
 
                                                 
186 Levinas, Totality, p. 89. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
En Route to Marx:  
Tracing the Origins and Dimensions of Intersubjectivity 
 
Where two roads meet: placing Levinas and Marx in philosophical context 
 We now have a better understanding of the theoretical and political anxieties that 
comprise the gulf separating Marx and Levinas. Whether stated in an effort to repudiate or 
simply reorient Levinas, what is shared by many commentators is the belief that Levinas cannot 
coincide with a radical politics unless his most foundational insights on the relationship between 
subjectivity, context, history, politics and “ethics” is fundamentally rethought. As a result, 
according to this construal, Marx can easily engage in fruitful dialogues with thinkers as 
different as Fichte, Heidegger, and Lacan because they share, at least in some broad sense, a 
common philosophical lineage. Levinas, by contrast, is considered to originate from a different 
genus, if not altogether sui generis. From the lack of interest garnered on both sides of the divide, 
one gets the impression that the result of any potential interlocution between Levinas and Marx 
would be, like a mule, sterile upon arrival. To paraphrase Kipling, Levinas is Levinas and Marx 
is Marx and never the twain shall meet.  
 There are several ways one could challenge this doxa. Most obvious, one could look at 
Levinas’ own views on the legacy of Marx and Marxism. Here, especially in his later years, 
Levinas confounded many commentators as he not only affirms the “generous” spirit of 
Marxism, which, through its concern for the other, demonstrates the limits of individual charity, 
but further, laments the failure of socialism, saying that it was “one of the great disappointments” 
in history because it was the bearer of a messianic legacy which wielded political power only in 
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the hope that it could “make political power useless.”187 Instructive as these comments might be 
for challenging the status of Levinas today (and sentiments to which we will return), we will 
begin with a slightly different approach, one that seeks to go deeper than simply grafting the 
concerns of one tradition onto another in an ad hoc way. We will begin such a task with another 
reference to Marx, written already in 1934, where the Levinas boldly claims that, even if he did 
not go far enough, Marx was the “first” in the Western tradition to contest the “liberal” view of 
subjectivity which is blind to the “series of restless powers that seethe within him and already 
push him down a determined path.”188 It is somewhat ironic that the young Levinas would be so 
eager to to bring us back to Marx’s fundamental insight that “being determines 
consciousness,”189 because it is this precisely this break with liberalism that accounts for the 
present rift between Marx and Levinas.  
Part of this story is by now well known, as, after Marx “breaks [it’s] harmonious curve of 
development,”190 philosophy becomes increasingly preoccupied with these “restless powers,” 
and continues to challenge, even invert, the famous Carteasean formula whereby an autonomous 
and disembodied subject encounters and begins to represent the external world. Advanced by 
likes of Heidegger, de Beavoir, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Fanon, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Lacan, 
Arendt, Althusser, and Foucault, philosophy no longer sought to establish the sovereignty of the 
subject, but instead began to map out the history and dimensions of the embodied social 
experience—the concealed structures, “referential totalities,” economic imperatives, symbolic 
orders and discursive fields—in which people are “thrown,” “subjectivized” and “interpellated.” 
                                                 
187 Emmanuel Levinas, Is it Righteous to Be: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), p. 80. 
188 Emmanuel Levinas, “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” in Critical Inquiry 17:1 (Autumn, 1990), p. 
66. 
189 Ibid., p. 67.  
190 Ibid. 
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Interestingly, this philosophical shift initially attempted to distance itself from the “historicism” 
of Hegel and Marx, where schools of thought like phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and 
structuralism often eschewed historical analysis in favour of more synchronic approaches. 
However, perhaps for obvious reasons, philosophy increasingly restored its historical orientation 
(though, usually, avidly anti-teleological); after all, if there is no “sovereign, founding” or 
“universal form of subject,” as Foucault famously insisted, then to speak of a subject is to grasp 
it in its historical specificity. Regardless of the specific approach or focus, what is significant is 
that the emergent social ontology sought to render visible the history, depth, complexity and 
interconnectedness of the human experience. The profundity of the de-centerment of the subject 
was singled above all else by the increasingly obligatory status of the prefixes “inter” and “anti” 
when dealing with theories of “subjectivity” and “humanism.” 
Levinas’ philosophy of the “social relation,” as he is quick to admit,191 cannot be 
understood apart from these crucial developments. However, his contribution comes primarily in 
the form of a critique, one that names an otherwise unnoticed ambiguity in such articulations of 
subjectivity. While such philosophies are rooted in the observation that experience, no matter 
how intimate or idiosyncratic, is already mediated by the social, they too often fail to adequately 
distinguish between—let alone theorize—the relationship one has to others (what is sometimes 
called the subject-subject, or “interhuman” relation) and the relationship one has to the various 
socio-historical products that precedes, mediates and emanates from this relationship. It is 
obvious that these two moments are inextricably linked: on the one hand, it is impossible to 
conceive of human products like tools, symbols, language, culture, institutions, and borders 
without the existence of actually existing human beings, and, on the other hand, when humans 
                                                 
191 See, for example, the way he pays homage to Hegel, Heidegger, Bergson, and others in Ethics and Infinity: 
Conversations with Philippe Nemo (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1982).  
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actually do encounter each other this interaction unfolds according to the rhythms and logics of a 
given context (and not in a socio-historical vacuum). Nevertheless, Levinas’ primary concern is 
that such a philosophical (and ultimately political) understanding of sociality preserves a remnant 
of the prior individualistic philosophies in-so-far as they subordinate the first moment (inter-
human) to the second (generic), and, in the process, already miss the critical import of the 
former. As a result, the philosophical grounds for the naive egoism of “idealist liberalism”192 
may have been eroded in the wake of Marx, however, the fundamental movement of such an 
egoism—which obliterates the stature of the other as such—is not so much overcome as it is 
delayed. And it is on these grounds that Levinas concludes that “this break with liberalism is not 
a definitive one.”193 
 For this reason, Levinas will often assume an extreme viewpoint from which Marx’s 
rupture with the liberal subject, previously celebrated, becomes nearly imperceptible. Such is the 
case in Totality and Infinity, where Levinas famously insists that the whole of “Western 
philosophy” be seen as a single homogenous movement, because all hitherto philosophy has 
“been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral 
term that ensures the comprehension of being.”194 For all its efforts to penetrate the veneer of the 
subject, this arc of intersubjective inquiry has, according to Levinas, left a foundational aspect of 
the intersubjective experience unthought—and in some cases debased beyond the atomism of 
Cartesianism or liberalism. Thus the much trumpeted transition from humanism to anti-
humanism, or from subjectivity to intersubjectivity, is only perceptible if we still assume the 
perspective of the self-positing subject, and take stock of what had to surrender (sovereignty, 
                                                 
192 Ibid., p. 67. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 43 
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primordial freedom, autonomy etc.). However, if we, following Levinas, survey this 
philosophical shift from the perspective of the other, who is “neutralized” just the same, such a 
shift will be imperceptible and Western philosophy will appear as an uninterrupted line from 
Parmenides and Plato to Hegel and Heidegger. Thus, in this one respect, Levinas posits a 
remarkable unanimity between liberalism, idealism, materialism, phenomenology, structuralism 
and post-structuralism. 
 This is why, despite his admiration and indebtedness to these critiques of the primacy of 
freedom, individuality or consciousness, Levinas remains largely indifferent to the specifics of 
these developments, and to the degree that they do concern him, do so mostly negatively—in 
what they either miss or befog. While philosophers increasingly rendered subjectivity intelligible 
by illuminating its historical, political, and hermeneutical horizons, Levinas is concerned with 
the primacy of a unique and singular relation to others which precedes, overflows, and remains 
altogether irreducible to any such horizon. The relation to the other thus occurs “prior to any 
world,”195 and Levinas’ entire philosophical project can be viewed as a painstaking effort to 
demonstrate this with respect to every and any world (be they linguistic, symbolic, economic, 
psychological, representational, thematic, political, and on and on).  
 While this context hopefully gives us the clarity to better approach the meaning and 
significance of Levinas’ project, it does little to quell the fact that Levinas’ theorization of 
everything outside the scope of this narrow relation remains wholly inadequate (though not 
altogether absent). While I maintain that Levinas’ articulation of a singular and unique relation, 
which operates at a remove from consciousness and representation, is not only theoretically 
hospitable to political appropriations but, in fact, provides a normative perspective that implores 
                                                 
195 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1981), p.133. 
Emphasis added. 
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us to analyze history, structure and conceive of new forms of collectivity and solidarity, Levinas 
himself provides us with little more than a vague gesture in such a direction. Thus, even if it is 
for the wrong reasons, the critics of Levinas are on point in one crucial respect: if the subject to 
subject relation is left estranged from the world of “totality,” Levinas’ overthrow of the liberal 
subject will no be less partial and incomplete than the previous philosophical revolution.   
 Without an analysis of politico-historical structures one can say precious little about what 
it means for society to consist of an irreducible and infinite plurality of beings. While Levinas is 
carefully attuned to the importance and necessity of other dimensions of our embodied 
experience (like our corporeal relationship to “the elemental” and “need”), his gross 
undertheorization of the social world has led to the repetition, rather than the subversion, of 
liberalisms most pathological tendencies. Namely, the liberal propensity of abstracting 
subjectivity from the materiality of the situation to which one is wedded—a pathology described 
so cogently by Levinas in his early essay on “Hitlerism,” where he identifies liberalism as a 
philosophy in which “man is not weighed down by a History in choosing his destiny.”196  
It is at the crossroads of these two incomplete revolutions where we will begin our 
dialogue. In following the path Levinas has set before us that leads back to Marx, we will 
attempt to chart an alternative course between them, one that can come closer to the “definitive” 
break that each of them sought. This requires both a rethinking of subjectivity and a re-imagining 
of political emancipation. Our task is then to think together these two intertwined yet 
qualitatively distinct moments of intersubjectivity: the dimension of what Levinas will call 
“neutral intersubjectivity,”197 concerned with generic collectivities and socio-historical processes 
and the entanglement with the radical other, a bond which is not only irrespective of 
                                                 
196 Levinas, “Reflections,” p. 66. 
197 Levinas, Totality, p. 68. 
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consciousness but completely indifferent to the social context which mediates—or one could 
even say predestines—their meeting. The relationship between Marx and Levinas can now be 
addressed through the following two questions: first, why is the disarticulation of these two 
moments of intersubjectivity important and, second, what is the exact nature of the relationship 
between these two moments after they have been torn asunder? The first question speaks to 
Levinas’ contribution for Marx while the second points to Marx’s relevance for Levinas. It is 
thus through such a dialogue that we hope to provide a trajectory beyond Marx’s and Levinas’ 
individual articulations of the relationship between subjectivity, ethics, and politics. 
 The way I have conceived of this rapprochement between Levinas and Marx it is 
necessary to wade deeper into the philosophical waters than Marx often cares to go. Marx’s 
relationship with philosophy in general, and German idealism in particular, is no doubt 
complicated and the subject of much debate. These issues will be explored in the next chapter 
but we can for the time being state that a philosophical conception of subjectivity, history, and 
society is inextricable from Marx. Like all thinkers, Marx can only make a his contribution by 
accepting, modifying and criticizing the set of politico-philosophical problems and frameworks 
that he inherits. I am thus largely in agreement with Rockmore’s assessment that “in reacting 
against Hegel Marx does not ‘leave’ philosophy but in fact makes a crucial philosophical 
contribution.”198 Just as Levinas cannot be understood without some reference to Husserl, 
Heidegger and others, neither can we discuss Marx in abstraction from his philosophical lineage. 
While Levinas claims that Marx was the “first” to challenge the disembodied and atomistic 
notion of subjectivity, this is not in fact the case. To better understand the nature of this 
philosophical rupture with liberalism—and Marx’s place within it—we will have to go back to 
                                                 
198 Tom Rockmore, “Is Marx a Fichtean?” in Philosophy and Social Criticism 36:1 (2010), p. 93. 
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Fichte. While Marx surpasses Fichte (not to mention Schelling, Hegel and Feuerbach) in many 
important respects, his theory of (inter)subjectivity is profoundly indebted to these earlier 
thinkers, even when Marx is the most critical of them.  
 The problem of “origins” is certainly a complex one and I readily admit that this 
prefatory discussion of Marx could have just as easily begun with Rousseau, Herder, or even 
Epicurus, the subject of Marx’s doctoral dissertation. Fichte has been chosen because he opens 
up a new field of theoretical inquiry, one that will help us isolate and speak to the set of tensions 
which go on to define the thought of both Marx and Levinas.  
 
Act or Fact?: Negativity, Materiality and intersubjectivity in Fichte 
 It may seem odd to begin a discussion about embodiment, materialism and 
intersubjectivity with Fichte. Fichte’s response to Kant—which rebukes the thing-in-itself for not 
being idealist enough—represents for many the pinnacle of subjective idealism. However, as we 
will see the very nature of the steep ascent toward an all-constituting subject, freed from the 
fetters of materiality, brings about it own demise. One could say that Fichte not only establishes 
the philosophical foundation for latter dialecticians like Hegel and Marx but he provides them 
with a crucial object lesson, one where Fichte’s system raises consciousness above material 
existence to such a degree that it collapses under its own weight and begins, in paradigmatic 
fashion, to resemble its opposite.  
 The argument of this chapter rests on two claims. The first is that Fichte’s crucial 
modifications of Kant opens up a novel theoretical space—filled with new potentialities, tensions 
and pathologies—that will go on to define the continental philosophical tradition. While Fichte 
did not (and could not) develop all the dimensions and facets of intersubjectivity, he transforms 
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the philosophical understanding of subjectivity in such a way as to make these later 
developments possible. As a consequence, Fichte does not just set the stage for Hegel and Marx 
but already anticipates199 many of problems and dynamics that go on to define continental 
thought, be it in the form of Marxism, existentialism, structuralism, and post-structuralism. 
Contrary to popular opinion (including Levinas’ own assessment), Fichte’s emphasis on activity, 
negativity, embodiment, and a non-intentional relation to others, makes it first possible (if not 
necessary) to explore questions of inter-human relationships, history, society, politics, alienation 
and species being. As Williams suggests, the problematics introduced by Fichte (which are 
subsequently picked up by Hegel) “begin a massive transformation of philosophy into social and 
historical modes of thought.”200 
 The second claim is that, despite opening up a new horizon of intersubjective inquiry, 
Fichte is emblematic of Levinas’ claims about philosophy maintaining its pathological spin 
despite its radical shift in orientation. While Fichte opens the up the possibility of, and tacitly 
relies upon, Levinas’ primary insights, he initiates another influential tendency, one that 
proceeds by obfuscating, subordinating, and in some cases eliminating, this feature of the 
intersubjective experience. As the “ego” is demonstrated to be a socially mediated phenomenon, 
the immediacy, individuality and pre-social character of central categories like autonomy and 
freedom become increasingly untenable. Nevertheless, such concepts retain their fundamental 
nature and prominence, as something to be achieved in and through social relations. In a theme 
                                                 
199 The common sentiment that thinker X “anticipated” thinker Y is somewhat problematic but without an easy 
solution. As Asher Horowitz once commented in a lecture (in response to such a refrain): “I do not anticipate my 
children.” In such a way I would like to acknowledge that Fichte was, without a doubt, instrumental in changing 
the philosophical landscape, while, at the same time, avoiding the absurd claim that all such later developments 
can be explicitly traced back to Fichte. If the history of philosophy has taught us anything it is that few 
philosophers have actually read Fichte in a serious way, though this trend has certainly abated in recent decades.  
200 Robert R. Williams, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel On the Other (New York: State University of New York 
Press), p. 6. 
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that will reverberate in the philosophical aether countless times and in countless ways: because 
subjectivity is transformed into a problem of how one might cultivate (rather than immediately 
possess) freedom and autonomy, the lingering question for Levinas (and, even if it is to a lesser 
degree, for Marx) to what degree do the “moments” which precede such mastery become 
interpreted retroactively, from the standpoint of the free subject (or at least the subject desiring to 
be free). This is no less true of the “social subject” who inherits all the same tensions and 
problems that plague previous articulations. This begs the proper Levinasian question of whether 
the adventure of embodiment and intersubjectivity was ever in doubt, or, if the foray into 
“otherness” was merely a necessary detour on the path to autonomy proper. The possibility of 
atomism and solipsism are now precluded, to be sure, as we are bound to others and to the world; 
however we must further understand the precise character of this relation. Our question, as we 
approach Marx is this: in what ways do the themes of “idealist liberalism” persist as we move 
from solipsism to recognition or from the immediacy of experience and consciousness to more 
complex forms of freedom? 
 
Interiority, or, the infinity of the act 
 Perhaps an unavoidable symptom of breaking significantly new philosophical ground, 
one of the most interesting aspects of Fichte is that he captures an impressive swath of the 
philosophical spectrum. At some moments he represents the culmination of subjective idealism, 
where the object is fully dependent on the subject, while at other moments the materiality of 
one’s situation completely engulfs the subject. Perhaps the best entry point into Fichte’s 
philosophy of subjectivity is his telling modification of Kant’s category of “intellectual 
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intuition.” Whereas Kant used the term to signify the finitude of knowledge201 (the impossibility 
of knowing the “thing-in-itself”), intellectual intuition plays the exact opposite role in Fichte’s 
philosophy, where it functions as the feature that makes all knowledge possible. Fichte applauds 
Kant’s revolutionary move, which broke with the passivity of empiricism by prescribing an 
active role for the subject, nevertheless, he remains skeptical that Kant’s formulation is able to 
captures the radical kernel of subjective action. As a result, Fichte takes exception to the 
typical—or what he would call “ordinary” or “unphilosophical”—manner in which self-
consciousness is typically portrayed. When speaking about self-consciousness, philosophers 
(including, for Fichte, the majority of Kantians) posit the “self” as a pre-existing object, which 
lies in wait to be reflected upon by itself. According to Fichte, this kind of “ordinary” thinking 
imagines that self-consciousness proceeds in the same manner as any other act perception, where 
the subject observes an external object (like a chair, tree or a sunset). The problem with such a 
formulation is that, in Fichte’s estimation, it reproduces the same dichotomy, where “thinker and 
the thought are opposed,”202 that rightly exists when I observe a chair (I am not the chair), within 
self-consciousness itself—a situation where, unlike the chair, the thought of the self is the self-
proper.  
 For Fichte self-reflection is philosophically, ethically, and politically important because it 
is qualitatively different from ordinary perception, where we simply perceive independent object. 
As a good Kantian Fichte readily acknowledges that, even in such “ordinary” observations, 
perception is always an act of perception. However, this Kantian emphasis on the faculties of 
                                                 
201 For example, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (London: Henry G. Bohn, 
1855), p. 185. Here Kant clearly distinguishes between sensory intuition, by which we perceive objects, and 
intellectual intuition, where we directly know the object, a capacity that Kant states can only be ascribed to God. 
202 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Science of Knowledge ed. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge University Press, 
1970), p. 37.    
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apperception does not go far enough in capturing the unique feature of self-consciousness. Self-
consciousness is the one situation where there can be no separation between the subject and 
object: the self is both subject and object at the very same moment and thus, strictly speaking, 
the self does not exist prior to the thought which thinks of itself. The Kantian category of 
“intellectual intuition” thus cannot apply to the unique phenomena of self-consciousness, that is, 
the primordial ego can never be a thing-in-itself because it cannot exist (unlike a chair) apart 
from the act of perceiving itself. As Fichte states:  
[I]t is unphilosophical to believe that the I is anything other than its own deed and 
product simultaneously. As soon as we hear of the I as active, we do not hesitate to 
imagine a substratum that is supposed to contain this activity as bare capacity...The I is 
not something that has capacities, it is not a capacity at all, but rather is active; it is 
what it does, and when it does nothing, it is nothing.203 
 
Thus, a description of subjectivity that is able to capture the profundity of the act must 
necessarily disregard the bounds of grammar, where the predicate (action) is necessarily posited 
as the effect of a pre-existing subject (a point Nietzsche illustrates with the example of lightning, 
where grammar inherently separates “the lightning from its flash”204 as if lightning could be a 
subject independent of this action). Action is not something that subject just happens to do, 
rather, it is “only through this act that the self originally comes to exist for itself.”205  
 This has four interesting implications for Fichte, all of which are particularly germane to 
our present inquiry. The first is that, because the “I” does not refer to a substance or set of pre-
existing faculties, then subjectivity cannot be rendered in terms that would intuit even the 
slightest hint of passivity. On this point Fichte is unambiguous: 
The intellect…is only active and absolute, never passive; it is not passive because it is 
postulated to be first and highest, preceded by nothing which could account for a 
                                                 
203 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right ed. Frekerick Neuhouser trans. Michael Bauer   
foundations, (Cambridge university Press, 2000), p. 23. 
204 Fredrich Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals trans. Horace B. Samuel (NY: Dover Publications, 2003), p. 26.  
205 Fichte, Science, p. 34. 
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passivity therein. For the same reason, it also has no being proper, no subsistence, for 
this is the result of an interaction and there is nothing either present or assumed with 
which the intellect could be set to interact. The intellect, for idealism, is an act, and 
absolutely nothing more; we should not even call it an active something, for this 
expression refers to something subsistent in which activity inheres.206 
 
The problem with “being,” as Fichte is acutely aware, is that it is begins from a position of 
passivity; a situation where the I is already bound to a determinate existence. While our 
conscious experience of everyday life of course begins from such a perspective (where I exist in 
particular body which exists within a given set of circumstances) this fails to grasp the infinite 
and irreducible potential operative within self-consciousness. This leads us directly to the second 
point, that freedom is always prior, and in opposition to, existence.207 As Fichte puts it succinctly, 
for “the idealist, the only positive thing is freedom; existence, for him, is a mere negation of the 
latter.”208 This means that, for “transcendental idealism” existence is secondary and derivative, 
only conceivable “through opposition to activity.”209  
 This brings us to the third point. While existence is derived from its opposition to 
freedom, we can, ironically, only become aware of our freedom once it has entered the sensible 
world. That is, freedom is only observable at the very moment it has been negated. Existence 
thus represents both the evidence and erasure of our freedom. In this opposition of freedom to 
existence we can observe that Fichte’s notion of intellectual intuition does in fact retain some 
residue of the Kantian thing-in-itself, albeit in a new form. Even though the subject coincides 
with its act, this concurrence cannot be perfectly transparent, and, as a result, there is always 
something hidden and impenetrable about our self-hood. That is, we can never witness our 
                                                 
206 Fichte, Science, p. 21 
207 This is also how Fichte is able to reconcile his philosophy of intellectual intuition with Kant’s prohibition on 
immediate apperception. Fichte states that the thing-in-itself is a category that can only be applied to existence and 
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intuition “refers, not to existence at all, but rather to action, and simply finds no mention in Kant.” Science, p. 46.  
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freedom immediately because freedom can only be observed to the degree that it becomes 
manifested within a finite manifestation. As Fichte explains: 
I cannot become conscious of my own freedom. For freedom in itself is the ultimate 
explanatory basis for all consciousness, and thus freedom itself cannot belong to the 
realm of consciousness. What I can become conscious of, however, is that I am 
conscious of no cause for a certain voluntary determination of my empirical I other than 
my will itself…one might well say that this very lack of any consciousness of a cause is 
itself a consciousness of freedom - and we wish to call it such here. In this sense then, 
one can be conscious of one’s own free action.210  
 
This point is crucial. Freedom is not a property witnessed within consciousness but the very 
frame of consciousness itself. Freedom is thus described as a “fact of consciousness,”211 and “the 
most primordial act of the subject,”212 which conditions and thus precedes consciousness. The 
self is thus always out of phase with, or lagging behind, itself, as it cannot translate—at least 
completely—its subjective essence into objective form.  
 The first three aspects (the non-substantial ego, that existence is derivative, and pre-
conscious nature of freedom) reach their culmination in a fourth dimension of Fichte’s thought, 
which is that philosophy is not just some pedantic exercise but a moral undertaking. If one 
departs from the standpoint of ordinary thought, which begins with categories like “fact,” 
“being,” “substance,” “existence,” “attributes,” and “faculties,” they remain, according to Fichte, 
confined by the shackles of finitude: 
It is therefore not so trivial a matter as it seems to some, whether philosophy starts out 
from a fact or an Act (that is, from a pure activity which presupposes no object, but 
itself produces it, and in which the acting, therefore, immediately becomes the deed). If 
it proceeds from the fact, it places itself in the world of existence and finitude, and will 
find it difficult to discover a road from thence to the infinite and supersensible; if it sets 
out from Act, its stands precisely at the point joining the two worlds, from whence they 
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can be surveyed with a single glance.213  
 
Such a perspective lacks any normative ground from which to make or evaluate between 
competing judgements. This is why, in his estimation, pseudo-Kantians, who ignore the 
primordial activity that underlies the faculties of apperception, have not the resources to explain 
or expound upon the moral categories. For this reason Fichte mocks the Kantians who begin with 
“fact,” stating that their concept of “right would have to turn out square, say, and their virtue 
circular.”214  
 Here we are finally able to see the full force of intellectual intuition in the Fichtean sense. 
In a sentiment which will become the modus operandi of subsequent existentialist thought, 
Fichte readily accepts that existence can only exist to the degree that it is determinate, 
nevertheless, if we begin from “fact” the subject will become an object so weighed down by 
inertia of its circumstance that it will fail to realize its latent potentiality. To forget the 
constitutive moment of subjectivity is to be chained to finitude: where the “I” is defined by 
arbitrary, yet static, social categories (where the “who” is always reduced to a “what”), where the 
individual will never signify to more than a collection of assorted labels (like “worker,” 
“student,” “mother”), and where thought is unable to transcend the terms of stale dogma (where 
systems and concepts can never express the meaning they have for me). In such a situation the 
ontological weight of the totality of relations which define us effectively extinguish the spark of 
freedom that lies dormant within each thought. Mired in the muck of finitude, Fichte—to 
foreshadow Marx—worries that thoughts begin to think the subject rather than the obverse.  
 If we begin from act, on the other hand, the future will become a realm of infinite 
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possibility. As Fichte states, if I have regard not for the thought or object but for “myself,” I will 
no longer be “restricted” by existence but will be able to “hold myself freely in this sphere.”215 In 
true philosophical self-reflection the I is able to “catch oneself in the act,”216 that is think itself 
with itself, and thus determine its existence in accordance with its infinitude. The unity of the 
thinking act with the thought creates the possibility of a truly self-determined subject, a situation 
where the “I” is both the act and the limitation of the act—simultaneously infinite and 
determinate. This self-objectification enables the subject to transcend the “thing-ness” of its 
being and the rigidity of thought. This is why Fichte proclaims that philosophy (including his 
own) must be an activity, something lived for oneself, not just a set of concepts to be memorized 
and recited. 
 
Negativity as a Bridge to the External World in General 
 Thus far it might be difficult to argue that Fichte’s emphasis on the non-substantial ego is 
sufficient to support the claim made by Wood that Fichte is the “earliest decisively anti-Cartesian 
in the continental tradition,”217 let alone Rockmore’s assertion that Fichte philosophy provides us 
with “the origin of Marx’s conception of human being.”218 Indeed, most caricatures end here, 
with the conclusion that Fichte’s radicalization of Kant would seem to necessitate a diminished, 
rather than prominent, role for the external world. The question facing Fichte is the same one we 
will put to Levinas, after bracketing out the realm of phenomenal experience, does “being” 
remain an undifferentiated mass on the hither side of subjectivity, to be defined negatively, as 
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little more than the evidence that subjectivity has been effaced?  
 While it is no doubt true that this modification does indeed exalt the subject beyond the 
bounds that Kant would allow, it ironically demands that Fichte take materiality more seriously. 
The Kantian subject was able to maintain a largely monological relationship to the objective 
world because of the radical bifurcation between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. Here the 
subject cannot grasp the object in its entirety but in no way is this limitation depicted by Kant as 
frustration; the subject simply takes what it can (by giving the world space, time etc.) and cares 
little about what is left untouched by perception (the realm where Kant famously leaves “room 
for faith”). The Fichtean subject is afforded no such luxury. The insistence on grounding 
perception in the infinitely free act, which could be limitless if it were not for the obstinacy of 
existence, implores Fichte to interrogate both sides of this relationship. The paradox of Fichte’s 
idealism is that its exaggerated posture opens up the possibility of a dialectical relationship 
between the subject and object, or, subjectivity and the material world.  
 Defining the self as a free act means that selfhood and existence are, for Fichte, 
primordially coupled. The goal for Fichte is to discover self-consciousness proper, but this 
necessarily means that, because the self only exists to the degree that it acts, it must find itself 
within its activity. As he writes, 
In order to find itself it would have to find itself as only self-active; otherwise, it would 
not find itself and, since it does not find anything at all unless it exists, and does not 
exist unless it finds itself, it follows that it would not find anything at all. In order to 
find itself as an object (of its reflection), it would have to find itself, not as determining 
itself to be self-active…but rather as determined to be self-active by means of an 
external check (Anstoß) which must nevertheless leave the subject in full possession of 
its freedom to be self-determining: for otherwise, the first point would be lost, and the 
subject would not find itself as an I.219 
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Self-consciousness is accordingly not predicated upon a theoretical “efficacy in general” or a 
“possible efficacy,”220 but a concrete practical relationship to the external world. As a result, to 
“find oneself” essentially means to create oneself, that is, to objectify freedom in such a way that 
the ego can identify itself within its objective manifestation. This means that activity already 
implies an “external check,” or “something in opposition to that efficacy.”221 The act and the 
negation of the act (or the I and the not-I) are thus two sides of the same coin of subjectivity—
even if Fichte will never relinquish the priority of act over fact, they are, to quote Gottlieb, “co-
emergent or co-constituted.”222  
 This point is crucial, we are not dealing here with the typical kind of platonic, religious or 
Rationalist dualism, where a pure substance (be it the “Forms,” “God,” or “Reason”) becomes 
sullied as it enters the realm of existence. Freedom and existence are now dialectically related in 
the sense that freedom can only exist in the very moment that it has been negated (even if this 
negation is only partial). To put it in theological terms, God does not precede the creation of the 
world, rather, the creation of the world is, at the same time, the creation of God. Thus, Fichte can 
maintain that “being” is “utterly opposed to the self” while at the same time conferring it with 
the status of “an external prime mover.” This is because without exteriority the self “would never 
have acted” and, Fichte concludes, “since it's existence consists solely in acting, it would never 
have existed either.”223 As a result materiality of the subject, which is immediately apparent in 
every desire, will and intuition, does not “precede nor follow the I,” for Fichte but, on the 
contrary, these features “are themselves the I.”224  
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 Here, as we interrogate the relationship between freedom, activity and intersubjectivity, 
we must pause and appreciate the way in which Fichte has heightened the philosophical stakes. 
Fichte’s construal of freedom, which eradicates any notion of a substantial subject, has 
effectively taken the philosophical spectrum, represented by activity on one side and passivity on 
the other, and folded it in half. There is no longer any moderate or nuanced position: Fichte has 
limited himself to a conceptual vocabulary that can only describe subjectivity in terms of 
absolute self-constitution or else a kind of radical passivity, where exteriority does not merely 
leave its imprint (again, because there is no substratum to be imprinted upon) but, on the 
contrary, calls the subject into being. This self-imposed limitation is perhaps best represented in 
Fichte’s account of sensibility which is blanched of all sense of receptivity, where sensation is 
reduced a feeling of mere resistance as the subject attempts (in vain) to annihilate the object (and 
even this slowing down of subjective momentum, though still not passive, connotes a sense of 
weakness for Fichte).  
 The second of these options, where passivity which is not merely tolerated by the subject 
but constitutive of subjectivity as such, represents a significant theoretical possibility. Such a 
possibility is already evident in the Science of Knowledge where Fichte discusses the constituting 
role of the Anstoß. In line with our inquiry about the importance of philosophical “depth,” it is 
telling that every interpreter or translator of Fichte is seemingly obliged to address the difficulty 
of defining, let alone translating, this conception of an external force that is constitutive of the 
subject. Does it mean “check,” “limit,” “negate,” “constrain” or is it closer to “impetus,” “push,” 
or “impulse”? Though it is often implied or tacitly understood (though rarely directly confronted) 
is that, just as we saw with respect to the terms “hostage” and “hospitality” in Levinas, at this 
level of pre-subjective abstraction, the distinction between being “pushed” or “checked” by the 
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exterior world is rather meaningless. If there is no subject to speak of, being pushed and being 
obstructed are functionally the same thing in that both imply a relationship with the material 
world that engenders the self-proper. Thus the trouble defining Anstoß (and its related concepts) 
is not merely a linguistic problem but a philosophical problem of the highest order: how exactly 
do we conceive of the relationship between consciousness and materiality, both analytically and 
normatively.  
 For his part Fichte goes so far as to label the Anstoß the “first mover,” because without 
desires, goals, objects, and ideas, the ego has no impetus to action. It would thus to be a 
misunderstanding to think of the Anstoß as only, or even primarily, an object (or not-I) that resist 
the will. The Anstoß is merely the brick wall that my fist cannot penetrate but already the fist and 
body that enclose the ego, the desire to break through, and so forth, because these are 
determinate instantiations of infinite freedom. This is important because the self-conscious 
individual does not experience all limitations as limitation; without this primordial limitation—
where the pre-subjective act becomes fused with the Anstoß—self-consciousness would never 
arise at all. Freedom does not first exist and then, subsequent to its existence, become 
constrained. This gesture towards materiality and embodiment raises, for Fichte, the same 
challenges previously noted with respect to Levinas and Heidegger, namely a situation where a 
relationship with the exteriority is not a contingent event that befalls the subject but the very 
event of subjectivity as such. Thus negativity is not only something experienced by the subject as 
it reaches a limit or obstacle, but a phenomenon always already implicated in its experience of 
self-consciousness (which is to say the experience of experiencing anything at all). In fact, this is 
the very origin of the problem for Fichte, the subject is so embedded within its lifeworld that it 
becomes all too easy to forget the miracle of freedom which lies dormant within every self-
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consciousness—evidenced by those who blindly follow their instincts, desires and social norms. 
Though he takes a circuitous route (to say the least), Fichte does certainly arrive at theory of 
subjectivity that emphasizes the materiality of one’s situation.  
 
Non-intentionality and the summons: Fichte’s Levinasian moment 
 This dynamic becomes extremely important as Fichte moves from an analysis of the 
material world in general to the specific relationship between humans. It is especially when 
discussing the other, the most unique species of “not-I,” that Fichte’s radicalization of idealism 
opens the door to a new understanding of intersubjectivity. This development, however, is 
anything but linear or even. With one foot in monological idealism and one foot in an emerging 
form of materialism, Fichte is able to make significant headway but often in the clumsiest of 
fashions. As some possibilities are pursued, ignored or foreclosed, Fichte overcomes some of his 
most stark idealist tendencies, while others are simply re-introduced at a higher pitch.   
 The Anstoß continues to be a central theme in many of Fichte’ subsequent works as he 
continues to investigate the depths of the relationship between the self and the external world. 
Fichte’s discussion from the Foundations of Natural Right is of particular relevance to our 
present inquiry. As before, Fichte emphasizes the role of practical activity while, at the same 
time, doubting whether freedom left to itself can account for its own origins. This is because 
activity (or at least the kind that expresses the impulse of freedom) presupposes that the ego 
already understands that objects are “infinitely alterable” according to their “will,” which, in 
turn, assumes a theoretical conception of the world, including not only the distinction between 
those things that are free to shape existence and those things which are not, but also an awareness 
of the various ways in which said transformations could take form. As Fichte states, the I “cannot 
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posit itself as having an effect on a particular object without all the while representing that 
particular object.”225 If one is to create, alter and represent the external world in a complex way 
one must necessarily possess a sufficient concept of freedom. Fichte is thus concerned, as 
Gottlieb nicely summarizes, with “practical and cognitive relationship to the external world,” 
which means that freedom is “not simply as the ability to move around without interference but 
also as the freedom to make objective judgments…to have a cognitive relationship to the 
world.”226  
 The full image of freedom cannot be deduced from the ego alone, it must, according to 
Fichte, be first observed outside the subject. Fichte thus concludes that an always prior encounter 
with another free being must be contained within the individual act, be it representation, thought 
or activity. This encounter with the other (already sketched out in the Science of Knowledge227) is 
described as a “bare summons [Aufforderung] calling upon the subject to act.” As Fichte 
continues: “Thus as surely as the subject comprehends the object, so too does it possess the 
concept of its own freedom and self-activity, and indeed as a concept given to it from the 
outside.”228 Fichte’s philosophy, as Williams put it, confronts us “with the following paradox: 
autonomous self-consciousness is not a given; it is a mediated result of interpersonal 
interaction.”229 Fichte has here opened up a different kind of relationship to the other, one that 
does not occur at the level of consciousness, intentionality or representation.  
 This non-intentional relationship with others is presupposed in thinking, knowledge, 
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intelligibility, in sum, in how the ego experiences both itself and the external world. This relation 
is, by definition, non-intentional230 because self-consciousness (that which is presupposed in 
intention) is not the author of this relationship, but the result. At times Fichte apprehends this 
point with great clarity. The inter-human relation, described as a “summons,” has a noticeably 
different tone than Fichte’s other discussion of the “not-I.” Like the Anstoß this entanglement is 
described as prior to the thinking subject, however, it exhibits a more nuanced logic from that of 
simple negation. Concerning the non-human external world Fichte expectedly claims that free 
activity “aims at nullifying…objects,” which gives the object a certain independence from the 
subject, but only in a negative sense, as that which “curbs,” “checks,” and “limits” free 
activity.231 One might thus expect Fichte to describe the other as unique, but only insofar as it 
proves to be the most exceptional form of primordial resistance. Instead Fichte claims that it 
would be a “genuine contradiction,” to believe that freedom could mediate this relationship 
because, at this level, freedom can only appear as something that “ought to exist in the future” 
but not “in the present.”232 Though freedom is the ontological ground zero for Fichte, this is the 
one place where he ponders the possibility of a hiatus, a place where freedom is secondary 
because the aim to “nullify” would already presupposes this prior relation. Freedom is to be 
found in self-consciousness, of that there is no doubt, and yet, as Fichte puts it in the 
Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy, “[c]onsciousness begins with consciousness of a 
summons.”233 While some have posited a sharp divide between pre- and post- Husserlian 
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philosophies of intersubjectivity,234 it is this common feature, it would appear, that provides the 
basis for all intersubjective inquiry. Simply put, our relationship with others is not only 
something we intend (though it can certainly be that) because this very intention, like every 
intension, speaks to an always prior entanglement with others.  
 In the concept of the “summons,” Fichte, however briefly, provides a conceptual opening 
capable of grasping the intersubjective relation in a way that does not merely consider the other 
from the standpoint of consciousness, and it is this precise inclination towards non-subordination 
that Levinas will later seize upon.235 While Fichte has been justifiably credited with setting the 
groundwork for the intersubjective articulations of Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Sartre, and even 
Lacan,236 his “mirror theory” of intersubjectivity—where the self becomes self-conscious only 
through seeing its reflection in the face of the other—this aspect of the inter-human relation has a 
decidedly different feel in Fichte, at least in these moments, than it does in these later 
articulations. The non-substantial subject gives Fichte occasion to consider that ways in which 
the image of freedom is gifted by the other, rather than simply reflected or won through an 
antagonistic struggle. As a result, despite their obvious similarities, Sartre’s emphasis on the 
conflictual nature of this encounter, where the “I” becomes fixed by the objectifying gaze of the 
other, is (at least at this primordial level) unimaginable.237 While Sartre similarly begins from the 
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standpoint of an infinite “nothingness,” this (pre-)subjective realm already includes (at least in 
Being and Nothingness) access to the very faculties of self-consciousness that Fichte deduces as 
possible only out of this very interaction. Thus Sartre’s pseudo-Levinasian claim that “I am 
possessed by the Other,” is described as a theft, even if it is acknowledged to be a necessary 
moment of self-consciousness. Thus intersubjectivity is constantly posed as a retroactive 
challenge to regain what has been lost. “I should be obliged,” as Sartre puts it, “to recover and 
found in order to be the foundation of myself. But this is conceivable only if I assimilate the 
Other’s freedom. Thus my project of recovering myself is fundamentally a project of absorbing 
the Other.”238 At this point Sartre is careful to note, echoing Hegel (and to a degree Fichte), that, 
for the sake of my freedom, I must leave the “Other’s nature intact,” but, the point I wish to 
underscore is Fichte’s departure from this model insofar as he acknowledges that there is no 
original crime because there is no freedom to speak of (at least in any substantial sense) prior to 
this interaction. Because this relation is not preceded by a mediating third term (such as freedom, 
cognition, or representation) intersubjectivity is conceived of (at least at this point) as an 
openness to others rather than a site of primordial contestation.  
 This lengthy analysis of Fichte thus serves a dual purpose. Not only can it help us better 
understand what is at stake in theories of intersubjectivity (what possibilities are opened up, and, 
of those possibilities which are developed, which are ignored, and which are foreclosed) but it 
can also help us clarify many of the interpretive issues raised in the first two chapters with 
respect to Levinas’ supposed “hyperbolic” and “masochistic” language. Much like Levinas 
Fichte runs up against the inherent limitations of concepts like activity, negativity, representation, 
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self-consciousness and freedom. As a result, the translation of Auffordung (summons) is 
seemingly even more puzzling for interpreters than the Anstoß. While Anstoß already contained a 
sense of priority (“first mover”) this primacy was more formal, as a necessary moment in the 
self-discovery of freedom as an embodied phenomenon. The Auffordung, or summons, goes 
beyond this sense of freedom expressed through limitation, as it represents the relation to the 
other as something closer to an exogenous moment of rupture—out of which freedom emerges as 
a possibility to be seized. Accordingly, the linguistic and philosophical limitations (both of which 
are predicated on the dominion of the subject) reproduce the same tension where interpreters 
quibble about whether the “summons” should be translated as “coercion,” “request,” “beg,” 
“demand,” “require,” or “invitation.”239 Regardless of what term we choose, the crucial, and 
once again under-appreciated, point is that Fichte is describing a relationship apart from our 
gnoseological experience of others (where others are perceived in so far as they register as a set 
of facts within consciousness). 
 For this reason, Fichte’s analysis of subjectivity can clarify the important connection that 
Levinas establishes between the singularity, normativity, and asymmetry—links that appears to 
be arbitrary, dogmatic and austere to the point of absurdity, once these concepts are taken as 
moral imperatives that merely describe how an already for-itself subject should perceive, or act 
toward, the other. Fichte, prior to making any prescriptive claims, is attempting to establish the 
complexity and depth of what it means to be a self-conscious being. Self-consciousness, it turns 
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out, entails many things. Not only does it require an understanding of what it means to be a free, 
active, and practical being but it also requires an awareness of how these capacities are already a 
testimony to our profound sociality. On this point Levinas and Fichte seem to converge: this 
emphasis on sociality invariably bring forth questions relating to the history and structure of 
various forms of life and thought (which we will momentarily get to), however, these concerns 
are grounded in, and thus cannot annul, the singularity and uniqueness of this entanglement with 
others. For Levinas this “responsibility” designates an orientation (and not a decision) which is 
antecedent to “freedom” and “representation,” which is why it expresses “a passivity more 
passive than all passivity” or an “exposure of exposedness.”240 For Levinas subjectivity is 
ultimately an expression of heteronomy rather than the capacity that can open itself to an-other.  
 The other is singular not because they are (contrary to some Levinasian commentators) 
designated by me as special, infinitely complex or unique. Rather, they are singular because they 
are not only experienced as a representation which means they do not immediately come under a 
collective banner. Of course all the caveats to the term “experience” and “immediately” must be 
applied as they designate a form of experience which is prior to consciousness and thus in our 
everyday experience of others they must, by the very nature of consciousness, appear under a 
theme, representation, symbol and collectivity. However, at the same time Fichte and Levinas 
will insist that this does not therefore mean that these can function as mediatory categories which 
could accept, rebuff, or soften this dimension (though this dimension is also always already 
entangled with an ontological dimension which often rejects, excludes and subordinates the 
other, a point which we will increasingly address). As Levinas puts it: “[i]n approaching the other 
I am always late for the meeting. But this singular obedience to the order to go, without 
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understanding the order, this obedience prior to all representation, this allegiance before any 
oath, this responsibility prior to commitment, is precisely the other in the same…”241 This 
dimension of the encounter persists whether the other is a stranger or “an old friend, an old lover, 
long caught up in the fabric of my social relations.” In either case they will, in-spite of 
everything, “[assign] me before I designate [them] as a τóδε τι [‘a this’].”242  
 What Fichte helps illustrate is that the profundity of this commitment to others is not 
predicated upon religious, abstract or even idealist principles (again, I would argue that this 
represents Fichte’s most important break with Kantian idealism). Rather, this relation speaks to 
the materiality and embodiment of subjectivity; an “inevitable orientation of being,”243 where, as 
Fichte states, “we are both bound and obligated to each other by our very existence.”244 A 
sentiment Levinas will repeat in his simple formulation: “To be unable to shirk: this is the I.”245 
The subordination of freedom and representation is thus not a search for an abstract ethical or 
religious “first principle” which would carry us away from the world, but an attempt to arrest the 
power and immediacy of self-consciousness in order to acquire a more profound understanding 
of what it means to be an embodied and intersubjective being. Of course self-consciousness, 
even in its most intimate and immediate expression, is already bound to the universal, as Fichte, 
(and to an even greater extent) Hegel, are well aware. But this insight is not by itself capable of 
revealing the structure of being-for-the-other, where the other is “the first one on the scene” who 
“orders me before being recognized,”246 not because they are morally superior but because they 
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are “more objective than objectivity”247 or, similarly, “the evidence that makes evidence 
possible.”248 That is, the other will signify a content which is irrespective to the signs and 
symbols it inevitably carries with it, and thus exhibit a normativity around which subjectivity 
coils.  
 Neither first an obstacle nor a collective (though the other certainly can appear as both of 
these things) the radically singular other is what calls subjectivity proper into being. Fichte’s act 
is, in context of the summons, not so much act as it is a response. As Williams describes, in 
strikingly Levinasian terms, for Fichte “freedom arises out of the claims of the other upon 
me.”249 Perhaps analogous to the way the an object in orbit will, through the consistency and 
symmetry of its circular path, create the illusion of independence and self-propulsion, masking 
the fact that it is an object in a state of perpetual fall around another body, self-consciousness, 
despite its sovereign appearance, is already structured as a response (or, responsibility, as 
Levinas puts it). In Fichte’s terms, “I must be given to myself as free – as strange as that may 
seem at first blush.”250  
 This movement is especially interesting in Fichte because the normativity of the other is 
derived from its potential to invert the relationship of freedom over exteriority, a priority which 
Fichte intended to establish. This inversion, which Levinas regularly labels “asymmetry,” or the 
“curvature of intersubjective space,” is once again captured by Williams: 
Fichte is not arguing that since I am free there must be others, for that would only 
establish the other as a condition of possibility. Instead Fichte argues the opposite: 
Because another has summoned me, I become explicitly conscious of my freedom and 
responsibility. In the Aufforderung, the other as the occasion for evocation of my 
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consciousness of freedom, has priority over my own activity. This priority of the other 
limits and inverts the transcendental primacy of subjectivity over being…Consequently, 
Aufforderung is not simply a transcendental condition a priori, but a fact, a given…it 
refers to the prior action of the other.
251
 
Thus, the other is normative not because it tells the ego what it should do or how it should act. 
The other is normative because its very signification (prior or beneath intelligibility) makes 
possible a theoretical understanding of the self, the world, and the relation between the self and 
the world. While this address does not have the same appearance of solidity and permanence as 
the hermeneutical structures and the historical relations in which it takes place, it is the meaning 
of subjectivity in the most concrete terms.  
 Given Zizek’s critique of Levinas’ phenomenology (which is over and above his disdain 
for his “ethics”) it is interesting that his “materialist” reading of Fichte highlights the very 
Levinasian dimension he elsewhere purports to disavow. Translating Fichte into Lacanese, Zizek 
implies that it is only through this traumatic encounter, where the ego is confronted with a 
“shock” of pure exteriority, that the subject is gifted its freedom. In Zizek’s words,  
this ‘shock’ has to arise ‘out of nowhere’ because of the subject’s radical finitude - it 
stands for the intervention of the radical Outside which, as such, by definition cannot be 
deduced...At this point, finitude (being constrained by the Other) and freedom are no 
longer opposed, since it is only through the shocking encounter of the obstacle that I 
becomes free.252 
 
In this reading Zizek appears to understand quite well that a decontexutalized other that arises 
“out of nowhere” or from “the radical Outside,” is not in fact the work of liberal moralistic 
phenomenological fantasy but rather points towards the asymmetry of intersubjectivity.  
 The alignment of Fichte and Levinas—in which the other implies a passivity “more 
passive still than any receptivity, in which for philosophers the supreme model of the passivity of 
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the subject resides”253—illuminates the strange paradox of Fichte’s idealism. Fichte begins a 
process that seeks to expunge all determinations and limitations from the subject, however, in 
doing so Fichte began to contemplate the kind of radical passivity alluded to by Levinas. While 
the act was invoked to establish the supremacy of the subject, by unfettering it of the weight of 
existence it effectively exposed the subject to a kind of vulnerability altogether different than 
receptivity traditionally understood. However, the Manichean character of Fichte’s philosophy—
where the subject is either absolute or it is called into being—also makes the looming revenge of 
the act that much more of a perilous prospect.  
 
The retroactive subject and the journey to subjectivity write large 
 The summons is, however, only one, very specific, dimension of our overall social 
experience. As both Fichte and Levinas will readily acknowledge, this entanglement not only 
occurs within, but creates, a socio-historical world. Levinas, standing on the shoulders of Hegel, 
Marx, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and many more, largely takes these other regions of “being” 
for granted (and is thus largely content to illuminate what they obscure). Fichte, on the contrary, 
forges ahead to work through the socio-political implications, tensions and contradictions that 
inevitably arise. Above all Fichte’s intersubjectivity complicates his earlier claim about the moral 
significance of true self-consciousness (or “philosophical thinking”). Here Fichte described 
freedom as the ability of the self to think itself with itself (or, as Hegel would put it, in and for 
itself), and thus truly determine itself by achieving a harmony between its subjective (the 
thinker) and objective (the thought) dimensions. Now that we understand the relationship 
between the self, others and the world, it turns out that this task is more difficult than we might 
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have initially anticipated. The “objective side” of self-consciousness can no longer be limited to 
the thought of the self because the “thought” of myself already includes my practical engagement 
with the world, which, in turn, relies upon my relation to others. As a result, Fichte’s injunction 
to seize the infinity of the act by thinking with oneself necessarily means to think with oneself 
with others. We can now confirm Wood and Rockmore’s earlier claim about Fichte because, 
here, self-consciousness—and the freedom discovered therein—no longer exists in a closed 
Cartesian loop, where the mind discovers itself through a strictly internal process. For those that 
follow in Fichte’s footsteps, from Marx onwards, freedom is about the perpetual re-collection of 
oneself with others in and through the world.  
 This point is crucial because it marks the precise point where Fichte and Levinas will 
diverge. To be clear, this divergence is not so much the result of Levinas charting an alternative 
path through the socio-political world, rather, it results from the fact that Levinas stops at the 
point where Fichte is just beginning to gain momentum. This topic, as it pertains to Levinas, will 
be raised in the next chapter in much more detail but it is important to note that, much like 
Fichte, Levinas realizes that the primordial inter-human relation must manifest itself within a 
word, theme, context, work or other material phenomena. Much like Fichte’s “act,” this moment 
of actualization is rendered by Levinas as both “inevitable” and a “betrayal;” a necessary tribute 
which will invariably obfuscate the moment from which it lives, where the other is “for me.” 
While Levinas does hint at the possibility that such a betrayal could be “reduced,”254 such a 
possibility is rarely pursued. This, all too often, leaves one with the sense that the relationship 
between “responsibility” and “politics” remains circumscribed within a paradox, where human 
existence is defined by a kind of generic alienation that is inevitable and unavoidable (which 
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leads to the critiques discussed in the first chapter, which links the fear that all forms of 
representation are already totalitarian to the ineffectual politics of defeatism).  
 Fichte, by contrast, begins to increasingly focus on the other side of this equation. Here 
he becomes consumed by the way words, representations and political institutions actually 
change the way humans relate both to themselves and to each other. For the ego does not only 
relate to the other in the Levinasian pre-conscious singular way but also at the level of generality, 
where, through its interactions humanity constitutes itself as a “species.” As Fichte writes, 
notably a half-century before Marx’s famous articulation of “species being”: 
The human being (like all finite beings in general) becomes a human being only among 
human beings; and since the human being can be nothing other than a human being and 
would not exist at all if it were not this…Thus the concept of the human being is not the 
concept of an individual—for an individual human being is unthinkable—but rather the 
concept of a species.255  
 
This move is crucial for our discussion of Marx because Fichte’s primary point is not merely 
representational (that I understand myself as a species) but developmental. Namely, that 
autonomy, individually or the form of consciousness itself is a product of a socio-historic 
development. Fichte thus describes how the perfectibility of the “species” does not originate in 
human “nature” but is rather the product of human (inter)actions: we must make ourselves what 
we want to become through education and “labor.”256 This transformation of intersubjectivity 
from a “theoretical problem” into “a problem of actions” is, according to Williams, “Fichte’s 
most original contribution,” because it demonstrates how consciousness is “embedded in various 
modes of social praxis, not all of which are transparently rational.”257 For all of Fichte’s 
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disparaging talk of finitude, norms, conformity, titles and labels, it turns out that freedom 
requires a particular set of socio-historic conditions.  
 Perspective is, however, everything. On the one hand, we can affirm the way in which 
Fichte goes beyond Levinas in thinking through the practical and political implications of human 
sociality. On the other hand, we must ask if Fichte sufficiently seizes the Levinasian moment, so 
as to lead to a radically different understanding of what it means to be a social being, or, 
alternatively, does this moment of heteronomy invite autonomy the same way an open wound 
begs for a suture? Put differently, is this dramatic expansion of the subjective field—where 
subjectivity is an expression of openness to others and to the world—viewed retroactively, that 
is, already from the stand point of its inevitable point of closure? On these questions, as one 
might by now expect, the results are mixed and uneven.  
 There are indeed times where Fichte expresses a yearning to accomplish, in social and 
political terms, something close to what Levinas describes at the level of subjectivity. This is 
evident in Fichte’s discussion of the importance of education in creating “a community among 
free beings as such,”258 which is opposed to society that would “employ rational beings as means 
for their own ends.”259 This utopic sentiment is encapsulated in his vision of establishing a 
political community free from cohesion, where, he concludes in similar terms to Marx, “the goal 
of all government is to make government superfluous.”260 However, modern society is, for 
Fichte, a great distance from these lofty aspirations. Once again anticipating Marx, Fichte 
describes society in an alienated state, where the social bond is experienced as in a perverted 
form, as pure instrumentality. As he writes,  
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We desired a member of society, and we produce a tool of society. We desired a free 
fellow-worker on our great project, and we produce a coerced, passive instrument of the 
same. Thus, as far as we were able, we have killed the man within the person we have 
treated in this manner; we have wronged him, and we have wronged society.261 
 
In such declarations it is clear that Fichte has not only transcended individualistic conceptions of 
freedom (where others are a mere obstacle frustrating my trajectory or desire) but the more 
intersubjective variants, where the “I” has no choice but to engage with others and society at 
large if it is to recollect itself and actualize the freedom latent within self-consciousness. Here 
Fichte indicates a fundamentally different orientation, where one is already concerned for others 
in a way that does not circle back to the domain of egoism, where the detour into the social 
represents more than the expansion of subjective powers.  
 However—and it is a big however—as prominent, important and influential as these 
threads may be, they are too often mired in a dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy which 
maintains the strict priority of the former in spite of the necessity of the latter. Fichte must 
abandon the possibility of a simple or immediate unity, to be sure, but throughout his philosophy 
there remains a longing to recover what was lost. As such, subjectivity is not defined by the 
ontological giveness of freedom, autonomy or self-coincidence but by the ability to create such a 
unity through mastery. Regardless at which level, be it the individual, collective, ethical or the 
political (all of which must converge on some level), the challenge of subjectivity-as-
intersubjectivity is to corral the disparate circumstances, forces and drives into a coherent, and 
thus free, Subject.  
 The goal of self-coincidence runs throughout Fichte’s analysis—from Jena to Berlin—as 
his object of inquiry increasingly shifts from individual consciousness to culture, politics and 
economics. At the level of the individual, Fichte describes the “drive” for “self-determination” 
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which is not given to me by “nature” (because this would imply a reliance on something external 
to my choice) but a drive that I “posit…as my own.”262 This autonomous drive “when 
apprehended in its totality” imparts us with the imperative that, “I am supposed to be a self-
sufficient I; this is my final end. I am supposed to use things in any way that will increase this 
self-sufficiency; that is their final end.”263 As Kelly notes in his seminal work on Fichte’s 
politics, the “[n]on-ego exists only for consciousness and for freedom…nature cannot be 
absolutely sloughed off, but it ought to be absolutely mastered.”264 The mastery of everything 
outside of the ego has obvious and important implications for the domination of non-human 
aspects of nature, while some have also enlisted Levinas to engage with such concerns265 we will 
(with some trepidation, given the present state of things) bracket out ecological considerations in 
order to focus on the inter-human relation.  
 The self-gifted imperative to become “self-sufficient” is at obvious odds with Fichte’s 
previously discussed “summons,” which expressed subjectivity as a movement of one-for-the-
other. Fichte grapples with this apparent contradiction throughout his work. Ever fearful of 
giving the final word to the other, Fichte will typically, and often contradictory, reassert the 
primacy of primordial autonomy. For example, in The Foundations of Natural Right, after 
describing the absolute necessity of the (prior and exterior) other, Fichte immediately counters 
this point by stating that “if there is such a summons, then the rational being must necessarily 
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posit a rational being outside itself as the cause of the summons, and thus it must posit a rational 
being outside itself in general.”266 In an effort to save the appearances, Fichte claims that “the 
summons” is simultaneously triggered through an act of cognition. This important modification 
effectively frees the subject from the grasp of the other, effectively making the response to the 
other conditional. Though the entanglement with the other was previously considered the ground 
of consciousness as such, Fichte now blurs the depth of human relations, referring to the 
“summons” at the level of the already self-conscious (and thus free) being, who can now “just as 
well refrain”267 from the call of the other. Robert Williams sums up this point nicely as he 
expounds on the inescapable contradiction at the heart of Fichte’s intersubjectivity: “The other 
who summons me is a phenomenon; however transcendentally-practically considered, I summon 
myself. The intersubjective significance of the summons seems to be subordinate to the 
requirement of autonomy...The phenomenal ‘other’ appears superfluous.”268 As a result “The 
other, who by summoning me, co-determines my determinability, is ultimately subordinate to or 
excluded by the requirement of strict autonomy, to wit, that all limitation and determination must 
be self-limitation.”269 In this vain the summons is reduced to a subjective echo, an exterior call 
that originated within the self. Such is a superlative example of what Levinas describes as the 
reduction of the other to the same by the imposition of a third term that mediates the summons.  
 The problem here is not mediation as such. Mediation is key to understanding Levinas’ 
view of subjectivity, where the self is mediated through without collapsing the distinction 
between the two. However, Levinas’ fear is that the radical nature of this entanglement is 
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obscured by reducing the other to a secondary, even contingent, aspect. By establishing the 
authority of a “third term,” which precedes the for-the-other, regardless of whatever journey the 
subject may embark upon, it is always accompanied with a metaphysical passport, or a 
primordial justification for their trajectory. This is as true, as Levinas points out, for 
individualistic theories (where the other is posited as obstacle) as it is for intersubjective ones 
(where the other is the positive condition of my freedom). While the third term ensures the 
comprehension of being—where the other is intelligible insofar as they appear as a series of 
intersecting designations (friend, immigrant, old, educated, woman, baseball fan) which are 
inevitably bound up with my projects (where they are either useful or an obstacle) or the 
aspirations for how one should comport themselves in the world more generally—it cannot be 
mistaken for the primary movement of intersubjectivity.  
 The force and priority of the “third term” becomes all the more apparent in Fichte as he 
moves from the intimacy of consciousness and experience to the plane of society, culture and 
politics. Within this shift the category of the “summons” begins to take on a different 
connotation. Instead of describing a non-intentional, pre-conscious, social relation subtracted 
from the social particulars, the “summons” is now associated with general processes of 
socialization, such as education, culture and “upbringing.”270 While many commentators make 
little of this progression, this slippage does not in fact represent a seamless continuity. Instead of 
indicating a primordial openess towards the other individuals are now “summoned” by a 
community towards a particular socio-political end. Once again, this shift is not in itself a 
problem. In fact, the insight that even the most intimate relations between people take place 
against a larger historical background is crucial to understanding subjectivity in a substantial 
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sense (which is why we cannot leave these aspects unthought as Levinas so often does). 
However, what Levinas can help us perceive is the ways in which this shift in analysis—from 
subjectivity, individuality, experience to intersubjectivity, history and structure—has often been 
accompanied by a corresponding normative shift which merely reproduces the problems which 
were thought to be overcome.  
 In the case of Fichte, we can witness how the conditionality of the summons (already 
instituted at the level of the individual) is repeated at a higher pitch as freedom and reason 
become embodied within language, culture, and political institutions. Accordingly, Fichte 
increasing draw sharper distinctions between those groups of people who embody “freedom” and 
the principles “transcendental philosophy” and those that do not. Thus the distinctions drawn 
between “humanity in general” and “a limited political community,” already espoused in his 
earliest works, become a theoretical touchstone for the mature Fichte, who, to quote Kelly, 
“‘nationalizes’ his vision of the community, only to insist on its cosmic relevance the more 
demandingly.”271 While Fichte does flirt with the notion of a pre-human savage (which he posits 
as necessary for dialectical reasons, that we cannot know ourselves as cultivated without positing 
a savage “other”) it is crucial to note that these fissures between humans are not typically 
conceived of as irremovable or eternal. Instead such demarcations are invoked to highlight the 
distance humanity has to go, and the obstacles it has to overcome, if the human race will ever be 
unified under the collective banner of freedom. Fichte is thus in a bind: at the most basic 
ontological level, humans are essentially equal in terms of their capacity to be free, and yet, only 
certain individuals and societies have actualized or refined this capacity. As a result, in order to 
actualize a the future harmonious society, Fichte demands the cultivation of the “merely sensual 
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civilizations.” Thus the proto-existentialist philosopher, who previously chided those who 
renounce their freedom by blindly accepting the dogma of convention famously, comes to the 
startling conclusion that: “It is the vocation of our race to unite itself into one single body, all the 
parts of which shall be thoroughly known to each other, and all possessed of a similar culture.”272 
 There is thus some truth to the often invoked Fichtean formula that “I=I” provided that 
we accept that an awful lot happens in the “=” that separates the two terms. The ego, in which  
“nothing alien is imported,”273 must recollect itself through a dialectic of fragmentation and 
appropriation, where the subject transcends itself through action and labor, slowly ossifying into 
a community and then a nation which, like the first embryo of freedom, is constituted as a whole. 
This journey thus concludes with a nation that is “without admixture of and corruption by some 
alien element that does not belong to the totality of this legislation.”274 Given that Levinas’ 
primary interlocutor was Heidegger, it is especially fitting that language is considered by Fichte 
to be the key conduit in the transformation of the subject to the Subject. Almost a hundred and 
forty years before Heidegger proclaimed that “language is the house of being,” Fichte wrote that 
“men are formed by language far more than language is by men.”275 Language is key, according 
to Fichte, because it is the congealment of a historical relationship between a people, land, 
culture, philosophy and politics. While language is used in an everyday manner to describe our 
immediate perception of the world, beneath the surface it contains philosophical worldview, or, 
as Fichte puts it, it directs us beyond the “sensuous” to a “supersensuous” realm of ideas.276 
These supersensuous ideas emanate out of the concrete experience of a community and therefore 
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each “nation” exists within their own semantic horizon. As a result, problems inevitable arise if a 
nation is forced to adopt a foreign language (through conquest or cultural assimilation) because 
the newly imported symbolic universe will not match the experience of the community. For this 
reason, Fichte claims that, because all other languages have been severed from their roots, 
German is the sole remaining “living” language. It is not so much that Fichte thinks that freedom 
and reason only speaks one tongue, rather he offers a kind of procedural explanation for the 
superiority of German, namely that it developed “without interruption”277 and thus it has been 
able to better preserve the philosophical principles of autonomy, reason and freedom. Put another 
way, because German is the linguistic product of the autonomous social and political 
development, it is intuitively equipped to speak the philosophy of freedom because it is already 
thoroughly steeped in its historical becoming. In Fichte’s words: 
The first difference between the fate of the Germans and that of the other tribes 
produced from the same stock to present itself directly to our notice is this: the former 
remained in the original homelands of the ancestral race, whereas the latter migrated to 
other territories; the former retained and developed the original language of the 
ancestral race, whereas the latter adopted a foreign language and gradually modified it 
after their own fashion. 278 
The term “foreign” is pejorative for Fichte but not because represents something essentially 
different in kind or from an inferior “stock.” Rather, it simply indicates that a given community 
has been cut off from its origins and, as a result, has become philosophically stunted. Dead 
languages, such as Latin (one of Fichte’s favourite targets) do not connect experience to the 
supersensuous world of ideas and thus they become fixed, dogmatic and stale, or, in Fichte’s 
terms, an “incoherent collection of arbitrary and utterly inexplicable signs of equally arbitrary 
concepts.”279 Somewhat paradoxically, it is because Germany is so firmly rooted in a place, 
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tradition and history, that it is uniquely suited to appreciate the dynamism of freedom and 
potency of life.  
 This distinction between living and dead languages has massive political import. The 
language of the German people “summarises at every step the totality of the sensuous and 
spiritual life of the nation as it is embedded in language in perfect unity, in order to designate a 
concept that is likewise not arbitrary but necessarily goes forth from the entire previous life of 
the nation.”280 German is much more than a language, it is a philosophical, cultural and political 
orientation, it is the historical manifestation of freedom. It is on these grounds that Fichte insists 
that the experience of subjectivity finds its highest possible expression in the “Fatherland.” As 
such, Fichte demands that, above one’s concern for “internal peace, property, personal freedom, 
life and the well-being of all” or “civic love for the constitution and laws,” one be consumed by 
the “blazing flame of the higher love of fatherland that embraces the nation as the vesture of the 
eternal, for which the noble man joyfully sacrifices himself and the ignoble, who exists only for 
the sake of the former, should likewise sacrifice himself.”281 Germany is not, however, just one 
fatherland among many. Though Fichte is at pains to demonstrate the necessary connection 
between concrete experience, ideas, language, and unimpaired development of a given 
community, the development of the German people has universal implications. As a consequence 
of speaking and thinking in the sole remaining living language, the German people possess, both 
intuitively and explicitly, a superior understanding of freedom. They are thus uniquely tasked 
with ushering in a new era of universal freedom.  
Those who believe in spirituality and in the freedom of this spirituality, who desire the 
eternal progress of this spirituality through freedom–wherever they were born and 
which- ever language they speak–are of our race, they belong to us and they will join 
with us. Those who believe in stagnation, retrogression and circularity, or who even set 
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a dead nature at the helm of world government – wherever they were born and 
whichever language they speak–are un-German and strangers to us, and the sooner they 
completely sever their ties with us the better. 282 
Not unlike Adam Smith’s entrepreneur or Marx’s proletariat, who can pursue their particular 
aims while remaining confident that they are serving the universal good (which is not, in and of 
itself a condemnation), the German alone is capable of being a true “patriot” because in serving 
their nation they “work for humanity as well.”283 
 Without minimizing the immense differences between them, Fichte’s view on the 
essential connection between language, history, embodied practices, cultural development, 
politics and the grounding of subjectivity make him a suitable proxy for Levinas’ primary 
adversary, Heidegger (or, at the very least, Heidegger as interpreted by Levinas). Unlike other 
forms of nationalism, Fichte’s jingoistic impulses are not rooted in biology, religion, ethnicity or 
even culture as such. Though Fichte’s emphasis on origins and unbroken development might be 
slightly more mystical than Heidegger’s articulation of “being,” what they share is a normative 
emphasis on the ground, site, home, or horizon from which subjectivity emanates. This is not to 
be confused with simple conservatism; both maintain that such a grounding is essential in order 
to transcend uncritical traditions, petrified dogmas, and “idle talk,” to use a lower stakes example 
from Heidegger. Freedom is not, then, a matter of arbitrary or spontaneous action, but demands 
that one takes hold of their life by mastering their circumstances. However, because the self is 
profoundly intersubjective, such a fate is only conceivable if one is fully immersed within a 
lifeworld that already points them in that direction. In this sense the German is already 
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swimming downstream. The Fatherland thus represents the only freedom worth its name—a 
striving which can only take place against a solid ground. Such can never be the fate of orphans.  
 Such is readily apparent in Fichte’s denigration of the “neo-Latin” nations,284 those 
veritable orphans who cling to stale dogma the way shipwrecked survivors grasp onto wreckage 
just to stay afloat. Such sentiments are repeated in Heidegger as he pathologizes orientations that 
he perceives to be “rootless,” “homeless,” “groundless,” or “worldless.” While these terms are 
typically applied to the instrumentality and calculating logic of technology and, occasionally, 
liberalism (both of which blanche the richness of “being”), it must be noted that he mobilizes 
these same concepts to rehash the trope of the “Wandering Jew.” Such is the case in his Black 
Notebooks, where Heidegger insinuates that the “groundlessness” state of Judaism, which is 
“not…bound to anything,” explains their fickle nature, which “avails itself of everything,” before 
claiming that is only through their “tenacious facility in calculating, manipulating, and 
interfering” that “the worldlessness of Judaism receives its ground.”285 
 
Towards a Rootlessness of Subjectivity: A Hiatus between the Particular and the Universal 
 This relationship between subjectivity and “ground” affords us the opportunity to further 
clarify the confusion surrounding the crucial import of Levinas’ work, specifically, how the 
scope and depth of Levinas’ analysis relate to ethical and political questions. It is, here, helpful 
to distinguish between two overlapping concerns that are inevitably invoked by any theory of 
intersubjectivity. The first concern relates to the scope of inquiry. On this point, Fichte’s 
analysis, which stresses the activity, materiality and sociality of consciousness, reveals the 
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necessity of examining selfhood and the inter-human relation (narrowly defined) in a way 
carefully attuned to the various ways in which these activities and relations are organized within 
a particular mode of life, composed of structures, norms, fields and institutions that already push 
individuals down particular paths to predetermined ends. Regarding this aspect I have attempted 
to demonstrate that Levinas is not only open to, but, presupposes this very dimension of 
intersubjectivity (even if he does little to explicate it). Moreover, my enthusiastic support for 
such a perspective is the basis for this entire study. In sum, the import of Levinas’ critique of 
“totality” must be located somewhere other than here, the scope of inquiry, which we have 
hopefully established as an analytical necessity. 
 This brings us to the second, closely related, concern. Now that we have our component 
parts—self, other, society—how are these elements configured together, or, from what 
perspective are they these elements articulated into a theory of subjectivity? On this question I 
have attempted to demonstrate that Levinas is particularly useful in both raising and addressing 
one specific dimension of this concern, which often remains implicit, overlooked and 
inadequately theorized. The Levinasian question, therefore, has nothing to do with whether or 
not the other is “always already” part of society (the central issue pinpointed by Levinas’ 
politically minded interpreters)—this is beyond a doubt. What remains in doubt, is the status of 
the other within the trajectory and orientation of this movement. This claim has one crucial 
caveat, this is not to assert the untenable claim that “others” are unimportant, or do not figure 
prominently in philosophy. Even the most myopic forms of liberal individualism or vulgar 
structuralism will frequently discuss and valorize “others.” Indeed, the category “recognition,” 
which spans the sacred continental/analytical divide, is almost unavoidable in contemporary 
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theory. So the first thing we must note is that the movement of egoism discussed here is not the 
same as solipsism and, incidentally, has nothing to do with recognition.  
 The proper Levinasian question is: how is the other situated with respect to the relation 
between self and society? As Fichte illustrates, even if one accepts these parameters regarding 
the analytical scope (which effectively eliminates the possibility of expressing subjectivity as an 
unfettered freedom primordially encumbered by others and society), one could, at a deeper level, 
still conceive of subjectivity as, for example, a private recollection of the self admits the social 
world, or, a far more circuitous return-to-self which privileges the expansive socio-cultural 
horizons, or, alternatively, as a break from the movement of egoism, represented as an 
orientation already to-the-other. Our thesis is that the last of these options, which posits 
subjectivity as a perpetual hiatus within the return-to-self, can begin to account for, and even 
provide a image of, a normative orientation that, out of its responsibility for others, concerns 
itself with expansive socio-historic horizons, even if it is not itself—again, in the most primordial 
sense—rooted in them.  
 This runs contrary to the dominant thread of philosophy, where the drama of 
intersubjectivity plays out as a tension between the self and society. When “others” are assigned 
a role in this drama, they are typically already viewed from the perspective of the recollected 
subject, already mediated through the universal. Even when prominently addressed, others 
appear as a secondary or contingent feature, often portrayed as co-inhabitants of a substantial 
lifeworld. Others are certainly important (for a variety of moral and descriptive reasons) but they 
are apprehended all the same within the movement of egoism (or “the same”), which extends on 
an axis from particular to universal. As witnessed with Fichte, it is in fact, this tension garnered 
from the oscillation between particular and universal (or self and society) that typically propels a 
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given thinker forward. Once again Heidegger is an exemplar in this respect. The Heideggerian 
subject, deeply embedded within the social, is conveyed in terms of individual mastery, 
occasionally rebellion, and, at the other end of the spectrum, a more conservative being at home 
with oneself within a collective tradition—a sentiment which, in its most pathological form, 
leads to the total surrender of individuality, as is readily apparent in his infamous speech to his 
students: “Let not theories and ‘ideas’ be the rules of your being. The Führer himself and he 
alone is German reality and its law, today and for the future.” Though it varies in degree and 
emphasis, this same oscillation between the particular and universal is also evident in Nietzsche 
(who unabashedly conceives of subjectivity as a project of self-creation286 all the while 
acknowledging the role of destiny and history287 ), Sartre (where it is distilled within his concept 
of the “singular universal,” which bends to the universal end of spectrum with his claim that the 
“militant” is able to overcome bourgeois subjectivity by becoming self-identical through their 
dedication to “the Party”288) and countless other philosophers, from Arendt and Foucault to 
Zizek and Badiou. While I would argue (perhaps against Levinas289) that such conceptions of the 
socially mediated subject have, historically, presented many opportunities to understand 
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subjectivity in terms that approximate Levinas’ position (as we already indicated with Fichte and 
will continue to do so with Hegel and Marx), however, I do support his general critique that such 
moments are rarely adequately seized and represent fleeting moments too often overwhelmed by 
the tendency to subordinate the other to the, seemingly primary, relation between the self and 
society. As we have continued to note, along this journey, from self to society and back again, 
the other retains a primordial justification for itself in the face of the other, which is, in turn, 
comprehended on the basis of a mediating third term. In Levinas’ words: “Like a shunt every 
social relation leads back to the presentation of the other to the same without the intermediary of 
any image or sign, solely by the expression of the face. When taken to be like a genus that unites 
like individuals the essence of society is lost sight of.”290 
Language, meaning and the interlocutor 
 We can now return to the relationship between subjectivity and “ground.” Just as Fichte’s 
earlier convergence with Levinas, on the asymmetrical relation between other and self, helped us 
clarify important aspects of Levinas’ deworlded other (unique, singular, etc.), so too does his 
marked divergence from Levinas help elucidate why this moment is so important. In response to 
claims (be they Fichte, Heidegger, or other) that subjectivity is a movement emanating from a 
primordial ground Levinas will respond by describing selfhood as a movement initiated by an 
moment of exogenous rupture. Subjectivity is thus defined by its rootlessness, which is always 
leaping outside and ahead of itself. Depth is here crucial because Levinas’ first claim is not, 
contrary to the dominant interpretation, that Heidegger’s social ontology is more or less accurate, 
and, as an moral corrective we must be careful to ensure that the subsumed other is removed 
from epistemological horizons so as to be liberated. Rather, Levinas’ most fundamental claim is 
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that the ground is not actually a ground, at least not in the way Heidegger (and, by proxy, 
Fichte) thinks it is.  
 This point can be illustrated most effectively in Levinas’ ruminations on language. Taken 
apart from the philosophical context he is responding to, Levinas’ discussion of language often 
appears to be another exercise in deconstruction, where Levinas is seeking to destabilize 
meaning by pointing out the infinite regress or aporia operative within thematization (for 
example, how one might be tempted to read: “saying saying saying itself, without thematizing 
it…”291). But Levinas’ concern with language is much different than, say, Derrida’s, who, more 
or less works from within a Heideggerian perspective, even if he seeks to problematize it. 
Levinas is not concerned at all with the interplay of terms within a referential system but, rather, 
is attempting to demonstrate how the tension between subject and the ground map out onto the 
realm of language. Here language is theorized as a creative mode of individual expression which 
always already participates in a pre-established symbolic universe (of shared words, meanings, 
concepts, idioms, etc.), which is itself (as many gloss over) forged by a long history of historical 
and material processes. Language thus represents yet another example of the self-mediated 
through the universal. 
 Without denying the importance of either spontaneous expression or the fixity of the 
socio-historical universe, it is incumbent on Levinas to highlight a third, equally fundamental, 
dimension of speech. To paint a picture of language as only a subject immersed within a 
lifeworld, playfully navigating the rules of grammar, syntax, and semiotics, as if it were strolling 
through a lush orchard deciding what fruit to pick, is to once again cast aside the interlocutor as a 
contingent or accidental feature. This gives the impression that the for-the-other dimension of 
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signification is simply added on to language—which is already, in-itself, as as a pre-existing 
assemblage of codes and symbols—the way one would add and “address” to a package “one puts 
in the mailbox.”292 As Levinas would have it, language does not begin with “conatus and 
interest,” nor should not be seen as “word-play” or a “game.” Rather, it begins with a “saying” 
that is “[a]ntecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the linguistic systems and the semantic 
glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it is the proximity of one to the other, the 
commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness of signification.”293 In 
communication, therefore, there is always a “surplus of signification over representation,”294 as 
language is the expression of for-another rather than a grounding within the ego (who decides to 
speak) or hermeneutical horizon (where language speaks the subject). 
 Levinas’ primary point is that there is a meaning to language that cannot be grasped 
within the symbolic universe of language, or “the said,” even if language requires such a 
manifestation. In this distinction between symbolic and pre-symbolic Levinas is not referring to 
the Lacanian constitutive exception that structures “the Real,” but the very concrete way 
language expresses a certain intention of intersubjectivity prior to the specific content it 
inevitably confers. While the fullness of language is only intelligible if one understands the 
horizon of signification (context, syntax, grammar, etc.), in order to retain this generic structure, 
it has to be spoken to a some-one. The solidity and permanence of the symbolic universe would 
thus be very much cast in doubt for the solitary individual.  
 This existential structure of signification is expressed well in various images of the post-
apocalyptic world. To walk in an abandoned city is to discover a world devoid of meaning; the 
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red octagon, the flashing lights, the various pictures, letters, and numbers would lose their 
universal character and be only “for me.” In such a circumstance one could surely flatter 
themselves and raise their ego to the stature of the god-like figure aimed at in extreme variants of 
existentialism and libertarianism. Free from the objectifying gaze of the other and the limitations 
of social convention, one could surely fashion themselves as the creator of a new symbolic 
universe. As the lone arbiter of meaning they could set about the task of creating new forms of 
grammar, syntax and define objects according to their unencumbered subjective whim. Of 
course, without an interlocutor, such a world would remain meaningless, not just technically, but 
existentially. It would be devoid of the essential element of meaning, which is, the expression of 
signification as already for an-other. As Fichte discovered as he penetrated the abode of self-
consciousness, it is only because subjectivity begins from the outside that it is able to move 
inward. 
 It is in this sense that Levinas states that, while language is indeed a particular expression 
of the universal, this movement is predicated upon an always prior leaping outside of itself and 
outside of context. This “prior” meaning of language—which is irreducible and, in a sense, 
external to the signification language acquires within a given context—does not of course 
designate a temporal priority. There is no disputing the prevalent view that the world is already 
flooded with meaning, constituted by an interlocking web of discourses, projects, socio-
economic relations and symbolic fields. The meaning and concepts used to communicate, as 
Heidegger was fond of demonstrating, are already inscribed into our perception of the world: the 
escalator beckons us “to go up,” the baseball bat “to swing,” the subway “to go to work,” the 
dollar bill “to spend,” the illegal immigrant “to either exploit or deport,” the cross “to kneel” and 
the national anthem “to stand up.” Nevertheless, to ground subjectivity in meaning over 
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presentation, is to miss the very intention of language, and thus reduce it to a tool, a curriculum, 
basis of a community, or, in its most extreme form, the congealment of Reason. The leap into the 
unknown, what constitutes the “pre-ontological weight”295 of language, is not an afterthought; a 
“world” in the Heideggerian sense, is only a world insofar as it is a world offered.  
 Crucial here is that in this formulation Levinas is not excluding or diminishing the. To the 
contrary, he is stating that Heidegger misapprehends its significance. By attempt to establish 
subjectivity qua language within “the foundation of the site,”296 he has inverted the relation 
between subjectivity and the world made common: 
To recognize the Other is therefore to come to him across the world of possessed things, 
but at the same time to establish, by gift, community and universality. Language is 
universal because it is the very passage from the individual to the general, because it 
offers things which are mine to the Other. To speak is to make the world common, to 
create commonplaces. Language does not refer to the generality of concepts, but lays 
the foundations for a possession in common. 297 
What is clear from this passage is that such an emphasis on the concrete act of presentation must 
not be confused with the decontextualized view of language as “a transcendental consciousness 
constituting objects,” it is simply to not lose sight of the fact that, prior to interpretation (and all 
that it entails) language signifies “society and obligation.”298 As a result, “[l]anguage, far from 
presupposing universality and generality, first makes them possible. Language presupposes 
interlocutors, a plurality.”299  
 This discussion of Fichte and Heidegger can also help us with the issue raised in the last 
chapter about how one should read Levinas’ recurrent references, in Totality and Infinity, to “the 
poor,” “the stranger,” “the widow,” “the orphan,” and “proletariat.” While there is no doubt, at 
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some level, Levinas is speaking to a concrete responsibility to those in need (which requires all 
the full spectrum of powers present within self-consciousness), however, over and above this, 
they are philosophically important because they are an expression of uprootedness, 
groundlessness, and homeless, all of which provide, for Levinas, a corrective metaphor to the 
coiling of the ego within a home, a site, the familiar, or the Fatherland. As Levinas put it, to be 
amidst other is to be “‘concrete abstraction’ torn up from the world, from horizons and 
conditions, incrusted in the signification without a context of the-one-for-the-other, coming from 
the emptiness of space, from space signifying emptiness, from the desert and desolate space, as 
uninhabitable as geometrical homogeneity.”300 Once again “emptiness” and “signification 
without a context” is invoked, not in order to abstract the individual from history and society, but 
to “confirms it” by demonstrating how “the relation that binds this multiplicity does not fill the 
abyss of separation.”301 Conceived of in this way, universality, represents something much more 
profound than bloated egoism or expanded particularity.  
 
Intersubjectivity from Fichte to Marx 
 Fichte allows us to fully appreciate the odd nature of embedded subjectivity, where 
consciousness is both the expression of a relationship with the world and the presentation of this 
expression. In the first moment of this double movement, consciousness is grounded in, and is a 
manifestation of, our profound embodiment: the sensations we feel, our relations to other people, 
the objects we perceive, the symbols, themes and representations which form our ideas, and a 
whole host of other social, economic and political relations which simultaneously engender and 
circumscribe the experience of selfhood. In the second movement, the congealment of the “I” 
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occurs as this “input” it is interpreted and presented as “for me”: where the collection of skin, 
hair, organs and limbs become “my body”; raw sensory datum becomes “cold,” “hungry,” 
“desire,” or “danger”; the place in which I dwell becomes “my perspective”; the assemblage of 
words become “my thoughts”; the human in the corner office becomes “my boss,” the 
intersection of market forces with opportunity becomes “my job”; the facts and theories about 
evolution and revolution become part of “my understanding” about who I am and how I came to 
be here. As Hegel so eloquently put it, The I is “at one with itself and all at home in itself… the 
crucible and the fire which consumes the loose plurality of sense and reduces it to unity.”302 
 In navigating this double movement, Fichte delivers a prototypical example of Levinas’ 
“reduction of the other to the same,” while, at the same time, indicating the possibility of an 
escape. The simple “for me” structure of naive consciousness is endlessly complicated, negated 
and criticized as Fichte analyzes the historical social, linguistic and political dimensions of 
subjectivity. The viewpoint where the other is apprehended as simply “form me,” is thus 
suspended, opening the door to an understanding of subjectivity attuned to the importance of 
sociality, activity, labor, language, culture, education, history and politics. However briefly, in 
these moments Fichte is able to think the importance of the totality of human relations, without 
reducing the significance of others to that very totality. Fichte not only approaches Levinas’ 
conception of subjectivity as one-for-the-other but succeeds precisely where Levinas stumbles, in 
utilizing his understanding of intersubjectivity to criticize the politics of his day while re-
imagining alternative possibilities. 
 However, despite these important advances and significant transformations the “for me” 
structure persists in Fichte, as the moments previously liberated are retroactively grasped from 
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the standpoint of their future development. As is evident from Fichte’s ambiguity, oscillation 
and uncertainty, this new orientation can take on many forms, ranging from a re-invented 
individualism—where the challenge of subjectivity is to master its circumstances and forge itself 
itself into a unity—to the disposition, displayed unapologetically in Fichte’s later years, where 
the free subject is little more than a medium, channeling the spirit of a nation on the way to 
cosmic unity. In either case the subject retains a metaphysical passport that justifies its 
trajectory in the face of the other. The other is given a prominent role in this drama but 
consumed by the “crucible and fire” all the same.  
 It is important to note the trajectory of Fichte’s articulation of intersubjectivity while at 
the same time avoiding any dogmatic or pseudo-idealist claims about the necessity of such a 
progression. Just as Levinas was responding to a particular historical moment, Fichte’s 
philosophy is a product of, and a response to, the problems, events and relations of his time. It is, 
for example, noteworthy that Fichte’s variant of nationalism was anything but an expression of 
Germany strength. The infamous address was an attempt to rouse the political spirt of the people 
in the devastating wake of the Napoleonic wars. Nevertheless, his concrete circumstances 
notwithstanding, Fichte’s journey from the eidetics of consciousness to a political theory of 
human emancipation not only demonstrates the necessity of a theory of intersubjectivity but 
foreshadows the normative complexities and tensions that accompany such an analytical shift.  
 It would be impossible to chart, at least in any meaningful way, the development of 
Fiche’s insights on embodiment, negativity and intersubjectivity as they are reformulated, 
modified and critiqued by numerous thinkers en route to Marx. If space permitted we could refer 
to Schelling’s philosophy of nature, which emphasizes subjectivity as the striving against a 
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“ground” which “precedes consciousness” and occurs “outside of time.”303 If we were to do so it 
would also be illustrative to once again highlight Zizek’s appropriation of Schelling (where he 
admires the way “the subject predestines himself – produces the ‘cipher of his destiny’, as Lacan 
would have put it – when, in an extra-temporal eternally past, always-already-accomplished 
unconscious free act, he chooses the eternal character of his temporal existence”304) or, similarly, 
the terms in which Heidegger expresses his affirmation (namely that Schelling gets to the 
essence of freedom, where “[t]rue freedom in the sense of the most primordial self-determination 
is found only where a choice is no longer possible and no longer necessary”305) to further 
demonstrate how this oscillation between individuality, freedom and agency on the one hand, 
and society, necessity and structure, echoes through the annals of philosophy. We would also be 
remiss if we left out Feuerbach’s important writings on sensuousness, passivity and the 
relationship between the “I and thou,” so instrumental for Buber’s later formulation, which itself 
had an enormous influence on Levinas (even if he believed Buber was similarly unable to fully 
break from the pull of ontology). These threads, however important, must remain loose ends.  
 This being the case, it would be imprudent to progress to Marx without at least a passing 
reference to Hegel. Not only is Hegel important to understand Marx, but crucial to understand 
the contemporary philosophical landscape. The only thing more consistent than the declarations 
espousing the death of Hegel’s totalizing philosophy are the efforts to resurrect him. His 
elaboration of concepts like negativity, dialectics, recognition, identity, intersubjectivity, 
struggle, revolution, history, and dynamism have his continued relevance for critical theory, 
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Marxism, historical materialism, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, theories of decolonization, 
and even analytical philosophy. It is thus no surprise that Hegel’s name is still invoked, more 
than any other, in reference to Marx, who (depending on who you ask) either absorbed, too 
much, too little, or just the proper amount from his master. While a proper analysis of Hegel is 
here impossible (let alone a survey of the modern interpretations and applications of Hegel) it 
may be fruitful to pose a few potential Hegelian objections to the dynamic laid out above in 
order to further clarify the theoretical terrain before we turn to Marx.  
 We can begin with Williams’s analysis of the transition from Fichte to Hegel, which 
outlines the general tension between Levinas and Hegel. Williams’ makes two interrelated points 
that are important for our understanding of Levinas’ place within the intersubjective tradition. 
The first is the suspicion that Levinas represent a return to dogmatic first principles, the very 
thing Hegel sought to overcome in his critique of Kant, Fichte, and most of all, Jacobi. The 
second point is that, by demonstrating the contributions and insufficiencies of these thinkers, 
Hegel has already incorporated Levinas’ concerns into his system while going far beyond them. 
These two points are summed up in the following claim: 
I argue that Levinas' critique of ontology is already present in Hegel's critique of 
classical metaphysics, and that the position Levinas urges against Hegel in Totality and 
Infinity is in fact Hegel's own. The latter does not reduce the other to the same, but 
rather grants otherness its due and allows the other to be.306 
While Williams’ analysis of the transition from Fichte to Hegel is overall extremely insightful, 
he relies on a misreading of Levinas (similar to the one we have traced in the first two chapters) 
which not only enables him to proclaim the superfluousness of Levinas and but also allows him 
side-step (if not reproduce) the crucial problematic highlighted above.  
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 To examine why this is the case, we can begin with Hegel’s general critique that, despite 
all of Fichte’s advances over Kant, he remains trapped in his trademark dualism. Thus while 
Fichte conceives of the relationship subject and object in a reciprocal and dynastic fashion, this 
dialectic is inchoate because it is unable to find a proper resolution. While Hegel’s appetite for 
unity has drawn the ire of many, Williams astutely points out that Hegel’s concern for Fichte’s 
unresolved dialectic is rooted in the political desire to avoid tyranny. On Hegel’s reading, Fichte 
dialectic represents a “bad infinite,” because the striving ego, if it is to fully know itself, 
perpetually requires a new limit (or “not-I”) that must stand in opposition to the ego.307 The ego 
can thus never be reconciled with its other because this antagonism represents the very 
constitution of the ego’s freedom. Fichte is thus, according to Hegel, caught in a contradiction: 
on the one hand, freedom is socially mediated and thus requires mutual recognition, but, on the 
other hand, the relationship to others is still expressed as a limitation on freedom. Without the 
possibility of reconciliation, even though the I requires the other (or non-I) to become self-
conscious, each must stand opposed to the other. This dualism is politically relevant for Hegel, as 
Williams describes, because it creates an intersubjective concept of freedom that requires 
“domination, mastery and servitude.”308 If self-consciousness requires that one dominate and one 
be dominated, it is easy to see why Fichte’s theory of recognition represents for Hegel an 
“internalized conflict of lordship and bondage.”309 Because others are both necessary for 
freedom and, at the same time, a limitation of freedom, Fichte can only overcome the 
heteronomy of intersubjectivity by forcing a unity by means of political coercion and tyranny. It 
is thus, Williams repeatedly claims, for the sake of equality and mutual respect—rather than 
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sacrificing individuality at the altar of the Absolute—that Hegel adopts and reformulates Fichte’s 
conception of recognition to entertain the possibility of a higher unity. For this reason, Hegel’s 
advance on Fichte, Williams claims, is rather obvious: since Hegel better understands the depth 
of intersubjectivity, the ways in which community is the “enhancement and concrete 
actualization of freedom,”310 he is better situated to conceive of an “I that is a we and a we that is 
an I.” 
 Before looking deeper into Williams’ interpretation of Hegel, we must flag a few 
problems with this reading. The first is that both Hegel and Williams overplay the degree to 
which Fichte perceives of others as a “limitation.” As demonstrated earlier, though it often 
expressed in terms that are highly contradictory, Fichte is consistent that others, in particular, and 
communities, in general, are the positive condition of the ego’s freedom—far beyond the sense 
of a necessary limitation. More importantly, while this simplification of Fichte makes for an 
easier narrative (that Fichte is forced by the contradictions of his system to opt for tyranny) it 
allows both Hegel and Williams to ignore the potential tensions that arise as Fichte increasingly 
adopts the exact theoretical position that they are advocating. Some of Fichte’s most troubling 
tendencies occur precisely where he has most convincingly abandoned the notion that 
community is negation of freedom. Instead of grappling with this tension Williams’ uses Fichte 
as a theoretical scapegoat as a way to avoid such a confrontation. Ignoring the degree to which 
Fichte’s pathological tendencies are carried over into his theory of intersubjectivity, Williams 
repeatedly argues that such problems can be easily traced back to Fichte’s inability to fully 
commit to the sociality of the subject.  
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 It is thus interesting that Williams, following Hegel, dismisses Fichte’s most obvious 
break with the logic of other-as-limitation, the “summons,” writing it off as just another variation 
on the Anstoß. Williams critique of the “summons” is somewhat surprising given the above 
concern with other-as-limitation. Williams does not, as one might expect, argue that, with respect 
to the summons, Fichte’s ego is still choosing to limit itself for the freedom of the other (and thus 
that the summons might represents a moral injunction which approximates the “harm principle”), 
which is altogether different from the view that the freedom of the other enhances my freedom. 
Williams surprisingly argues the opposite, that Fichte is too radical in his assertion that the ego 
requires a summons to become free. By depriving the ego of any recourse, the self is too 
dependent on the other, and thus Fichte simply inverts the previous asymmetry of the Anstoß 
where the ego dominated the other—in the summons the other dominates the ego. Whatever its 
gesture towards intersubjectivity, the summons is, as Williams puts it bluntly, “the language of 
alienation and Kantian Moralität.”311 In either case, the Anstoß or the summons, the possibility 
of a proper resolution to this antagonism is foreclosed and thus the looming potential for a forced 
unity, or tyranny, remains.  
 Having dispensed with the asymmetrical relation (where, from the first, either the subject 
or the other hold the upper hand) Williams argues, perhaps counterintuitively, that Hegel’s 
reformulation of Fichte’s concept of recognition is able to overcome Fichte’s limitations (society 
as a constraint and the dialectic of dependence/domination) by emphasizing conflict at a deeper 
ontological level. To summarize Williams’ argument: Fichte’s important contribution to 
philosophy was to discover the structure of recognition as the basis of self-consciousness and 
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thus freedom. Hegel’s contribution is realizing that Fichte’s description cannot not be taken as 
the transcendental condition of consciousness as such—which assumes that recognition is a 
“more or less automatic”312 or immediate—because the process of recognition is in fact the 
product of a history of human struggle. We cannot thus simply analyze the nature and processes 
of the individual consciousness or speak of freedom as an immediate transcendental capacity (as 
Kant and Fichte do), rather, we must understand how forms of consciousness have developed in 
concert with struggles, revolutions and institutions and how these social processes, in turn, 
determine capacity for individuals to actualize their freedom. Mutual recognition cannot thus be 
simply assumed or dogmatically asserted but is but one potential outcome of the human 
experience.
313
  
 This is crucial because, according to both Hegel and Williams, Fichte’s notion of 
intersubjective conflict remains at a stage of arrested development, where one is still subservient 
to the other. Hegel avoids such subservience by placing more “ontological distance”314 between 
subjects, which means that subjects, being distinct and relatively equal entities, engage with each 
other in a moment of primordial, but temporary, conflict. While such an emphasis on conflict is 
perhaps more violent than two ego’s bound to each other from the start (each in an asymmetrical 
fashion to the other), it also presents the possibility of a (historical) resolution.315 In sum, Hegel’s 
view of recognition as a process of becoming can better account for harmonious relationships 
which preserve the ontological distinctness of individuality while, at the same time, conceiving 
of society as the enhancement and fulfillment of individuality. The degree to which this dynamic 
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is substantially different from Fichte’s position is a question we will bracket out to pursue the 
more important connection Williams makes between Hegel and Levinas.  
 All of this is evidence for Williams that, contrary to the many “caricatures” of Hegel, his 
“holistic social ontology is quite capable of incorporating the other without reduction of the other 
to the same.”316 While Williams is convincing in his claim that the preservation of difference is a 
central feature of Hegel’s social ontology, the claim that he already incorporates the thrust of 
Levinas’ insights is based on a misreading of Levinas. For Williams, Levinas, like Jacobi before 
him, seeks to “preserve the independence and integrity of a phenomenon” by denying any 
“knowledge of it.”317 By precluding the possibility of a “phenomenon,” “appearance” or 
“ontological theme,” Levinas attempts to ensure that “the other cannot be reduced to the same 
(egology) and self and other cannot be parts of a totality.”318 According to Williams, Levinas 
avoids reducing either the self or the other to “the same” because both the “self and other absolve 
themselves from each other within their relation, and so remain absolute within the relation.”319 
Because Levinas advocates that the self and other form a mutual pact to let the other exist as 
separate and distinct entity, Williams concludes that “Levinas would side with Fichte,” because, 
for both, the relation to the other “only limits the self, rather than with Hegel for whom the social 
is an enhancement and fulfillment of freedom.”320  
 Once again Levinas’ purported skepticism and irrationalism provides the perfect 
philosophical fodder. In proper Hegelian fashion Williams seeks to demonstrate that Levinas’ 
ambitions are in fact well intentioned, even useful, however, they are too contradictory, one-
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sided and ultimately self-defeating to accomplish their goal. Williams proceeds to raise the 
familiar aporia associated with Levinas’ “anti-ontological” thought (how can one use the terms 
of ontology and reason to speak about a non-ontological other), leading him to ask how an 
“utterly transcendent, unknowable other” could possibly “obligate.”321 Crucial here is that 
Levinas’ musings about transcendence and responsibility are taken to be pre-conscious, but in 
the sense they are moral edicts from another realm (not unlike Plato’s forms) rather than a further 
contribution to an embodied theory of intersubjectivity. As a result, the “pre-freedom, pre-
conscious obligations” that Levinas speaks of are simply “asserted dogmatically, or taken as 
immediate facts or truths.”322 Once Levinas’ one-sidedness and inherent dogmatism is 
established, Williams need simply repeat Hegel’s critique of Jacobian skepticism that 
demonstrates how social mediation is already implicit within such skepticism (“the one who 
philosophizes as a skeptic has to appropriate the very thing he rejects in order to make his case”) 
and thus ethical concerns—like the respect for difference—must be accomplished on the 
ontological plane. This dialectical movement allows Williams to confidently conclude that 
Levinas’ concerns and critiques are indeed important but they not only misunderstand their own 
foundations but have already been incorporated into the Hegelian system: 
Levinas’ critique of ontology is already present in Hegel's critique of classical 
metaphysics, and that the position Levinas urges against Hegel in Totality and Infinity is 
in fact Hegel's own. The latter does not reduce the other to the same, but rather grants 
otherness its due and allows the other to be.323 
 
 While I am not unsympathetic to Williams’ claim that Hegel represents the “greatest 
social ontology yet produced in the West,” his zeal to find a dialectical resolution between Hegel 
and Levinas reproduces the very dynamic that has caused so much skepticism of Hegel’s 
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dialectical method (expressed from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Adorno and Levinas), where 
unity is established by excessively pruning those particular features which do not easily fit. 
While it makes for an excellent narrative, the conflation of Levinas with the Jacobi and Kant 
leads to a gross misinterpretation of Levinas and thereby misses what could have otherwise been 
a fruitful dialogue.  
 The key consideration is, once again, the status of mediation. From Williams’ description 
one gets the impression that Levinas simply adopts Kant’s prohibition on direct knowledge of the 
thing-in-itself and simply converts it into the ethical maxim. Williams is thus able to assert that 
Hegel would “deny Levinas's claim that the related terms remain absolute within relation” 
because “if the relation is real, the relata must have an effect on each other.”324 Of course there is 
a some truth to the assertion that Levinas is concerned with the tendency of dialectical 
movements to collapse the distance between two terms involved within a relation, however, his 
scepticism of negativity and resolutions has a decisively different logic than those posed by 
Kantians, liberals, or existentialists. Levinas’ does not place the other beyond the reach of 
knowledge and mediation so as to guarantee it’s autonomy, nor does he abstract from history and 
structure to extoll the virtues of spontaneity, rebellion and rupture. Levinas’ critique of dialectics 
is not opposed to mediation but is an attempt to dislodge the perspective from which such 
mediation is taken in. Levinas, as it has been demonstrated throughout, is thus not against a 
concept of “totality,” but, on the contrary, is attempting to search for its normative foundations, 
which is essential to make judgements about society, politics and history (rather than ignore 
them). Accordingly, the distance between Levinas and Hegel is not rooted in Hegel’s attempts to 
conjure up the totality of relations that mediate our experience of ourselves, others and the world 
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around us. Levinas readily accepts that Hegel had made incomparable strides in our 
understanding of subjectivity,325 but, he also doubts that he has grasped the full spectrum of 
intersubjective mediation because, in his attempt to take in the “whole,” he assumes a 
perspective of a priori freedom.  
 The claim that Hegel privileges a particular viewpoint within the whole might seem at 
odds with Hegel’s expressed disdain for dogmatic or one-sided claims. In fact, it is the interplay 
between competing claims (be they philosophical, social, economic, or political) that thrusts the 
dialectical forward. Hegel thus aims to incorporate disparate ideas and experiences (often by 
historicizing them) into his philosophy without either subsuming their individual contribution or 
overly identifying with any particular element. Nevertheless, Hegel is also well aware that such 
an external or detached perspective is impossible to attain. Ever emphasizing the embodied and 
historical nature of ideas, Hegel famously states that “each individual is in any case a child of his 
time; thus philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts. It is just as foolish to 
imagine that any philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as that an individual can 
overleap his own time or leap over Rhodes.”326 This Hegelian emphasis on situatedness presents 
an interesting parallel to Kant’s relationship between finitude and faith: the more Hegel 
emphasizes the finitude of understanding—which is why even the philosopher (let alone the 
common person327) sits janus-faced, unable to grasp the future significance of the present 
moment—the more he points towards a perspective which can survey, perhaps even redeem, the 
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whole of history from a single glance.328 Even if Hegel, himself, is not close enough to the end to 
fully grasp its significance, subjectivity is a story told from the perspective of freedom, and its 
striving to actualize itself in and through the world. Though Hegel is less seduced, relative to 
Fichte, by a fetishized view of language and culture (which is not to say he does not have his 
own racist and xenophobic moments) he similarly blurs the lines between an analysis of the 
whole and a normative foundation that privileges the orientation of the whole over the relations 
that, at every moment, usher it into being—a well known concern of Marx. 
 It is not my intention here to re-hash the debates, as old as Hegel himself, about whether 
concepts like the “Absolute,” “Spirit,” “Universal,” “World History,” or the “cunning of reason” 
are inherently teleological, metaphysical or even theological, or whether they can be salvaged 
through a Marxist, Lacanaian or any other kind of “materialist” framework. Instead we will insist 
that the questions that Levinas raises are unavoidable, even if we accept Hegel’s insights into 
mediation, history and struggle while downplaying the degree to which he, like Fichte before 
him, prioritizes the relations that orient individuals over the relations between individuals. For 
example, one can read Hegel the following proclamation from the Philosophy of Right as largely 
descriptive in nature:  
At the forefront of all actions, including world-historical actions, are individuals as the 
subjectivities by which the substantial is actualized. These individuals are the living 
expression of the substantial deed of the world spirit and are thus immediately identical 
with, they cannot themselves perceive it and it is not their object.329 
 
Here, rather than interpret it as yet another example of Hegel inverting the subject into a 
predicate of “world spirit,” this passage could be read in line with articulations of 
intersubjectivity such as Heidegger’s “Dasein,,” Foucault’s “épistème,” or the concept of 
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“lifeworld,” developed from Husserl to Habermas, where the theoretical ambition is to illuminate 
the ways in which the sum of human relations produce a world that cannot possibly be fully 
comprehended, even as that world is produced and reproduced. In this register, Hegel’s insights 
are certainly invaluable, not only because they shed some light on what it means to be a social 
being but because they provide the basis for political critique, where it is imperative what 
capacities have been developed or suppressed, what voices have been amplified or marginalized, 
in what ways have power and oppression been inscribed into the seemingly neutral and largely 
unnoticed political unconsciousness.  
 Nevertheless, the Levinasian question persists: in Hegel’s impressive analysis, how is the 
relation between self, other, and society understood? Is the ultimate significance of other 
comprehended on the basis of the meaning they derive within totality, or within movement able 
to comprehend the rise and fall of a succession of totalities? Simply put, does Levinas not have 
something to offer Hegel, something much different than Williams’ assertion, apropos of 
Heiedegger, that Hegel has already conceived of the relation to the other as a “letting be” rather 
than a “return to same”?330 For of its important contributions notwithstanding, does Hegel’s 
dialectic of antagonism and reconciliation provide a sufficient explanation, and ultimately a 
justification, for both the responsiveness of subjectivity and—at the level of prescription—my 
concern and responsibility for others? 
 While we cannot adequately address this question here, my initial claim would not simply 
be that, by prioritizing freedom (both individual and social), Hegel debases the other, rather, 
Hegel, like many of the those who contribute to our understanding of intersubjectivity, does 
indeed gesture towards, or sometimes even presuppose, something close to Levinas’ idea of 
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subjectivity as a going outside of oneself prior to the thought of a return. One of the best 
examples of this, though it is couched in condescension towards the “uneducated,” can be found 
in the underrated essay Who thinks Abstractly?, where Hegel attempts to reveal the highly 
abstract nature of everyday common sense. Hegel claims that abstract thinking is not, as is 
commonly believed, the lone purview of the philosopher, but is most prevalent in ordinary 
experiences, where individuals are routinely perceived on the basis of a single attribute that is 
taken as representative of the whole. Such an instrumental reduction of the complexity of being, 
Hegel explains, is the height of abstract thinking: “This is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the 
murderer except the abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in 
him with this simple quality.”331 Hegel concludes the essay with a similar example of the 
“common soldier” who is, for his superior, nothing but an “abstractum of a beatable subject with 
whom a gentleman who has a uniform and port d'epée must trouble himself.”332 Not only do 
such insights already set the groundwork for Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, but his sentiment that 
we are “troubled,” so to speak, by the “other” in manner altogether different from the one 
suggested by a uniform (which signifies “beatable subject”), expresses something close to what 
Levinas will endlessly circle in his meditations on experience, philosophy, love and war. 
However, such affinities cannot be properly explored—how such a moment becomes are 
misunderstood, muted, obfuscated, or expanded—if one already assumes, as Williams does, that 
such a dialogue has already taken place.  
 These considerations are even more important for those who emphasize the materiality 
and historical specificity of Hegel’ philosophy. Andrew Cole, for example, will counter the 
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philosophical readings of Hegel (from Kojeve and Sartre to Lacan and Zizek) that attempt to 
abstract the universal lessons about the nature of self-consciousness, politics and 
intersubjectivity, in order to demonstrate the degree to which Hegel (pace Marx) is already a 
materialist. According to Cole, Hegel is less of an idealist than his readers, who insist on 
translating—both linguistically and philosophically—the concrete feudal antagonism between 
the “Lord” and the “Bondsman” as a generic master/slave dialectic, giving the impression that it 
can function as a “Platonic foundation” which applies to every and any relation of subjugation.333 
There is no doubt that Cole’s analysis of the Lord and the Bondsman dialectic, which profoundly 
anchors Hegel’s within Feudal relations, helps us appreciate the theoretical specificity of Hegel’s 
conception of labour, struggle, domination, possession and private property. However, Cole’s 
materialist assessment and appropriation of Hegel, which is, in large part, aimed at 
demonstrating Marx’s debt to Hegel, leaves the Hegelian paradox detailed above (where 
accepting ones particular or finite perspective is bought at the price of a larger metaphysical 
perspective) a glaring lacuna. In Cole’s zeal to prove that Hegel’s master/slave dialectic hold 
significance to feudalism alone, he ratchets up the tension that, to the degree that this historical 
reading is true, Hegel forecloses the possibility that the number of communities that can be said 
to be “self-conscious,” at least in any meaningful sense. In fact, the only time Cole addresses this 
glaring shortcoming is to underscore the point that Hegel specifically had feudal relations in 
mind, evidenced for Cole in Hegel’s proclamation “that ancient slaves never achieve self-
consciousness.”334 While Cole parenthetically dismisses such a view out-of-hand—and the point 
here is not to attribute such a perspective to Cole, which would be misleading and ludicrous—he 
fails to address the looming philosophical and normative implications of such a myopic 
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materialist reading, where only the struggles that fit a narrow set of historical criteria are 
believed to lead to self-consciousness proper. Hegel might indeed, as Cole suggests, have had his 
specific and concrete material relations in mind, but this does not make his larger “idealist” 
conceptions about history and subjectivity any less apparent, in fact, quite the contrary. And 
these problems do not solve themselves simply because Hegel’s most metaphysical features 
appear antiquated from our modern perspective. This is particularly concerning because Cole’s 
overall aim is to demonstrate the degree to which Marx “adopts more or less wholesale Hegel’s 
dialectic.”335 
  It is thus not surprising that he makes little of Susan Buck-Morris’ meditation on Hegel, 
the master/slave dialectic and universal history from the perspective of the Haitian revolution.336 
This is unfortunate because such an engagement might have shed more light on what Hegel, and 
his theory of Feudalism, history and subjectivity, has to offer us today. Buck-Morris, for her part, 
does address such question as she seeks to free Hegel’s most valuable insights from the fetters 
and prejudices of his time. In doing so she gives us a hint of what we are searching for as we 
seek to conjoin the two moments of intersubjectivity that we have thus far been separating. There 
is a distinctive Levinasian sentiment in her re-formulation of Hegel’s concept “Universal 
History”: 
rather than giving multiple, distinct cultures equal due, whereby people are recognized 
as part of humanity indirectly through the mediation of collective cultural identities, 
human universality emerges in the historical event at the point of rupture. It is in the 
discontinuities of history that people whose culture has been strained to the breaking 
point give expression to a humanity that goes beyond cultural limits. And it is in our 
empathetic identification with this raw, free, and vulnerable state, that we have a chance 
of understanding what they say. Common humanity exists in spite of culture and its 
differences. A person’s nonidentity with the collective allows its subterranean 
solidarities that have a chance of appealing to universal, moral sentiment, the source 
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today of enthusiasm and hope. It is not through culture, but through the threat of 
culture’s betrayal that consciousness of a common humanity comes to be.337 
 
In this formulation Buck-Morris gives a us a clue as to what universality might look like from a 
Levinasian perspective: articulated as a point of rupture indifferent to culture, difference, and 
identity, rather than the expansion of egoism or an all-encompassing container enveloping every 
particular. To this we might simply add that such “discontinuities,” “betrayals” “vulnerabilities” 
and “non-identities” do not only emerge as “residues of events,”338 but are first expressed in the 
most ordinary of experiences, and it is on this basis that we are able to recognize the 
emancipatory potential of such a rupture with totality. For what else is the “raw, free, and 
vulnerable state” that Buck-Morris speaks of if not the “nudity of the face.” And, this being the 
case, we must also concede that the face already begs for alternative forms of politics, solidarity 
and struggle.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 Alienation and Liberation in Levinas and Marx 
 
 
 In the previous chapter we described how Fichte both anticipates and sets in motion  
a broad spectrum of intersubjective inquiry. On the one hand, Fichte erodes the possibility of the 
atomistic subject, presented as an immediate or autonomous unity. In one of the most definitive 
statements on subjectivity Fichte will argue that self-consciousness proper—the ultimate self-
relation wherein the founding act of subjectivity can be presented as an object in consciousness 
and thereby seized upon by consciousness itself—is itself a socially mediated accomplishment.  
 Upon close inspection social mediation was found to contain two dimensions which are 
inextricably linked and co-emergent, yet distinct moments which cannot be conflated. Fichte 
begins by exploring the inter-human relation (arguing that consciousness presupposes the 
presence of others, a presence which gifts the image of freedom and humanity in general to the 
subject) before turning his attention to the generic relations that mediate and give the inter-
human relation its texture and defining characteristics. In his mature philosophy Fichte becomes 
increasingly preoccupied with the social contours that structure the relation in which subjects 
face each other. As a result, the abstract and static image of two solipsistic egos catching sight of 
their reflection in the face of the other is concretized and put in motion as Fichte continues to 
theorize the “active” side of subjectivity through his analysis of language, labour, institution and 
politics.  
 Through a crucial modification of Kant, Fichte ushered in a second philosophical 
revolution, one that broke the closed loop of apperception to investigate the complex 
intersubjective processes that mediate consciousness. But Fichte was also found to be an 
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exemplar in a second, related, sense. While he dissolves the theoretical foundations of the pre-
social subject, he displays the recurrent temptation to retroactively conceive of subjectivity in the 
very terms eschewed. Once again anticipating the philosophical currents to come, he conceives 
of this project both at the level of the individual (where the dependent ego must master the 
external word of the not-I to create itself as a self-sufficient unity) and social (where the goal, 
expressed in the same terms, becomes to create a cultural/linguistic/political Subject). Thus 
Fichte inaugurates a complex understanding of what it means to be social and historical being. 
While he opens the door to a profoundly different understanding of the social and historical 
dimensions of consciousness, the challenge of subjectivity is consistently posed from the 
perspective of what had been theoretically lost. Sovereignty is no longer an immediate attribute 
of the self-conscious subject yet continues to function no less as a regulatory principle—
something to be achieved as the subject attempts to recollect itself (either psychologically or 
politically) amidst the social and natural world. From such a perspective the “other” becomes 
indistinguishable from generic social relations, which is portrayed as the flux of history that, 
depending on the moment, ought to be either mastered or submitted to.  
 In this Fichte not only foreshadows the analytical breadth and depth of subsequent 
inquiries into intersubjectivity (the increasing focus on the ways in which language, culture, 
labour, economics, politics, power etc. shape the very experience of consciousness) but the 
normative orientation that continues to animate such articulations. Here we can return to 
Levinas’ critique of Western philosophy, which we are now better equipped to address. Levinas’ 
most consistent claim is that despite the opportunities afforded to philosophy by this meander 
into the social, the tradition has “most often” taken the form of “a reduction of the other to the 
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same.”339 It should now be clear that Levinas is not here claiming that all philosophy ends in the 
pseudo-Hegelian culmination of Spirit which extols the universal at the expense of the sublated 
particular. Rather, Levinas notes that the very axis itself, that links particular to the universal, is 
constructed in such a way as to subordinate the signification of the “for-the-other.” Thus, 
regardless of where one finds themselves on the spectrum, be it Kierkegaard or Hegel, the “for-
the-other” is a conditional proposition, secondary to the ground from which subjectivity 
emanates. As a result, the other qua other is relegated to the background, as something to be 
considered long after the foundations of identity, society and politics have been set. 
 To begin to understand the relation between subjects as conditioned by the totality of 
relations, without grounding subjectivity itself within this very totality, we suggested that such a 
accomplishment required the interruption of the return-to-self (a movement which extends from 
the particular to the universal). This inquiry has led us to a new question, how can the totality of 
social relations be thought (rather than simply dismissed) from this new perspective, that is, from 
the perspective of their interruption? It is with this question that we have expressed the need to 
return to Marx.  
 We can begin this investigation with one more of Levinas’ references to Marx, taken 
from an interview with Richard Kerney: 
When I spoke of the overcoming of Western ontology as an ‘ethical and prophetic 
cry’…I was in fact thinking of Marx’s critique of Western idealism as a project to 
understand the world rather than to transform it. In Marx’s critique we find an ethical 
conscience cutting through the ontological identification of truth with an ideal 
intelligibility and demanding that the theory be converted into a concrete praxis of 
concern for the other. It is this revelatory and prophetic cry that explains the 
extraordinary attraction that the Marxist utopia exerted over numerous generations.340 
 
Levinas’ unabashed affirmation of the “prophetic cry” found within Marx is itself an intriguing 
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path that will momentarily pursue. However, before doing so we must address the conspicuous 
irony of Levinas’ statement. Such a purported fidelity to Marx would merely be misleading, 
rather than ironic, if Levinas was simply ignoring the concrete normative commitments of 
philosophers like Fichte (which we outlined in great detail in chapter 3) by reducing German 
idealism to the ambiguous and retrospective gaze of Hegel’s “owl of Minerva” (which is itself a 
limited reading of Hegel). What makes this gesture ironic is that, despite being viewed as one of 
the pre-eminent ethical philosophers of our time, Levinas’ work too often retains the same 
retrospective and ambiguous character that he is purporting to eschew—and projecting these 
political shortcomings onto the preceding philosophical age does little to solve this lacuna.  
 It is also, from our perspective, somewhat ironic that this very ambiguity stems from the 
very element of Levinas’ thought which we have attempted to underscore for the explicit purpose 
of thinking Levinas with politics. Emphasizing the pre-subjective depth of Levinas’ thought has 
thus put us in an interesting theoretical predicament. The course we have charted has 
intentionally foreclosed the well-worn path of simply translating the “ethical relation” as an 
intimate ethical imperative. While this remains an attractive option insofar as it leaves the reader 
with obvious moral imperatives, such an ethics can only be bought at the price of politics and 
history. By emphasizing the pre-subjective depths of the relation our reading has established the 
theoretical possibility of a radical Levinasian politics and, at the same time, exposed the Levinas’ 
insufficiency for taking up this very task.  
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Generic and Specific Alienation 
 
 The primary reason for this insufficiency is that, although Levinas provides a view of 
subjectivity well suited to ground a theory of alienation,341 it fails to adequately distinguish 
between generic and specific alienation. Far too often Levinas depicts all the generic bonds that 
bind subjects together within day to day existence (themes, identities, institutions) as an 
undifferentiated mass, where every relation is equally distinguished in its incapacity to 
adequately encompass the “face.” This radical bifurcation between “totality” and “infinity” is on 
one level necessary, in order to ensure that the subject remains rootless and ungrounded with 
respect to the Other: 
The condition of being hostage is not chosen; if there had been a choice, the subject 
would have kept his as-for-me, and the exits found in inner life…The implication of the 
one in the-one-for-the-other is then not reducible to the way a term is implicated in a 
relationship, an element in a structure, a structure in a system, which Western thought in 
all its forms sought for as a sure harbor, or a place of retreat which the soul should 
enter.342 
 
At the same time the reluctance to navigate this rigid demarcation separating two worlds, that is, 
to engage with the very substance of life, effectively reproduces (especially at the level of 
politics) the very pathology Levinas hoped to address.  
 The tragic irony of Levinas is that, in his attempt to escape the grasp of the “neuter,” he 
charts such an extreme course that he finds himself reunited with his great adversaries on the 
other side of the world. If the famous ambiguity found in Hegel stemmed from the fact that he 
sublated too much of the subject into substance (family, institutions, the state, etc.), which left it 
very much in doubt whether alienation was about comprehending ones destiny or changing it, 
Levinas’ ambiguity arises for precisely the opposite reason. Because none of the social relation is 
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permitted to manifest itself as works (themes, institutions, etc.), the everyday world becomes 
nothing more than an indiscriminate field of alienation. In the end a blanket refusal is just as 
incapable of critique as a blanket acceptance.  
 Levinas typically addresses such concerns under his concept of “the third.” Like many of 
his concepts, “the third” reappears in numerous contexts, sometimes with different, even 
contradictory, connotations. While Levinas gives some credence to the view that “the third” 
should be read as a literal third person who complicates the purity of a relation to the other,343 in 
general “the third” refers to the inescapability of mediation, universality, reason and judgement. 
As Levinas states, in my view correctly, “the third party is the very fact of consciousness,” and 
not “an empirical fact,” that is, “the third” does not appear as a fact appearing within 
consciousness, because consciousness is already mediated by the universal, where “all the others 
than the other obsess me.”344 As we have suggested all along, this means that a “commitment” in 
the everyday sense of the term “already presupposes a theoretical consciousness, as a possibility 
to assume, before or after the event, a taking up that goes beyond the susceptiveness of 
passivity.”345 Thus the “third party” is the “birth of thought, consciousness, justice and 
philosophy.”346 This means that, for all the talk of exteriority, singularity, and 
decontextualization, Levinas is well aware that “the transcendence of the face is not enacted 
outside of the world” and that “[n]o human or inter human relationship can be enacted outside of 
economy.”347 The “beyond” that Levinas speaks of is therefore necessarily “reflected within the 
totality and history, within experience.”348  
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Thus, contra Levinas’ critics, it is not that Levinas is allergic to politics, but that he 
declines to explore the relation between subjectivity and politics, at least in an in-depth and 
nuanced way. Therefore, the primary lacuna facing Levinas does not in fact stem from his initial 
insistence of bracketing out every dimension of experience, save for one, but rather, it arises 
from his imprudent decision to re-introduce the totality of the social world all at once (and once 
for all). In contrast to Hegel, who meticulously reconstructs the nesting spheres of experience, 
from sensation, desire and consciousness to religion, family and the state, Levinas theorizes more 
like a magician, who, at the conclusion of their trick, pulls down the curtain one more time to 
reveal the world they had previously made disappear.  
Thus, in one theoretical step we go from the asymmetrical relation to the other outside of 
every reference all the way to freedom, reason, reciprocity and representation, where humans all 
appear on “equal footing as before a court of justice,” and a “society in which there is no 
distinction between those close and those far off.”349 And with this, a unique story comes to a 
familiar end: “In the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the 
metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of the We, aspires to a State, 
institutions, laws, which are the source of universality.350 The question, perhaps the only 
question, is: when we return from the journey to infinity and back again, do we feel at home or 
estranged in the world around us?  
 On this question Levinas equivocates. In some instances he proceeds from “totality back 
to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself,”351 but not “in 
order to preach some way of salvation (which there would be no shame in seeking).”352 Or 
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similarly that: “Our task is to show that the plot proper to saying does indeed lead it to the said, 
to the putting together of structures which make possible justice and the ‘I think.’ …essence then 
has its hour and its time.”353 A sentiment repeated again as he states that, since “clarity occurs, 
and thoughts aim at themes,” his “task” is simply to establish the “articulation and signifyingess 
antecedent to ontology.”354 Levinas likens this movement to “the phenomenological 
reduction,”355 which is somewhat damning since, several pages later, he makes a parenthetical 
comment that “phenomenology states concepts without ever destroying the scaffoldings that 
permit one to climb up to them.”356 One indeed might find it difficult to find a critical edge in an 
ethics that has, regardless of context, always already happened. From this perspective, Levinas’ 
philosophy is either devoid of normative concerns or, to the degree that it expresses an ethics, is 
well suited for the conservative apologist. 
 On one level, such caution in affirming the “ethical relation” as a set of concrete social 
relations is to be expected, since Levinas is adamant that this “reduction” not become a 
“rectification of one ontology to another, the passage from some apparent world to a more real 
world.”357 This is sometimes referred to by Levians as a “methodological problem”358 that he 
must necessarily represent the unrepresentable while paying tribute to its unrepresentable nature. 
However, to leave the relation as a “paradox” is not to critique totality but to leave it untouched. 
Thus by the time we arrive at the state, Levinas concludes, in proper Hegelian fashion: “It is then 
not without importance to know if the egalitarian and just State in which man is fulfilled (and 
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which is to be set up, and especially to be maintained) proceeds from a war of all against all, or 
from the irreducible responsibility of the one for all.”359 But why is it important to know? Is the 
modern liberal state predicated on the “irreducible responsibility of the one for all” or, 
conversely, is it a revolutionary call to transcend our political horizon, in which members of 
society are forced to confront each other as if in a war of all against all? Is the state, to 
paraphrase the difference between Hegel and Marx, engendered by the social relation or 
superimposed upon it?  
 Our present task is to find the limits of such a reading. In doing so we will attempt to 
recover the moments in Levinas that gesture towards the possibility of a political community 
founded not on totalization and instrumentality but responsibility of the one-for-the-other. To this 
end we will return to Marx and the explore the “messianism”360 that Levinas, himself, noted on 
occasion. 
 
The Return to Marx 
 We can return to where we left off at the introduction of the third chapter. Here we noted 
Levinas’ admiration for Marx’s view of subjectivity—which contested the liberal subject by 
illuminating the “restless powers” that “seethe within” and push the subject “down a determined 
path”361—which amounted to no less than a theoretical revolution. While Levinas situates his 
thought within the wake of this event, the nature of the break also created the (apparent) distance 
between Levinas and Marx. The majority of philosophical work continued to explore the socio-
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historical topography that structures and mediates relations between humans, while Levinas (at 
times myopically) focused on the peculiar nature of this bond itself apart from the context in 
which it is inevitably bound up with. The question which we will now pursue is, can a return to 
Marx, after Levinas, be an integral part of the project to put the fragmented moments of 
subjectivity back together again, albeit in a new way.362  
 Our first step toward this goal is to make sense of Marx’s theory of the subject, which is, 
admittedly, somewhat like attempting to untangle a box of old Christmas lights. It is without 
doubt that Marx’s most impactful contribution to modern political theory is derived from his 
ability to think human relations in their totality. While several of his predecessors made 
significant headway in this direction, their attempts to map out the socio-political networks that 
bind humans together were still, according to Marx, too enamoured with an abstract conception 
of subjectivity as such. At the beginning of the analysis, philosophers already presuppose an 
idealized form of consciousness or pre-social perspective from which humans enter into history 
and society. By taking the “imagined activity of imagined subjects”363 as their point of departure 
they are able to argue, at the end of their analysis, that the social process itself is guided by an 
ideational intention—either directly, in a self-conscious way, or indirectly, as the semi-
unconscious collective result of the aggregate of human intentions. Regardless of what we make 
of the validity of Marx’s critique, we must recognize his fundamental point, that if we are to 
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understand the human condition we cannot begin with the image of an “abstract being squatting 
outside the world” but with the concrete relations that organize humans into a “society” and a 
“state.”364 
 This is not to suggest that for Marx human consciousness is unimportant or simply an 
illusion. From his earliest writings in 1843 to Capital, the “mental powers” of humans—which 
are contrasted with the best laid plans of “spiders” and “bees”365—are central to Marx’s 
fundamental argument about the necessity to interrogate the specificity of how a given society is 
organized. It is thus surprising, if not ironic, that Althusser continued to approach Marx’s 
ruminations on consciousness with such a timorous disposition, since, without such a capacity 
humanity would in fact be the very “abstract being squatting outside the world” that Marx 
critiques. While all non-human animals exist in a complex relationship with their environment 
the human world is qualitatively distinct. Marx is, relative to his time, acutely aware of the 
evolutionary biological features of the human (instincts, needs, etc.), however, his primary 
interest is in the unique capacity for humans to modify themselves in concert with their 
environment. Thus, when he famously claims that “being determines consciousness,” the term 
“being” does not primarily refer to a set of biological impulses or instincts which are contained 
within the individual mind (though, for Marx, this is all certainly grist for the mill). Rather the 
“being” determining consciousness refers to the human created environment which is comprised 
of a constantly changing network of complex socio-historic relations. Human consciousness is 
thus vital because without it there would be no world proper—or, to translate it into 
Althusserian, no structures to interpellate the subject—only biological determination.  
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 Because consciousness is nothing other than the capacity for self-transformation, it 
cannot be perceived in an individual mind alone, or in abstraction (where it becomes a 
transcendental foundation); it can only be observed in the way a given society will organize, 
express, refract, sublimate and even create new human needs, abilities, and desires. This is what 
Marx means when he refers to the human as a “species-being” who is “universal and therefore 
free”; not that the human is free in the sense of no longer dependent on each other or the world 
but that it can, in concert with others, condition the environment that in turn conditions them, a 
situation where even “the whole of nature” becomes their “inorganic body.”366 On this point 
Marx is clear: “all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature.”367 
Consciousness is thus vital to understanding the human condition, provided, that is, that it is not 
abstracted from its material expression, which is contained within a totality of economic, 
political, and symbolic relations.  
 While consciousness—where even the “worst architect” constructs her creation in her 
mind in a way that spiders and bees do not—is central to understand the importance of the 
“exclusively human”368 form of labour, Marx is adamant that this need not, and, in fact, should 
not, lead to the conclusion that society (or any human creation) is the result of a free, 
unencumbered, deliberate, or self-conscious planning. Marx is just as quick to stress that this 
creative process typically takes place in response to the exigencies of necessity—necessities 
which are not only imposed by the natural environment (floods, droughts, predators, etc.) and our 
biological existence (need for food, shelter, etc.) but also reproduced in a variety of ways within 
the social word.  
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 This brings us to the matter at hand: how exactly does Marx comprehend the relationship 
between the self, others and society and, moreover, does this help us in our quest to  
rejoin Levinas in a political critique. Front and centre in this discussion is a certain ambiguity 
within his articulation of the relationship between consciousness and “being.” On one hand, the 
very “species” character of humanity would seem to necessitate that consciousness (at least its 
particular articulation) lag behind its material social relations. The term “species-being” is often 
referenced as evidence of the young Marx’s explicitly normative conception of human nature 
(either positively, as evidence of Marx’s humanism or, negatively, as proof of Marx’s 
“essentialist” and naive few of society); however, much of what Marx files under the concept is 
clearly meant in a descriptive register, where he typically is making the case that bourgeois, 
liberal and idealist thinkers simply misunderstand what it means to be a social and historical 
being (though some, like Feuerbach, get closer than others). While this description certainly 
contains a sense of normativity (in the sense that it shapes our understanding of who we are and 
therefore what possibilities lie before us), Marx’s recurrent point is not these abstract or 
atomized conceptions of subjectivity are “bad” but that they mistakenly perceive the embedded 
and embodied nature of subjectivity as a secondary concern, or even a flaw of subjectivity, rather 
than its essential feature. That human consciousness is rooted in “being” is a fact and could no 
more be condemned than the fact that the mind requires food, oxygen and sleep.  
 It is thus telling that, immediately after the famous passage in Capital where he describes 
the marvel of human consciousness, Marx discusses the “complex of things” that mediate this 
relation (tools etc.) where he quotes a famous passage from Hegel’s “Logic”: “Cunning may be 
said to lie in the intermediate action which…[even though it] does not itself directly interfere in 
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the process, is nevertheless only working out its own aims.”369 Far from endorsing a pseudo-
theological notion of providence, Marx is picking up from Hegel the (also very Heideggerian) 
point that when the worker constructs a project in their mind, the tools they use are not merely an 
inert substances mediating and ushering in a set of pre-formed ideas into reality. Workers only 
discovers themselves (their ideas and projects) by already comporting themselves within a world 
of equipment, already designed for specific ends and which thus already represent a specific 
congealment of social relations. Marx is well aware that, in this sense, the essence of labour is 
not found in the individual idea of what to construct but already contained within the “complex 
of things” which represent a horizon of imperatives and possibilities. This is simply to say that 
the architect described by Marx is not the (early) Fichtean ego floating in the abstract realm of 
infinite possibilities. In reality, the architect rides the elevator up to the 26th floor, enters her 
cubicle, sits at her desk, sighs as she thinks about her deadline before grabbing her pen and 
triangle to sketch out the 3rd floor of a new luxury water-front condo that she could never herself 
afford. Even this example is somewhat misleading to the extent that it already contains a sense 
that the circumstances of life are themselves an infringement on life. While this infringement 
becomes a distinct possibility, as we will see, at this level the implements, imperatives, norms 
and structures of all kinds are first necessary if one is to move within the world.  
 For this reason, this description, that simply states “tools,” “norms,” etc. determine 
behaviour, is still too abstract. If you are to understand anything meaningful about a given form 
of subjectivity you must say which tools, norms, practices, and structures. In the Poverty of 
Philosophy, Marx thus critiques Proudhon for building a kind of theoretical “scaffolding”370 
which purports to deliver abstract principles without respect for the historical circumstances in 
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which it arose. He is thus able to, quite easily, selectively “preserve the good side” of historical 
events (“Napoleon,”371 “slavery,”372 etc.) because he operates from the illusion that such 
principles are intelligible apart from the concrete relations in which they were birthed. Thus, 
Marx concludes, if we want to “save” given “principles” it is imperative to “ask ourselves why a 
particular principle was manifested in the eleventh or in the eighteenth century rather than in any 
other” a question which compels one to “examine minutely what men were like in the eleventh 
century…what were their respective needs, their productive forces, their mode of production, the 
raw materials of their production—in short, what were the relations between man and man which 
resulted from all these contains of existence.”373 This is why Marx is adamant that, in the 
“drama” of existence, the subject be simultaneously depicted as both “author” and “actor.”374  
 From the first flicker of thought consciousness is thus a social and active endeavour. 
Thinking is already a kind of doing, something practiced and performed within a horizon of 
themes, customs, institutions, problems and concerns. To translate it back into Fichtean terms, 
Marx is radicalizing and expounding upon Fichte’s claim that “being” (or the Anstoß) “is the 
external prime mover,” which is why one should not reify a form of consciousness as such. As 
Marx puts it: 
production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with 
the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life…[t]he 
phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material 
life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.375  
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Even a “pure” discipline such as “natural science,” is, according to Marx, necessarily imbued 
with an “aim” “through trade and industry, through the sensuous activity of men.”376 Cutting to 
the one-sided nature of many of the debates surrounding “realism” versus “discourse,” Marx is 
well aware that every object is perceived as the object of its consciousness only against a 
background referential totality, and, at the same time, aware that such objects are never 
exhausted by these discursive fields in which they inevitably find themselves (a point Adorno is 
also fond of pointing out).  
 To refer back to our guiding inquiry, even the passive side of subjectivity is, for Marx, a 
form of activity. Consciousness itself is a profoundly passive experience, where the subject only 
emerges through a complex of social relations. In this sense, Marx has no problem with 
exteriority and heteronomy, this is precisely what consciousness is, a (potentially) marvelous 
expression of the being with others and the outside world. At the same time this external world 
(and therefore the ego) is always in motion, it is pushing or pulling the subject in a pre-
determined direction towards pre-determined ends. Consciousness is thus something like the 
surface of a rushing river about which very little can be said apart from the general flow of the 
water.  
 This is the crux of Marx’s famous Thesis, where Marx is dubious of Feuerbach’s attempt 
to combat “abstract thinking” by retreating to the sphere of “contemplation” because such an 
attempt to apprehend the concrete does not grasp the practical side of “sensuous activity”377. 
Marx is adamant that passivity cannot be abstractive from activity, and not just in the sense that, 
to use Mao’s example, that if “you want to know the taste of a pear” you must actively pick it 
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from the tree and bite into it (thus changing both you and the pear).378 Marx’s point is that even 
this private sensory experience already presupposes an orchard, monoculture, factory farms, 
pesticides, exploited labour (often from immigrant or peasant populations), expropriated land, 
and so on as far and wide as one wishes to go. As Marx argues, sticking with the theme of fruit: 
Even the objects of the simplest ‘sensuous certainty’ are only given him through social 
development, industry and commercial inter-course. The cherry-tree, like almost all 
fruit-trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by commerce 
into our zone, and therefore only by this action of a definite society in a definite age has 
it become ‘sensuous certainty’ for Feuerbach.379 
 
An obvious play on Hegel’s critique of “sense-certainty,” Marx’s point is that even the most 
intimate sensory perception is mediated through a complex history.  
 This is significant for Marx because when the Young Hegelians believe themselves to be 
philosophizing about subjectivity qua subjectivity, they are unconsciously theorizing subjectivity 
qua “the German.” As a result, Marx concludes, the “essence” of our human condition is not, and 
cannot, be contained within “each single individual” but rather only within the “ensemble of 
social relation.”380, or, as he elsewhere calls it, the “mode of life.”381 Labour—specifically the 
human form of labour—is thus central because it does not simply satisfy human needs but 
creates the very substance that fills consciousness.  
 What is clear is that the fundamental premise of Marx’s dictum “being determines 
consciousness” is not something to be evaded, shirked or overcome. It is not so much that it is 
undesirable to bring the “essence” of subjectivity back under the purview of the “single 
individual” so much as such a desire represents a contradiction in terms: one cannot lose the 
social relations without losing the very substance of consciousness itself.  
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 Thus far Marx’s philosophy of the subject presents us with an interesting set of 
challenges and considerations with which we can begin to confront Levinas’ inability to 
concretely think through the problem of specific alienation. However, in order to do so we must 
continue to explore and grapple with crucial tensions that arise within Marx’s theory of 
intersubjectivity.  
 
The question of normativity 
 While social relations prove to be the very substance of consciousness, this does not 
mean that Marx relinquishes the authority to make normative claims about the world. On the 
contrary, this whole exercise is, for Marx, an attempt to demonstrate the normativity built into 
the fabric of everyday social relations. To quote Howard Zinn, one can’t be neutral on a moving 
train. Nevertheless, even with a robust theory of intersubjectivity, one is hypothetically left with 
numerous options: Marx could still valourize the particular social and political horizons of his 
day; or similarly, root the “essence” of being within a fetishized lineage or mythical past; 
perhaps overwhelmed by the immense inertia of society he could have disavowed the utility of 
collective projects, preferring instead to focus on self-modification and care; in the absence of 
transcendental principles he could have either extolled the strong and the mighty (who are 
capable of setting the standards by which others live) or simply shrugged his shoulders with a 
relativist indifference; he could argue for a particular set of social relations capable of ceding 
itself to true self-conscious planning, thus finally establishing the self-conscious subject 
previously presupposed by idealism; or, alternatively, Marx could stress the need for new forms 
of subjectivity grounded in new forms of social organization predicated on responsibility for 
one-another. 
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 While even a cursory review of the literature on Marx will reveal that there is a case to be 
made for many of these versions of Marx, it is noteworthy that Marx will hastily foreclose many 
of these options, especially those that skew towards individual solutions or those that fetishize a 
particular “mode of life,” be it linguistic, cultural, religious or other. The task here, rather than 
fight for one particular Marx over another, will be to outline features both positively and 
negatively that advance the objective we have been pursuing. One could call this an instrumental 
reading but, as Marx has already demonstrated, all readings are in some sense instrumental, and 
thus there is always more to say.  
 
Normativity and Passivity 
 Here we must return to the relationship between passivity and activity, particularly with 
respect to the inter-subject relation. For all the reasons mentioned above, Marx is understandably 
cautious when it comes to the kind of passivity articulated his philosophical predecessors. It 
would be wise to approach Marx’s resistance to pure “passivity” with the same generosity 
previously extended to Levinas’ purported eschewal of “activity.” Just as Levinas’ insistence on 
the instrumentality implicit within the activity of “ontology” was a response to the horrors of the 
20th century, so too is Marx’ skepticism of “passivity” derived from his contemporary’s relative 
indifference to the suffering induced on a systemic level. Under such conditions it is to be 
expected that Marx would approach the abstract “social virtues” derived from a decontextualized 
interpersonal relation—such as “the feeling of natural human affinity and unity”—with a certain 
level of hostility, since those who espouse such platitudes seem to be blind to the fact that 
“feudal bondage, slavery and all the social inequalities of every age have also been based upon 
this ‘natural affinity.’”382 Far from leading to a “criticism of the present conditions of life,” 
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Feuerbach is able to take “refuge” in his lofty ideals, sublimating his expressed desire to actually 
confront the reality of “overworked and consumptive starvelings.”383 To begin with such 
optimism is, for Marx, as useful as pointing a flashlight in one’s own eyes: it may make the 
world a brighter place, but, it will also effectively blind you to the status and suffering of others. 
All things considered, there are many sound reasons behind Marx’s enthusiasm to analyze the 
inter-human relation primarily in terms of the concrete socio-political relations that mediate all 
human interaction.  
  Given this predisposition it is actually somewhat surprising how much passivity Marx 
retains. Though his philosophy of intersubjectivity arrives as an “ensemble,” Marx is clear that 
the significance of the bond established between subjects is not itself exhausted by the context in 
which it does so. There is no doubt something to the stereotype that the more philosophical and 
explicitly normative aspects (often associated with his “humanism”) slowly wane over the course 
of Marx’s writings (though I would argue are still present and important throughout), and even 
with the young Marx, there is a hesitancy (for all the reasons mentioned) to speak of inter-human 
signification apart from the concrete context of everyday existence. It is therefore interesting that 
his most abstract philosophical reference to the inter-subjective relation appears in Capital, a 
work purportedly sheltered from the capricious winds of humanism. (Though, to be fair, even 
this statement, which appears in a footnote, is used as a metaphor for political economy by Marx, 
to describe how value is a relation and not the inherent property of the autonomous commodity). 
As Marx writes: 
In a certain sense, a man is in the same situation as a commodity. As he neither enters 
into the world in possession of a mirror, nor as the Fichtean philosopher who can say ‘I 
am I’, a man first sees and recognizes himself in another man. Peter only relates to 
himself as a man through his relation to another man, Paul, in whom he recognizes his 
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likeness. With this, however, Paul also becomes from head to toe, in his physical form 
as Paul, the form of appearance of the species man for Peter.384 
 
When writing this passage Marx is well aware that, in reality, “Paul” and “Peter” are not 
solipsistic ego’s existing in an abstract realm who just happen to discover the other—and thereby 
themselves—for the first time. Marx is obviously here vulnerable to the same critiques that he 
frequently levels against his contemporaries: in theorizing “man” he is mistakenly universalizing 
a particular German, masculine experience (evidenced, above all, by the designations “man,” 
“Paul,” and “Peter”). At the same time there is something to this decontextualized meeting that 
Marx is attempting to articulate; that the self is necessarily mediated through others (as Levinas 
puts it, “I am ‘in myself’ through the others”385) regardless of the designation ascribed to them 
by their context (where the other is “my child,” “boss,” or “fellow worker,” etc.). Thus the 
specific context mediating this fateful meeting between Paul and Peter—the very substance of 
sociality that otherwise consumes Marx’s thought—is here irrelevant. It makes no difference (in 
this highly specific sense) if Paul is wearing a suit, sarong, or priestly cassock; if they are 
meeting on the factory floor, a hotel bar or on a crowded bus; or even if their names were 
“Hannah” and “Aaradhya.” Regardless of the specific overlapping, intertwined, co-extensive 
strata of being, this particular point remains the same: Hannah will experience the experience of 
Hannah as already a relation to Aaradhya and vice versa. This means the asymmetrical relation 
does not, strictly speaking, take place on the same plane as the context that mediates it.  
 This dimension of the inter-human relation is precisely what Levinas is aiming at when 
he describes intersubjectivity as a “relation without relation.”386 Simply put Hannah does not 
decide to become an intersubjective being entangled with Aaradhya based on a given context or 
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attribute she may or may not possess, nor does “being” or “structure,” hovering from on high, 
simply produce effects that we label “Hannah” and “Aaradhya”—where the only relation that 
exists between them is via a mediating third term. The “otherness” of the other, that is, my 
inability to extricate myself from the other, as Levinas suggests, “does not depend on any quality 
that would distinguish him from me, for a distinction of this nature would precisely imply 
between us that community of genus which already nullifies alterity.”387  
 It is uncontroversial to say that Marx unequivocally affirms the analytical validity of 
Levinas’ assertion that the relation to the other precedes the relation to the self (where the other 
is already “for me” or interpreted on the basis of the terms set forth from a given totality). Such a 
non-intentional relation is in fact the theoretical lynch pin of Marx’s theory of alienation 
developed in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. This particular facet of alienation 
has (to the degree it is discussed at all388) been typically limited by Marx’s many interpreters to a 
discussion of the fourth type of alienation described by Marx—the alienation of “man from 
man”—which is viewed as afterthought or consequence of the previous three, more primary, 
forms. Indeed, the progression of Marx’s analysis gives this very impression, at least initially. 
Marx begins by discussing alienation from the perspective of the worker estranged from the 
product of their labour. He then takes a step back and describes the worker is simultaneously 
alienated from the creative activity itself. Zooming out even further Marx reaches the conclusion 
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that if individual is alienated from the products and the processes that determine how and what is 
produced, then, they must also be alienated from society itself, that is the collective substance (or 
“species being”) that, as we described above, determine the very horizons in which subjectivity 
can express itself. There is a logical flow to this analysis that proceeds from the particular to the 
universal aspects of alienation, a progression that is characteristic of Marx’s preferred mode of 
presentation.  
 After examining the general implications Marx breaks off to explore alienation from the 
perspective of “man to man,” which at first appears to be little more than an addendum, a kind of 
theoretical house cleaning to be addressed only after the particular/universal relation has been 
solved. Accordingly, Marx begins by describing the alienation of “man to man” as a necessary 
“consequence” of the first three forms because when “man” attempts to confront “himself” he 
necessarily “confronts other men.” However, Marx goes on to note that this relation to the other 
may appear as a secondary (or more accurately quaternary) concern, as an interpersonal 
confrontation that happens long after the battle field of society has been constructed, but in 
reality the first three aspects (labour, activity, species being) cannot be extracted from the 
relation to the other. Because the self is already mediated through others the alienation of the 
individual from “species-being” must mean that not only is the self-estranged from itself but 
therefore must already presuppose that “man is estranged from the others and that all are 
estranged from” their collective “essence.” Thus Marx concludes that, contrary to how it may 
appear, the alienation of “man to man” must be the initial expression of alienation through which 
all the other facets of alienation are experienced. As he states: “Man’s estrangement, like all 
relationships of man to himself, is realized and expressed only in man’s relationship to other 
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men.”389 The first three aspects of alienation are thus, strictly speaking, modalities of the fourth. 
Marx would seem here to abide by Levinas’ insistence that the mediation of the self through 
society (language, norms, institutions, etc), retains its structure (at both the individual and 
universal poles) precisely because it is expressed through a relation to other concrete living 
humans. This is the social aspect that makes alienation indeed possible. For Marx, the worker 
experiences Levinas’ point that one “disentangle [themselves] from society with the Other, even 
when [they] consider the Being of the existent he is,”390 in a very real, albeit it negative, way. 
The worker cannot, after taking stock of the structures that mediate the relation to others, 
renounce their sociality and become the atomistic homo economicus (like Robinson Crusoe) that 
Marx otherwise uses as philosophical fodder. As a result, if the relation to the other is malformed 
so too is the relation that one has to themselves. While the necessity of human entanglement 
opens up the possibility of alienation it also presents us with the distinct possibility that the 
relation to others, and thereby our relation to ourself, could be expressed otherwise.  
 The question that we must now confront is, if Marx accepts the descriptive value of 
Levinas claim, what sense of normativity does he derive from it? Is it portrayed, as it is in 
Levinas, as “hospitality,” “goodness,” and “ethics.” To guide us in this inquiry we can refer to a 
crucial “equivocation”391 pointed to by Asher Horowitz within the “developmental 
imperative”392 guiding Marx’s social ontology. For reasons that we have already explored at 
length, Horowitz notes that, for Marx, the uniqueness of the human resides in its ability to 
develop its capacities in concert with others and their environment. However, the imperative 
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guiding the imperative to develop human capacities, according to Horowitz, is itself ambiguous, 
oscillating between two different perspectives: the “human-to-human” relation and the relation 
of the “human-to-itself.”393 While Horowitz is careful to note that these perspective are not 
necessarily in conflict with one another, and, moreover, that the “noble” goal of self-
development “does not eo ipso undermine the human-to-human,”394 he indicates—at least as a 
theoretical possibility—how they might come into conflict. If the human-to-human is made 
subordinate to the development of human capacities within the framework of the “human-to-
itself”—where labour represents the objectification and recuperation of my power—the other 
risks becoming simply another “region of objectification…as though the affirmation of the other 
occurs for the sake of my self-affirmation, my reality, and my power…This is the logic of 
totalization”395  
 This is, however, an “equivocation” within Marx. As Horowitz notes, within Marx’s 
theory of “species-being” there is also a conception of self for-the-other without being against 
itself, where activity and labour is itself an affirmation of others. The possibility of a theory of 
objectified relations (labour, activity, language, politics) that does not unequivocally represent an 
instrumental totality is precisely what we are seeking in order to push Levinas beyond his 
inchoate view of alienation and politics. However, in order to place Marx in service of Levinas 
we must first address this lacuna within Marx.  
 
Marx with Levinas: the human-to-human 
 We will begin by exploring the human-to-human side of the relation (or the Levinasian 
side) as it presents itself in Marx. Here Marx derives a great deal of normativity from the inter-
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human relation. To return to the section of the Manuscripts on alienated labour, apart from the 
specific passage quoted above, the inter-human relation is mostly explored from the perspective 
of the human to itself. In such instances the other concerns Marx insofar as they are the 
phenomena through which the subject must experience their alienation, where the necessity of 
“bonded activity” places the worker “under the yoke of another man.”396 There are many 
exceptions however, the most notable of which is found in the sentence immediately following 
Marx’s insight that “all” relations are first expressed in the relation to the other, where he 
therefore concludes, in proper Levinasian fashion, that the problem with alienated labour is that 
the “worker” is forced to “regard the other” according to the “situation in which [the] worker 
finds [themselves].”397 Alienated labour thus forces me to assess, judge and value the other in 
accordance with their alienated circumstance. A similar sentiment is expressed, just prior, in 
Marx’s concluding thoughts on the alienation of “species-being,” where he states that the 
collective bond, described as the “spiritual” and “human essence,” shared by the members of 
society has become nothing more than a “means” for their “individual existence.”398 While it is 
developed in greater detail elsewhere, the estrangement of one from the other is portrayed here as 
distinct form of alienation, not reducible to, or a modality of, the alienation of the self.  
 The fact that one must find themselves in, through, and for others is a fact often 
celebrated by Marx. This requires a much more nuanced conception of passivity than the one 
articulated by Fichte who, at his existentialist height, conceived of sensation as nothing other 
than objective resistance to the infinity of the subjective act, and thus no kind of passivity at all. 
By contrast, in Marx there is the recurrent sense that passivity does not indicate a deficiency of 
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being but, rather, furnishes it with its very substance. The external world is thus not immediately 
under the rubric of “consciousness of”; rather consciousness is “delayed” by Marx, now seen to 
be an expression of a primordial relation to the world. As Marx puts it in the The German 
Ideology, consciousness is “from the outset afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with 
matter” and is, “therefore, from the very beginning a social product.”399 “A being which does not 
have its nature outside itself” Marx writes “is not a natural being and plays no part in the system 
of nature…A non-objective being is a non-being.”400  
 This non-allergic relation to the realm of the “not-I” is a considerable departure from 
Fichte’s view of sensation (which itself contains notable exceptions) or the liberal view that the 
social world is composed of an aggregate of individuals externally related to one another. This 
primordial openess to the world is one of the attributes the young Levinas finds attractive in 
Marx: 
Marxism no longer sees the human spirit as pure freedom, or a soul floating above any 
attachment. The spirit is no longer a pure reason that partakes in a realm of ends. It is 
prey to material needs. But as it is at the mercy of a matter and a society that no longer 
obey the magic wand of reason, its concrete and servile existence has more weight and 
importance than does impotent reason. The struggle that preexists intelligence imposes 
decisions on the latter which it had not taken.401 
 
Levinas would go on to expound upon Marx’s theory of embodiment in Totality and Infinity, 
where, against Heidegger, he would describe sensation as marking a non-intentional openess to 
the world, or “living from,” where the contents of the world have not yet assumed their “ready-
to-hand” function and disappeared within the instrumental totality of implements and projects, 
where “existence is not exhausted by the utilitarian schematism that delineates them as having 
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the existence of hammers, needles, or machines.”402 This is not to deny that the world is already 
in motion and every sensation is bound with an activity and history of activities, but, as Marx is 
also aware, this reprieve from activity is necessary so that the activity of consciousness does not 
itself become a fetishized activity, the sole index by which all else is judged (as Levinas puts it, 
where the “I think” quickly becomes the “I can,” or the “exploitation of reality”403). In this same 
vein Marx will embrace the vulnerability of existence, stating: “To be sensuous, i.e. to be real, is 
to be an object of sense, a sensuous object, and thus to have sensuous objects outside 
oneself…To be sensuous is to suffer (to be subjected to the actions of another).” He continues, 
that it is only because the human is a “suffering being” that they can, in turn, become “a 
passionate being.”404 
 Marx’s appreciation for the embodied nature of existence becomes crucial in how he 
regards the human-to-human relation. Not beginning from a fetishized view of primordial 
autonomy or self-unity, Marx is less prone to gifting the subject a “metaphysical passport” 
through which it can justify itself—at the most fundamental level—in the face of the other. It 
then follows that identity, consciousness, and freedom, are therefore not conceived of as 
independent from or antithetical to the human-to-human relation. In these moments Marx breaks 
from the identity principle, to borrow a phrase from Adorno, as the other is not only perceived 
from the recovered gaze of consciousness, where it is little more than the raw materials of the 
Subject which is-already and yet-to-be. And thus, Marx does in fact approach the question of 
alienation in the manner demanded by Levinas: 
In order to describe the passivity of the subject, one should not start with its opposition 
to a matter which resists it outside of it...nor should one start with the opposition 
between a man and a society that binds him to labor, while depriving him of the 
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products of his labor. This passivity is, to be sure, an exposedness of the subject to 
another, but the passivity of the subject is more passive still than that which the 
oppressed one determined to struggle undergoes. ..the subjectivity…of the subject, is 
due to my being obsessed with responsibility for the oppressed who is other than 
myself…”405.  
 
 What I am suggesting here is that the “ensemble of social relations” is comprised of two 
qualitatively distinct kinds of social relations in both Marx and Levinas, something 
approximating the two strands of a double helix. The first strand represents the immediate 
human-to-human relation while the second delineates the actual social, symbolic, and political 
content of the relation. At every moment these two strands spiral together to create the texture of 
experience. Something close to this metaphor is suggested by Marx in the German Ideology, 
where he states that society itself “presupposes the intercourse of individuals with one another” 
but that the “form of this intercourse is…determined by production.”406 That there are two 
strands of the social relation which are irreducible to each other is precisely what enables both 
Marx and Levinas speak of human sociality in terms of alienation and non-alienation. If the 
“ensemble” was expressed not as two strands but as a monolithic movement (that is, if the social 
relation was context and nothing more), then one would forfeit the right to make normative 
judgments about society: for better or worse, we would define ourselves and others only through 
the terms that society happened to provide for us (which is the common critique of Heideggerian 
relativism). As we have noted, for Levinas these strands remain (with some important exceptions 
which we will discuss) relatively equidistant, as the human-to-human is indiscriminately 
betrayed by its material manifestation. While slightly less enthusiastic about the sanctity of the 
human-to-human (which isn’t really saying much), this tempered optimism paradoxically 
enables Marx to conceive of a reduction in the betrayal. Marx thus views the social bond from 
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both of these perspectives in order to critique and indicate an alternative relation between the 
two.  
 The two sided nature of the social relation is most apparent in Excerpts from James Mill’s 
Elements of Political Economy. Along the lines we have drawn, Marx begins by distinguishing 
between two forms of mediation: the subjects “relation to others” and the “alien mediator” the 
intercedes between the humans on behalf of the “relation between things.” The problem, as Marx 
describes it, is that network of “independent” relations has fulfilled the mediatory function 
“instead of man himself being the mediator for man.”407 Crucial is that here mediation is not 
simply an analytical category (things are always mediated by their relation to other things) for 
Marx, but a normative distinction which privileges the human-to-human while eschewing forms 
of human mediation where the self only relates to the other a “third term.” This allusion to the 
Levinasian term is appropriate since Marx goes on describe mediation in terms that mirror 
Levinas’ critique of Heideggerian Being: “It is obvious that this mediator must become a 
veritable God since the mediator is the real power over that with which he mediates me. His cult 
becomes an end in itself. Separated from this mediator, objects lose their worth. Thus they have 
value only in so far as they represent him.”408 This mediating totality consists of two 
“movements”: The “social, human movement” which is counterposed to the “mediating 
movement” of “exchange,” that is described as the “abstract relation” of private property and the 
money form—abstract because “in the process of exchange men do not relate to each other as 
men, things lose the meaning of personal, human property.”409 
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 This gives Marx occasion to critique the Hegelian view that the exchange relation, 
predicated on private property and embodied in the money form, represents the objectification 
and return to self, and thus the overcoming of estrangement. According to Marx, this movement 
of mediation has only increased “dehumanization” because the “element” of exchange is not in 
fact commodities themselves but the very “moral existence, the social existence, the very heart of 
man.”410 In such a society the terms of exchange become the basis of the social relation itself, 
where the economic relation becomes the measure of the other, an “economic judgement on the 
morality of man”411: 
 This means, then, that the totality of the poor man’s social virtues, the content of his 
life’s activity, his very existence, represent for the rich man the repayment of his capital 
together with the usual interest. For the creditor the death of the poor man is the very 
worst thing that can happen. It means the death of his capital together with the interest. 
We should reflect on the immorality implicit in the evaluation of a man in terms of 
money…”412 
 
This gives clarity and substance to Marx’s later claim from the Manuscripts, where, in discussing 
the alienation of “man to man,” Marx briefly notes that alienated labour requires one to see the 
other in accordance to the standard and situation in which the worker finds himself. The 
exchange relation, according to Marx, necessitates that one perceives in the other only those 
discreet attributes which can be translated into “value” according to the instrumental terms of the 
totality. 
 Through this bifurcation of the social experience, where the human-to-human relation is 
simultaneously expressed and revoked within social relations, Marx is able to claim that the 
dominant mode of life expressed by market relations represents the “very antithesis of a social 
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relationship.”413 By this Marx does not of course mean to suggest that the market is not firmly 
embedded within society, rather, he is claiming that the very social processes that interpellate the 
subject already represent a perversion of sociality. As Marx describes, in “social activity,” and 
“social enjoyment” the “essential bond joining him to other men appears inessential, in fact 
separation from other men appears to be his true existence.”414 The market thus represents the 
atomization of humanity in and through society.  
 This very sentiment is scattered throughout Marx’s writings, for example, in the 
Manuscripts Marx writes that the “human essence” only exists within “a bond” where the 
“existence for others and their existence for [them]” is described as the “vital element of human 
reality.”415 In On the Jewish Question, Marx similarly states that “the bond” that now binds the 
members of society is no longer “species-life” but that of “natural necessity, need and private 
interest, the conservation of their property and their egoistic persons,” and thus each sees the 
other not as the “realization but the limitation of [their] own freedom.”416 This is immediately 
followed by one of Marx’s most interesting (and curiously seldom theorized) statements, where 
Marx is somewhat perplexed by the squandered emancipatory potential of the French revolution:  
It is a curious thing that a people which is just beginning to free itself, to tear down all 
the barriers between the different sections of the people and to found a political 
community, that such a people should solemnly proclaim the rights of egoistic man, 
separated from his fellow men and from the community.417  
 
What is essential here is that Marx’s vision of a political community is founded, not a “third 
term” (such as a shared language, lineage, customs, beliefs, nor on the rights of the atomized 
individual), but on the destruction of every barrier erected to separate the human from the 
                                                 
413 Ibid., p. 267. 
414 Ibid., p. 266. 
415 Marx, Economic, p. 394. 
416 Marx, “On the Jewish Jewish Question,” Writings, p. 230. 
417 Ibid. 
 198 
human. The “essence” of the relation with others is the relation qua relation (or, in Levinas’ 
terms the “relation without relation”) and thus Marx does not (contra Fichte) seek to establish a 
community based on this or that predicate (although any society will inevitably contain a 
multiplicity of predicates). This example points to the possibility that a community can be 
founded upon a rootless orientation vis-a-vis the other, even if it must necessarily entail a 
complex network of mediations (language, institutions, etc.). Marx describes such a possibility as 
the “real community” where individual does not obtain their freedom in their obedience to Being 
(or any of its manifestations) but only “in and through their association.”418 
 To return to the Excerpts, this sentiment is once again confirmed in Marx’s attitude 
toward the advancement of the productive forces within market relations. A society predicated 
on the exchange relation (founded upon private property) has dramatically increased the 
developmental capacities of society, and yet, Marx states, this expansion of human powers, while 
impressive, has made humanity more “egoistic” and “un-social” and thus (at least here) it 
represents the antithesis of social advancement: it has transformed the subject into “an abstract 
being, a lathe…a spiritual and physical abortion.”419 The development of productive capacities 
have thus impeded human liberation by further entrenching the priority of the mediating totality 
as a bond of the social over and above the social bond.  
 At this point Marx again begins to ponder what society might look like if the human-to-
human relation were affirmed rather than suffocated within society. Marx, here, gives a much 
more detailed view of his later statement, which describes freedom as only obtained in and 
through association with others. Beginning from the perspective of production guided by market 
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exchange, Marx claims that the products of labour are nothing but “objectified self-interest,”420 
and thus humans only relate to the needs and desires of each other externally, as if they were 
nothing more than the requisite region of my self-satisfaction. To elaborate the depravity of this 
relation, Marx utilizes a metaphor that becomes the central analogy of Capital, where the 
commodity, animated by spirit of capitalism, takes on an independent life of its own.  
As a human being, then, you have no relation to my product because I myself have no 
human relation to it. But the means is the true power over an object and hence we each 
regard our own products as the power each has over the other and over himself, i.e. our 
own product has stood up on its hind legs against us: it had seemed to be our property, 
but in reality we are its property. We find ourselves excluded from true property 
because our property excludes other human beings.421 
 
What is so fascinating about this passage is that it is clear that the autonomy of the object is not 
only posited in reference to the first three forms of alienation, where the subject becomes 
estranged from its products, activity and relation to being-as-such. The autonomy of the product 
is attributed primarily to the fact that it “excludes” the other, and thus remains within the private 
domain, even though it is socially produced and available for purchase by others. To again put it 
in Levinasian terms, Marx is stating that even though the production and sale of commodities 
occurs with the social arena, its movement is within the domain of the “same,” that is, does not 
extend beyond the reach of expanded egoism. 
 At this point Marx, once again, foreshadows his reference to the “language of 
commodities” in Capital, as Marx states that, in such a situation, the “only comprehensible 
language we have is the language our possessions use together.”422 In the same way he 
disarticulates the social bond into two movements, Marx now proposes a rigid demarcation 
between the language spoken by the market and the “human language” which “[w]e would not 
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understand…and it would remain ineffectual” from the perspective of the former. Marx 
continues: 
From the one side, such a language would be felt to be begging, imploring and hence 
humiliating. It could be used only with feelings of shame or debasement. From the other 
side, it would be received as impertinence or insanity and so rejected. We are so 
estranged from our human essence that the direct language of man strikes us as an 
offence against the dignity of man.423 
 
According to the former, the value of the human is “worthless” in itself. The only value the other 
has for me and vice versa is through “the value of our mutual objects.”424 
 In works like Capital, as we will momentarily investigate, Marx explores the contours of 
this totality in great detail, however, in the Excerpts, unlike in many of his subsequent works, 
Marx provides us with an image of the “human language.” “Let us suppose that we had produced 
as human beings,” Marx begins, in such an “event each of us would have doubly affirmed 
himself and his neighbour in his production.” The human is “doubly affirmed” because they not 
only enjoy the creative act of objectifying their individuality within the sensory experience of 
unlamented labour but also would find “enjoyment” in the “knowledge that in my labour I 
had…procured an object corresponding to the needs of another human being.” Marx then 
concludes, in the most Levinasian fashion that, in such a circumstance: 
I would have acted for you as the mediator between you and the species, thus I would be 
acknowledged by you as the complement of your own being, as an essential part of 
yourself. I would thus know myself to be confirmed both in your thoughts and your 
love. In the individual expression of my own life I would have brought about the 
immediate expression of your life, and so in my individual activity I would have 
directly confirmed and realized my authentic nature, my human, communal nature. Our 
productions would be as many mirrors from which our natures would shine forth.425 
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With this Marx has not only transcended the closed loop of same at the level of the subject/other 
relation (the first strand of the double helix), but, has expressed labour, activity and 
objectification (the second strand) in terms that continue to confirm subjectivity as responsibility. 
 
Rootlessness, language and universality redux 
 It is remarkable how close Marx’s distinction between the “human language” and the 
“language of commodities” is to Levinas’ famous distinction between the “saying” and the 
“said.” The first significant thing to note is that both cases mark a significant departure from the 
obsession with language within philosophy. The focus on language, like that of subjectivity in 
general, is marked by the break with empiricism, where words and concepts were considered 
inert conduits which express ideas already given to the mind (Locke, etc.). Thinkers such as 
Condillac, Herder and Von Humboldt increasingly understood language as more than just pre-
manufactured tools, concepts themselves took an active role in shaping the subjective experience 
of the world. Language was now considered to be, as Von Humboldt claimed, “a formative organ 
of thought.” The history and structure of language becomes a focal point for a variety of thinkers 
such as Fichte, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Arendt, Gramsci, Lacan, Derrida, and Kristeva. 
 The relative indifference of Marx and Levinas to social and semiotic dimensions of 
language is often considered to be, for a variety of reasons, a detriment. While this may indeed 
be the case, it does help illuminate one of their common strengths. This dimension of language 
does not seem to interest them because they are both concerned with language as an expression, 
or activity, which, like all expressions, is directed toward other humans. This aspect is precisely 
what is obscured when one focuses on the stable features of language such as etymology, syntax, 
grammar, semiotics, interpretation, culture, etc. This is, in no small way, a by-product of their 
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commitment to a variant of rootless subjectivity, even universalism, one that refuses to 
subordinate the human-to-human to a mediating third term, and therefore wary of any attempts to 
ground a community within a tradition, lineage, way of being-in-the-world, or particular “mode-
of-life” (which is also not to say that they would not benefit for an analysis of language as a 
social force, etc.).  
 What is fascinating is that, for both Marx and Levinas, language is conveyed as an all or 
nothing proposition that either expresses the one-for-the-other or represents the perversion or 
frustration of that desire. Consequently, what is resisted is the temptation to misapprehend this 
signification, a situation where the hermeneutical horizon itself becomes the repository of being-
for-others. The emphasis on language as expression, thus, elides the possibility that this moment 
would become sublimated or fully consummated within sphere of meaning. Where, as Marx so 
eloquently puts it, “I would have acted for you as the mediator between you and the species.”  
 But, as Marx is well aware, this is only one aspect of the social experience, which cannot 
remain abstracted from history, economics and politics. In our age of neoliberalism, austerity, 
nationalism, and imperialism we certainly continue to exist in and through each other. This 
means that, on the one hand, the experience of the world is often coupled with expression of 
hope, solidarity, love, and kindness. However, on the other hand, it also means that such 
moments are too often fleeting, malformed, and suppressed by the particular species-form 
society has assumed. The question that lies at the intersection of Marx and Levinas is therefore, 
can we conceive of new forms of universality and “species-being” that affirm, rather than 
distorts, our being for and with others. We will momentarily return to this question; however we 
will be in a better position to do so after we have sufficiently explored both sides of the 
equivocation in Marx.  
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Beyond labour as freedom and freedom as egoism: a critique of Jaeggi and Gould 
 
 To remain on this side of the social relation for just a moment longer, it is important to 
note how this aspect of Marx, which emphases subjectivity as a radical break from egoism 
(defined intimately or socially), is dramatically under-theorized. Marx’s theory of labour, and 
subjectivity more generally, is typically understood only as the objectification of the contents of 
the mind, which, though their re-appropriation makes the subject, as Hegel puts it, into a 
“substance.” The relationship of the subject to their labour becomes the axis around which the 
self can either be recovered, and thereby developed at a higher pitch (where the external world 
becomes, quite literally, its inorganic body) or alienated (where self fails to recognize itself in the 
world around it). From this perspective, others are an important aspect of self-development (or 
return to self), to be sure, however, the other is only significant in their generic function (other-
as-society, or “being-with,” to use the Heideggerian phrase), and even then only secondary 
characters necessarily dragged into the plot by the movement of the ego.  
 Such a view provides the basis for many contemporary critiques (and some applications) 
of Marx. From Althusser to contemporary critical theory, the common refrain is that concepts 
such as “species-being” and alienation, can only appear as “objectivist,” “essentialist,” and 
“Promethian” when held up to modern philosophical standards. According to Honneth, perhaps 
the most prominent of these, Marx’s theory of alienation is antiquated because it refers (even if 
negatively) to an idealized and very specific “relation of labour” which has been “lost.”426 
Honneth, therefore, remains puzzled that Adorno in particular, would have retained Marx’s 
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(relatively unaltered) category of “alienation” despite his otherwise strong distaste for 
“generalizations and hypostatizations.”427 
 In her attempt to rescue the concept of alienation from Marx’s “Promethean-expressivist 
twist,”428 Rahel Jaeggi treads a similar path. According to Jaeggi Marx’s pathology stems from 
the fact that his normative foundation is rooted in human labour as an end-in-itself. Highlighting 
Marx’s “Aristotelian” impulses, she states that what is “alienating about alienated labor” is that it 
is “instrumental” and therefore without “intrinsic purpose, that it is not (at least also) performed 
for its own sake.”429 Marx is considered by Jaeggi to be the quintessential example of the 
development imperative from the perspective of the self-relation, where the “human being 
produces herself and her world in a single act. In producing her world the human being produces 
herself and vice versa.”430 Labor, according to her reading of Marx, enables the subject to 
“recognize” itself and its capacities and thus find itself “through this relation,” which is why only 
“unlamented labor…counts for Marx as the human being’s essential characteristic.”431 Labour is 
thus crucial for Marx because the subject must first build a mirror for itself so that it can 
recognize itself as a free being—a situation where, according to Jaeggi, there is “perfect 
correspondence between the image reflected in the mirror and the source of that reflection.”  
 This interpretation enables Jaeggi to quickly dismiss Marx’s theory of alienation out of 
hand: to posit labour as an “reappropriation of something that already exists,”432 necessarily 
leads Marx down the path of essentialism, perfectionism and objectivism. Instead of already 
assuming a perfect relation that has been lost, Jaeggi charts a new course for the theory of 
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alienation by retreading familiar territory where the individual is something to be constructed 
from the social rather than discovered (and thus she does not presuppose a specific relation to 
labour per se).  
 This reading of Marx is interesting on a number of levels. The first is that Jaeggi’s own 
normative/analytical standpoint, which advocates a kind of intersubjective egoism. As I have 
detailed elsewhere,433 Jaeggi is able to circumvent crucial ethical, political and historical 
questions because she adopts, for social reasons (namely, this is already the normative 
orientation of our present “form of life,” and, since there is no “archimedean point,” it remains a 
fact of our social existence), a myopic view of alienation, which simply describes the inability of 
one to find oneself within their own actions. This sleight of hand enables Jaeggi to seamlessly 
drop the analytical scope of Marx’s analysis (history, capitalism, in sum, the totality of social 
relations) because her view of the “non-essentialist” subject does not concern itself with the 
plight of others (except to the degree that they represent the social material from which I craft 
my being). Thus the narrative that labour is an end-in-itself qua the recovery of the self, enables 
her to justify the narrow scope of her analysis. Accordingly, for Jaeggi, the non-alienated life 
refers to the feeling of having a stake in one’s life, or “a way of carrying out one’s own life and a 
certain way of appropriating oneself - that is, a way of establishing relations to oneself and the 
relationships in which one lives.”434 Because, putatively unlike Marx, she sets no predetermined 
end for the subject, she need not concern herself with the “perfect” or “Promethean” labour 
relation. The only imperative Jaeggi leaves us with is to transform the “inner void” of 
subjectivity into a “true self,” or else risk the prospect that we might, literally, remain a 
                                                 
433 See, Robert Froese, “Review of Rahel Jaeggi’s ‘Alienation,’” Journal of Social and Political Thought  - Special 
Issue: Pathologies of Recognition  25 (2015): 44-53. 
434 Ibid., p. 33. 
 
 206 
nobody.435 This imperative, she states, avoids metaphysical claims because it is derived from the 
horizons of the “form of life” in which she resides. Devoid of a relation to the other qua other, 
alienation simply describes “relationlessness between the human being and the world.”436 
 This sentiment is not only present in critiques of Marx. Gould’s (overall interesting) 
study on Marx’s “social ontology,” for example, stakes out a similar position with some crucial 
modifications. According to Gould, Marx’s view of freedom differs from Hegel and Aristotle 
only in one key respect, it rejects “the idea of a pre-given or fixed nature or essence that becomes 
actualized.” Gould thus concludes that, for Marx, freedom is “the process of creating this nature 
itself…a freedom to realize oneself in which an individual creates him or herself through 
projecting possibilities that become guides for his or her actions, where the realization of these 
possibilities leads to the projection of new possibilities to be realized.”437 In almost identical 
terms to Jaeggi’s “non-Marxist” definition of freedom, Gould states that, for Marx freedom and 
labour work together to the end of “self-transcendence through transforming the world.”438 What 
is immediately apparent is that, while Gould provides a convincing counterpoint to Jaeggi’s 
“essentialist” accusations, she does so by positioning Marx in a way that perfectly mirrors 
Jaeggi’s purported corrective, where the story of subjectivity is once again about self-mastery 
without limit or end. At this level Gould’s Marx is virtually indistinguishable from Jaeggi’s 
espoused position: 
Furthermore, since this transformation is carried out by individuals in social relations 
and this is a social activity, the conditions for this individual self-transcendence are 
themselves social conditions. Thus for Marx, freedom as the process of self-realization 
is the origination of novel possibilities, acting on which the social individual creates and 
recreates him or herself constantly as a self-transcendent being.439  
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Gould therefore concludes that, “[f]reedom has no ground as a value outside of itself and all 
other values are grounded in it. It is value itself as the end in itself.” The only “qualification” 
Gould puts on this process of “pure self-creation” is that “freedom is achieved only in and 
through this process of working on nature in a given form of society.”440 What is fascinating 
about the comparison between Gould and Jaeggi is that latter admits that her values for self-
mastery are engendered by her historical and spatial particularly (which she calls “mode of life” 
and we might qualify with the more particular “neoliberal”), and thus represents a kind of soft 
relativist historical materialist (individualist by convention), while Gould hypostatizes the 
imperative for self-mastery and thus risks reifying neoliberal values in the name of Marx. 
 This notion of non-alienated labour as an end in itself is of course not absent in Marx, as 
we briefly noted earlier, however, before turning to this tension in Marx, it is important to note 
that Marx’s theory of subjectivity and alienation is presented in both Gould and Jaeggi without a 
hint of tension, as if the matter is solved for both Marx and us.  
 No doubt freedom, conceived of in terms of individuality, mastery, self-transformation, is 
an integral parts of the human experience and can go a great distance to describe any project of 
liberation. The questions remain, however, if left to themselves (conceived of as untethered or 
self-grounded values, as Gould states), do such concepts adequately capture the concrete 
experience of sociality, and, moreover, can they articulate a normative orientation equal to that 
very experience? I think Marx precedes Levinas by answering in the negative. As we have 
shown, Marx’s conception of the human bond, and freedom in, through and for others, goes well 
beyond the scope of freedom defined above. To accept such a definition of freedom, one has a 
hard time explaining the difference between Marx’s call for universal revolution and Jaeggi’s 
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anti-historical individualism. The easiest way to parse the difference would be to represent it as 
an analytical quibble about how deep and wide one need to churn and alter their social relations 
for it to count as “authentic” self-transformation. From such a perspective, Jaeggi’s position 
would seem far more reasonable, as Marx’s dive into the deep structures of capitalism, where his 
immodest attempt to master more than one could ever, would appear as another symptom of his 
perfectionism.  
 If Marx’s theory of intersubjectivity were indeed predicated upon self-mastery as the 
ultimate value, it would appear that Marx only arrived at the depths of the “mode of 
production”—which function as his theoretical “ground zero”—because he wanted to fashion 
himself into a truly transcendent (and thereby perfect) being. And thus, because he cannot 
possibly live up to his own lofty standards of what constitutes true freedom (which would appear 
to require be mastery on a universal scale), he was bound to lose the very thing he sought to find. 
Such a position would also presuppose that Marx’s universalism is grounded in analytical 
necessity. Namely that, as a happy coincidence, his task of self-mastery just so happens to 
require the collaboration (and hence forth liberation) of those who were lucky enough to share 
his particular mode of being—and presumably his concern need extend no further. This concern 
thus reaches a universal scope only as a consequence of the global reach of capitalism, which 
now requires universal liberation as the positive condition of his own private odyssey. Thus 
Marx’s proclamation that “[l]abour in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded 
in a black skin”441 is simply describing an analytical necessity, a concern for the others that could 
otherwise be avoided if the conditions for self-transformation were favourable enough to narrow 
his scope of concern. 
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 While Jaeggi’s potential answer to these questions is unclear, Gould attempts to address 
these issues by smuggling her ethics through the back door, via an examination of Marx’s theory 
of “justice.” She attempts to square the circle by expanding the scope of freedom as a robust 
notion of “positive freedom,” which allows her to sweep up everything that escapes the narrow 
logic of self-mastery. Here she very briefly notes Marx’s affinity for “non-instrumental 
relations” that goes beyond “formal reciprocity” and “recognition” but even this becomes a 
modality of self-mastery, rooted in the rational “respect” for how others are also free beings on 
their own journey of self-development.442 Not only does this reading leave some of the most 
interesting aspects of Marx unexplored, but it fails to name, let alone address, the potential 
tension within Marx’s theory of freedom, which oscillates between freedom as (self) 
development and freedom as in-for-and-through others. It is to this tension that we will now turn. 
 
Levinas for Marx 
 We can now explore the other side of the equivocation found within Marx, where the 
human-to-human is in danger of becoming subordinated to the human-to-self. It is without 
question that Marx’s work is frequently animated by his disgust for the suffering and subjugation 
of workers, children, slaves, and women—as Levinas himself suggests, in “Marxism” we find 
the “recognition of the other.”443 At the same time, it is imperative that we raise the tensions, 
exceptions and contradictions, in an attempt to avoid simply repeating them.  
 By raising his normative concerns to the systemic level, which are ultimately grounded in 
the “mode of production,” Marx has given himself a problem which is nearly impossible to 
solve. By the necessities of his social ontology Marx is forced to not only confront the particular 
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instances of cruelty and barbarism—as Marx notes, even liberals are particularly good at this—
but the social logic that incentivizes and demands such malice and sacrifice.  
 To confront systemic relations is a daunting task in-itself, no doubt. However, such a task 
verges on absurd because, as Marx is wont to show, the consciousness of individuals is 
necessarily entrenched within, and is an expression of, the “mode of life” in question. This 
sentiment often sounds needlessly crude and deterministic (sometimes because it is articulated as 
such, by Marx and others). Nevertheless, Marx’s fundamental point is that because 
consciousness is an embodied, circumscribed, and determined phenomena, it is necessarily a 
tapestry woven together from socio-linguistic norms and practices, religious and ethical rituals 
and beliefs, as well as legal and political frameworks—all of which must exist within a fairly 
stable relationship with respect to how a society produces and distributes the means necessary to 
sustain this physical, spiritual and symbolic life. This being the case, the irony (or better, 
tragedy) of Marx’s insight is that domination and misery become routinely naturalized (seen to 
be either unavoidable or justified), and, as a side effect, liberation becomes nearly unintelligible 
(a point noted earlier with respect to the unintelligibility of the “human language”). 
 The term “unintelligible” here seems to be preferable over a more pejorative term (like 
undesirable, etc.) to the degree that it implies the materiality and depth of a given ideology.  
It is not simply that the abolishment of hierarchical relationships are undesirable from the 
perspective of capitalism (or feudalism, caste system, etc.), but within such co-ordinates, this 
egalitarian impulse can only appear as an upheaval of the natural order of things. Thus, as Marx 
laments, those that suffer the most “are even forced to recognize and acknowledge the fact that 
they are dominated, ruled and possessed as a privilege from heaven!”444 When one considers the 
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popularity of Hoffman’s 1896 “extinction thesis” (which posited that the rates of poverty, disease 
and death in American “Negro” populations were an indication of biological inferiority and an 
ill-suited disposition to modern society, which, consequently, predicted their extinction within 
generations) or the way contemporary debates on race, gender, immigration and neoliberalism 
still pivot on factors that naturalize hierarchy (genetics, IQ, personality, culture, etc.), it is clear 
that ideology is deeply entrenched within a mutually reinforcing network of material and 
symbolic relations. Any “mode of life” that runs counter to such a society simply has little or no 
symbolic or material space within the existing universe, and can only appear as, at best, utopian.  
 It is thus for very good reason that Marx finds himself painted into a corner. On the one 
hand, Marx observes the dynamism and variability of human society. On the other hand, he also 
observes that radical transformations do not usually result from democratic deliberation and 
conscious planning. Rather, such ruptures unfold when there is a significant and unplanned shift 
in the foundation of social relations (which typically relate to the structure of how production is 
organized) that causes consequences and contradictions that cannot be contained within the 
existing paradigm or totality of relations. For reasons we will go into, Marx prefers to theorize 
the internal contradictions that evolve out of a given mode of production (or the tension 
produced between forces and relations of production), but he also notes that such social 
transformations can occur through war, colonization, or even dramatic changes in one’s natural 
environment. At any rate, Marx seems convinced that, on account of the peculiar form of social 
beings that humans are, revolutions tend to lag behind the necessities that follow from a crack in 
the socio-economic edifice, so to speak. (In some ways this is reminiscent of the Heideggerian 
“breakdown” situation, where it is only when the smooth functioning of the life-world is brought 
to a standstill by the exigencies of the situation that it can be confronted and radically 
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transformed—a sentiment Heidegger himself seems to echo positively in his famous statement 
that “only a God can save us”—although, for Marx, such a process is still less conscious than 
even this analogy with Heidegger would imply.) 
 All of this adds up to the fact that Marx appears to find it difficult to reconcile, or even 
articulate, the relationship between these two planes of existence. Marx seems equally compelled 
to show us both the systemic causes of violence and how little we can do about it. Marx, whose 
consciousness is itself woven out of the tapestry of 19th Century German life, proceeds by 
examining one of these planes and (largely) neglecting the other. More often than not Marx will 
quarantine (even if he presupposes) specific questions that relate to ethics and inter-human 
relation, preferring instead to focus on the meta-subjective concerns such as the succession of 
modes of production, revolutions and history. Of course such a move does not typically, as we 
have already noted with respect to Levinas, have the desired effect and continues to haunt the 
thinker after they have considered the issue long solved.   
 This is where we can come back to the looming ambiguity in Marx between freedom as 
self-transformation in and through development and the as the expression of the human-to-
human relation. Rather than dividing the “young” from the “mature” Marx, this oscillation is 
better thought of as a vertical movement that Marx continues to wrestle with throughout his 
works. It is thus already present in the account of alienated labour that was evidence of Marx’s 
convergence with Levinas. There are moments when Marx speaks about alienated labour that he 
does not only express a desire for a different kind of social bond. In these places it sounds much 
closer to the desire to be free from the fetters of exteriority or “otherness” as such, as if the 
intersubjective relation—that is the necessity of being mediated through the not-I—was itself 
was a form alienation. Thus, when Marx describes that, in alienated labour, the product confronts 
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the worker as “alien, hostile and…independent,” he often gives the knife of alienation an extra 
twist by emphasizing that it is evidence of “another man” and “master” having possession over 
what is rightfully his.445 Of course, as we noted several times, political subservience is neither 
desirable nor does it relate to the specific matter at hand. If responsibility is nothing more than 
the apologetics for oppression (a new form of “slave morality”) it would not be an issue that 
Marx raises the problem of alienation as he does. What is noteworthy about this description is 
that it appears as though Marx is doubling down on counterposing freedom to alienation, where 
it is not just the distorted social relation that is being contrasted with freedom but the social 
relation itself, a dependence which is brought into view by the exaggerated dependence of the 
alienated relation. In such moments Marx sounds much closer to Fichte, who (at times) 
begrudgingly accepts the necessity of others which, in turn, also makes him all the more diligent 
to re-instate the reign of the self-proper (the antipode of Levinas’ dictum, which Marx elsewhere 
embodies: “I exist through the other and for the other, but without this being alienation: I am 
inspired”). Marx thus follows up his description of alienated labour with the dictum: 
A being sees himself as independent only when he stands on his own feet, and he only 
stands on his own feet when he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the 
grace of another regards himself as a dependent being. But I live completely by the 
grace of another if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life but also its creation, 
if he is the source of my life. My life is necessarily grounded outside itself if it is not my 
own creation. The creation is therefore an idea which is very hard to exorcize from the 
popular consciousness.446 
 
It is as if any power or relation of mutual dependence is already here a form of alienation, the 
subject is thus in an existential fight against alienation and the journey of subjectivity and self-
development is thus one of mastery and overcoming the external character of the other.  
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 Again, to stress the unevenness of Marx’s though in this regard, this passage is 
immediately following one where he denounces poverty because it is the “passive bond which 
makes man experience his greatest wealth - the other man - as need.”447 This is significant of 
course because one of Levinas’ complaint, in Totality and Infinity, is that containing the human-
to-human relation under the rubric of need does not get to the root of the relation because 
expressed as a “need” the other is still only considered retroactively from the standpoint of 
already consciousness, that is, “for me.” Marx here seems to acknowledge this very point and, 
moreover, condemns the “for me” structure of capitalism itself for reducing the other-as-wealth 
to mere “need” (the very same sentiment expressed in Excerpts). 
 This oscillation between subjectivity in-for-and-through others and as a return-to-self is 
especially relevant where Marx considers the meta-subjective plane of existence, where he does 
not only evaluate the specific relations within a mode of life but the worlds themselves and even 
the very movement between these worlds. It is too simple to say that here Marx reduces the 
succession of modes of production pure and simple to the developmental imperative, which is at 
best a form of theodicy. At the same time, it remains a distinct ambiguity throughout Marx’s 
work. In the chapter “The Metaphysics of Political Economy” from the The Poverty of 
Philosophy, Marx attempts to distinguish his dialectical position from his contemporaries. He 
begins with a critique of the “fatalist economists” (Smith, Ricardo, etc.) and chastises them for 
their myopic focus on increasing the “productive forces” while ignoring the “accidental 
sufferings” of the proletariat. This leads Marx to an unequivocal denouncement: “Poverty is in 
their eyes merely the pang which accompanies every childbirth in nature as in industry.”448 
However, as Marx continues he also equally admonishes the “Romantics,” those “blasé 
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fatalists,” that see only poverty and misery in this new stage of development. Marx’s dialectical 
solution, of course, is to find liberation within the immiseration. However, this often seems less 
like making the best out of a bad situation (or, to paraphrase Marx, we make history but not in 
the conditions that we choose) and more like a teleological understanding of development that 
risks fetishizing development as a necessary dialectical unfolding, as Marx concludes:  
So long as the proletariat is not yet sufficiently developed to constitute itself as a 
class…and the productive forces are not yet sufficiently developed in the bosom of the 
bourgeoisie itself to enable us to catch a glimpse of the material conditions necessary 
for the emancipation of the proletariat and for the formation of a new society, these 
theoreticians are merely utopians…the measure of history moves forward, and with it 
the struggle of the proletariat assumes clearer outlines…they see in poverty nothing but 
poverty, without seeing in the revolutionary, subversive side, which will overthrow the 
old society.449 
 
To complicate the matter further, this sentiment is filled with ambiguity. It initially appears as a 
fairly clear example of Marx taking refuge in the meta-subjective movement, where the suffering 
of others is instrumentalized (and perhaps even encouraged) in order to achieve the necessary 
level of productive forces to achieve freedom as the final return-to-self. At the same time, even 
within this chapter Marx’s expressed concern is to turn the critics of poverty from “doctrinaires” 
to “revolutionaries,” that is, to actualize their morality within a set of concrete economic and 
political conditions, and thus escape, rather than reproduce, the very cycle of poverty. At still at 
other times, in Marx’s writings his revolutionary spirit feels much more ambivalent than either of 
these moments would suggest. Given his pessimism about the potential of self-consciously 
systemic change, he seems to leave us with no other alternative other than to hope and pray that 
the continual evolution of productive forces will eventually produce a set of relations which can 
no longer be contained within the existing co-ordinates, making liberation both necessary and 
possible.  
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 There are many dimensions of this quandary for which Levinas would be of no use. 
When it comes to questions of history, economics and political strategy, one can find libraries of 
better places to turn. The one place Levinas proves to be a crucial ally is in clarifying exactly is it 
that Marx is hoping to attain. That is, to what end should our developmental capacities be 
implemented? What exactly do we mean by freedom and how does this relate to our relationship 
to labour and to others? 
 One of the crucial distinctions Marx consistently utilized to answer these questions is the 
relationship between “freedom” and “necessity.” Of course, like everything else this division 
turns out to be itself ambiguous. As Kandiyali notes, in exploring their relation Marx “oscillates” 
between two distinct logics of freedom which leads him to consistently articulate two different 
answers to this question: sometimes for Marx true freedom is found within the necessity of 
labour and at other times the “realm of freedom” is found only within leisure which lies beyond 
labour and necessity. Interestingly, Kandiyali attributes the first sense of freedom to Marx’s 
Hegelian lineage (where freedom is found in the social aspect of labour, in satisfying the needs 
of others) and the second to his Aristotelian influence (where freedom lies not in the instrumental 
activity of labour but in contemplation which is for its own sake).450 Kandiyali’s reading is 
interesting in that it not only explores the intersubjectivity of labour from a normative 
perspective (a sentiment notably absent in Jaeggi and Gould), but this impulse is traced back to 
Hegel, who is often seen as the source of Marx’s egoistic view of labour (as externalization and 
return to self). As important (and related) as these questions are, we will pursue this oscillation 
from our overarching concern, which is tangential to Kandiyali specific aim.  
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 Here we can return to the earlier reading of Marx with Levinas. In the first sense of 
freedom, Marx finds freedom in necessity because freedom is only found within activity as an 
expression for others. One can find enjoyment in necessity, not because they are masochistic but 
because freedom in this sense is no longer synonymous with the expansion of my individual 
capacities. From this perspective, as Marx approaches the development of collective capacities, 
he is more concerned with how society is organized in production rather than the immensity of 
productive capacities per se. When Marx conceives of freedom as opposed to necessity, he seems 
to assume that a certain threshold of development is necessary for freedom to count as true 
freedom. Viewed from this perspective, other “forms of life” are viewed in terms of how 
advanced their productive capacities are, with little attention paid to how those capacities are 
organized. While an analysis of the productive capacities does not, obviously, imply a normative 
judgement, it is often the case with Marx that it does. If freedom requires a certain threshold of 
developmental capacities, then true freedom is still lurking over the horizon.  
 Simply put, when freedom is viewed as antagonistic to necessity, Marx seem much more 
prone to subordinating the human-to-human to the developmental imperative. Here the history of 
human society is told, much like Hegel, as the teleological maturation of the Subject. For 
example, when discussing the evolution of human capacities, Marx has a proclivity to define less 
developed forms of society as “herd”451 “sheep” or “tribal” consciousness, a form where the 
substance of consciousness is “purely animal” because it has yet been “hardly altered by 
history.”452 Marx goes on to describe how consciousness, still “sheep-like or tribal” at this point, 
can only differentiate itself and grasp its own development through self-transformation and 
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labour. A sentiment repeated in the Grundrisse, where Marx states that the original form of 
“species-being” is a “clan being” or “herd animal” and this “herd-like” existence is transformed 
into a “zoon politikon” through the process of exchange.453 
 As suggested above, Marx seems to care far more about the productive capacities than 
what may be gleaned from the social and political forms of organization contained therein. This 
can, at least partially, be explained as Marx’s conviction that the dialectical unfolding would 
necessarily lead to contradictions between the productive forces and relations, and, moreover, 
that this path of development, already underway, was linear without a hope of return. As a result 
the communal structure of the “hunting peoples,” is thus largely dismissed because, in such a 
society, the “individual has as little torn himself free from the umbilical cord of his tribe or 
community as a bee has from his hive.”454  
 The category of “necessity,” as it is articulated in these passages, does not thus simply 
refer to the reduction of the “working day” as it appears in the famous passage from Capital 
Volume III. Necessity here also refers to the necessity of instincts and drives that define non-
human animals. What Marx seems to imply is that only those societies that have substantially 
transformed their environment (that is made their subjectivity into substance) have freed 
themselves from their animal exigencies (only if partially, or as Marx likes to put it, “one-
sidedly”). There is here a connection between self-mastery and complex forms of consciousness. 
Consciousness begins as an immediate unity (communal property) and only begins to 
differentiate itself through the development of its capacities which, Marx notes several places, 
must first take place through one-sided development, such as the division of labour (which rips 
the individual from the womb of unity) before it can return to itself as a realized differentiated 
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totality. We are thus back to the problem raised by Hegel in chapter three, whether or not other 
societies are developed and differentiated enough to be bestowed with the title of “self-
consciousness.” To the degree that this narrative holds for Marx, it does indeed subordinate the 
human to totalizing movement that he otherwise appeared to disdained.  
 Thus with Marx we consistently find ourselves in a bind. While he typically reserves his 
harshest epithets for those who would instrumentalize the suffering of others (for example the 
way he describes child labour and slavery), he consistently struggles to navigate the relationship 
between these diverging normative impulses (which is not to suggest that there is an easy 
answer). Marx’s otherwise vehement prohibition against any mediating movement that would 
intercede and dominate the human-to-human relation (be it God, the Idea, the State or the 
market) proves to be too luring, a deus ex machina of sorts, dropped from above to bring closure 
to the drama of human existence. For example, in On the Jewish Question Marx affirms that the 
mediating movement of religion was a necessary stage in the maturation of the consciousness 
just as political liberation can only be accomplished “in a devious way, through a medium, even 
though the medium is a necessary one.”455 In the appendix to Capital Marx later repeats and 
elaborates this sentiment, which I will quote in full: 
Hence the rule of the capitalist over the worker is the rule of things over man, of dead 
labour over the living, of the product over the producer….Thus at the level of material 
production, of the life-process in the realm of the social - for that is what the process of 
production is - we find the same situation that we find in religion at the ideological 
level, namely the inversion of subject into object and vice versa. Viewed historically 
this inversion is the indispensable transition without which wealth as such, i.e. the 
relentless productive forces of social labour, which alone can form the material base of a 
free human society, could not possibly be created by force at the expense of the 
majority. This antagonistic stage cannot be avoided, any more than it is possible for man 
to avoid the stage in which his spiritual energies are given a religious definition as 
powers independent of himself. What we are confronted by here is the alienation of 
man from his own labour. To that extent the worker stands on a higher plane than the 
capitalist from the outset, since the latter has his roots in the process of alienation and 
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finds absolute satisfaction in it whereas right from the start the worker is a victim who 
confronts it as a rebel and experiences it as enslavement….the capitalist is just as 
enslaved by the relationship of capitalism as is his opposite pole, the worker, albeit in a 
quite different manner.456 
 
 The rootless subjectivity of Marx cannot thus be praised unequivocally. In Marx we find 
the presentation of humanity as an open-ended project, one that does not find-itself at home with 
itself—where the primacy of the relations that mediate the relation to others (the state, the 
market, a Fatherland, home, or any other site) would already imply the ontological separation of 
the human-to-human (class, race, culture, language, tradition)—but is instead defined by its 
restlessness and critical spirit, which seeks to exhume the significance of a world offered to the 
other. At other moments, however, this anti-nostalgic impulse will become fetishized and self-
referential, deployed in service of development as an end in itself no longer tethered to the 
meaning that it has for me as an expression for the other.  
 It is precisely this ambiguity which the young Levinas has in mind when, after affirming 
Marx’s grasp of the social, states that this “break with liberalism is not a definitive one.” Levinas 
remains skeptical that Marx’s perspective is “not sufficiently impotent not to retain, at least in 
principle, the power to shake off the social bewitchment that then appears foreign to its essence. 
To become conscious of one's social situation is, even for Marx, to free oneself of the fatalism 
entailed by that situation.”457 Thus Levinas states, as “paradoxical” as it might appear, the pathos 
of liberalism (as well as fascism) can be overcome “if the situation to which he was bound was 
not added to him but formed the very foundation of his being.”458 As he would later put it, the 
“detour” of subjectivity that inevitably lead back “coinciding with oneself, that is, to certainty, 
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which remains the guide and guarantee of the whole spiritual adventure of being” is precisely 
why “this adventure is no adventure.”459 In such a moment, to quote Horowitz once again, is “the 
egoism of the exchange relation—which is raised by several levels of magnitude under the 
commodity fetish—actually transcended?”460 
 To be clear, this critique does not imply there is a simple or straightforward moral 
solution to the complex problem of human history. By now it is patently obvious that all ethical 
questions are also political and economic questions. I take no issue with Marx’s efforts to ponder 
the emancipatory potential contained within historical forms of organization. To paraphrase 
Marx, one’s ethics can only be as lofty as those values permitted by the organizational form of 
their society. By addressing this tension in Marx I hope to simply help clarify the impossible 
question of what needs to be done, that is, what counts and what does not count as human 
emancipation? If the guiding pursuit of humanity is to develop “self-consciousness,” defined as a 
transformation of the subject-as-predicate back into the subject proper, then we must first ask 
what is the guiding orientation of consciousness? With Levinas we must reply, it is nothing other 
than the universal manifested within the particular offered—at every moment—as a gift to the 
other and all others. It would thus seem to be significant if self-consciousness is the movement of 
self-mastery through the social or, alternatively, if it is living with, for and through each-other.  
 This leads us to a closely related second point. Viewed from a perspective that does not 
fetishize development as such, one can see that, for all of Marx’s handwringing over the 
necessity of labour in order to free up time for distinctly human pleasures, hunter gatherers had 
largely solved the problem thousands of years ago, and typically had significantly more leisure 
time than any advanced capitalist nation (not that leisure time itself should become the index of 
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value). To approach society from the perspective that Marx assumes in the Excerpts enables us to 
better perceive the potential richness and complexity of other forms of society, especially ones 
predicated on pre-capitalist social relations. If self-consciousness proper is, as Marx suggests in 
Excerpts, accomplished in the relations that affirm the other, then we must consider the distinct 
possibility that humans attained self-consciousness long before they became unconscious (or 
better still, resist the temptation to reify consciousness as a collective “form,” even if one takes 
seriously the totality of relationships that mediate individual relations). Such is the contribution 
of thinkers such as Glen Coulthard,461 Peter Kulchyski,462 and Leanne Simpson,463 who search 
for images of a future utopia in non-, pre-, and anti-capitalist forms of social organization. As 
Coulthard states, the developmentalist model falsely presupposes “primitive accumulation” and 
capitalist social relations as the “necessary condition for developing the forms of critical 
consciousness and associated modes of life that ought to inform the construction of alternatives 
to capitalism in settler colonial contexts.”464 Kulchyski similarly points out that the mode of 
production specific to hunter and gatherer societies, though typically overlooked by Marxists, is 
just as fruitful for theorizing alternative modes of life than the images of utopia offered in 
science fiction: 
gatherers and hunters thrived in sustainable communities for millennia in politically 
egalitarian and gender-egalitarian social forms where wealth differentials were 
relatively minimal, most property was owned in common, and where respect for 
personal autonomy was a fundamental base of the social order, we are then in a position 
to say that capitalism, rather than being an extension of some ancient and natural 
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impulse, is rather a historical anomaly and probably an unsustainable mode of 
production.465 
 
To again muddy the waters, Anderson’s worthy study Marx at the Margins indicates that, in his 
later years, Marx himself continued to think and rethink through these very complex issues and, 
in some respects, came to similar conclusions.466 The object here is not to demonize or deify 
either Marx or Levinas (who held many of Marx’s own prejudices), but to collect and animate 
the scattered moments of liberation that have existed, and continue to exist, embedded within 
various forms of life, thought, and experience. That is, to hear within history and society, what 
Kulchyski has called, the “echo of an impossible return.”467  
 
Marx for Levinas 
 Having clarified how Levinas can help navigate the tensions within Marx we can now 
return to the problem with which we began. Here Marx presents a unique challenge to Levinas. 
Marx’s skepticism with dwelling upon abstract ethical imperatives, such as “the feeling of 
natural human affinity and unity” is not so much that they are unimportant as they cannot 
account for what is to be done, since feudal bondage, slavery and all the social inequalities of 
every age have also been accommodated by this “natural affinity.” Key here is that this is not 
simply Marx replacing these platitudes with an imperative of his own, which he views as more 
concrete—which is often how the famous “philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways; the point is to change it”468 is interpreted. Marx’s primary point—equally 
normative, even if less explicitly so—is that to actually institute a particular normative 
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framework or aspiration one must actually change the very substance of society. Thus, it is not 
that Feuerbach (or whomever) does not possess valuable insights on consciousness, 
intersubjectivity or ethics; rather that they misapprehend the relation between their goals and the 
conditions which such aspirations requires. As a result, Marx states, they simply “produce a 
correct consciousness about an existing fact” rather than “overthrowing the existing state of 
things.” It is not that one cannot theorize about such matters—as noted above Marx has some 
lofty ideals of his own—it simply means that if ethics is to mean anything more than the moral 
scaffolding of a given “mode of life,” it must also be a politics. That is, both an analysis of the 
current state of the situation and a gesture towards what an alternative organization of the polis 
might look like.  
 This led us to two questions: what exactly is Levinas describing in his critique of 
“ontology,” and, is Levinas capable of re-think totality as a mode of being that affirms the other 
(even if the “ethical relation” will never be fully expressed within the terms of totality)? 
Regarding the first question, in his explication of the logic which seeks the “reduction of the 
other to the same,” Levinas offers countless examples. The vast majority of these are drawn from 
the philosophical tradition (where Heidegger holds a special place of distinction), however 
Levinas sporadically refers to other examples that capture the way in which “ontology” is 
manifested in concrete and specific material ways, such as “war,” “propaganda,” “rhetoric,” and, 
more suited for our purposes, the “tyranny of the state,” “industrial city,” “wage-earner,” and 
even “economic life.” The example of war is cited by Levinas as the apotheosis of ontology, a 
“visage of being” that delivers the general formula that becomes replicated within “the concept 
of totality, which dominates Western philosophy.” Thus whether we are talking about war or 
Heidegger, “ontology” represents an instrumental “totality” that imposes “an order” where the: 
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 meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is derived from the totality. 
The unicity of each present is incessantly sacrificed to a future appealed to to bring forth 
its objective meaning. For the ultimate meaning alone counts; the last act alone changes 
beings into themselves. They are what they will appear to be in the already plastic forms 
of the epic.469 
 
 Part of the reason that Levinas is unable to develop his theory of alienation is that, 
although he invokes a potential relationship between these forms, he fails to probe the matter is a 
systematic way. It is thus left to us to speculate what the relationship between political and 
philosophical ontology might be. Because Levinas does not interrogate this relationship, it 
remains unclear if ontology, in its most pathological forms, is a consequence (perhaps necessary) 
of consciousness itself, or, perhaps, it is that bad philosophy encourages bad politics, or 
alternatively, that the whole process is already somehow rooted in the complex of historical 
relations itself. As a result, while Levinas provides us with an important perspective of what it 
means to be a social being, his critique of alienation tends to skew towards the “I’ll know it when 
I see it” variety.  
 There are a few interesting exceptions to this trend, which can be further illuminated with 
reference to Marx. The most striking is a seldom referenced passage in Totality and Infinity 
where Levinas is once again criticizing Heidegger’s “Being,” on account of its propensity to 
comprehend existents only in their relation to totality. According to Levinas, in Heidegger, 
existents become synonymous with their activity and function within the larger horizon of 
meaning (projects, imperatives, etc.). In strikingly Marxist terms, Levinas proclaims that to only 
see the “world as a set of implements forming a system” is to (regardless of explicit intention) 
already “[bear] witness to a particular organization of labor in which ‘foods’ take on the 
significant of fuel in the economic machinery.” Levinas continues that it is no coincidence or 
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random omission that Heidegger can only see an instrumental relation to the world, where even 
the relation to food is “entirely masked the usage.” That Heidegger does not consider human 
“enjoyment” and “satisfaction” as a possible embodied non-instrumental function is already a 
symptom of capitalist social relations and not some idiosyncratic oversight. It is thus no 
coincidence that Heidegger talks a great deal about mediation and relations but in a way that 
ultimately denies the profundity of the embodied experience, as Levinas notes, “Dasein in 
Heidegger is never hungry.” “Food can be interpreted as an implement” Levinas proclaims, 
“only in a world of exploitation.”470 This sentiment is repeated a few pages later as Levinas, once 
again, suggests that, in privileging function over enjoyment, Heidegger is merely reifying 
capitalist social relations: “The limit case in which need prevails over enjoyment, the proletarian 
condition condemning to accursed labor in which the indigence of corporeal existence finds 
neither refuge nor leisure at home with itself, is the absurd world of Geworfenheit.”471 
 There are many fascinating things about this passage. While it remains thoroughly 
underdeveloped, Levinas’ critique of totality is similar to more traditional Marxist thinkers.  
Take, for example, Wendy Brown’s definition of neoliberal rationality that “configures all 
aspects of existence in economic terms”472 or David McNally’s claim that the turn to “discourse” 
has erased, for precisely the same reason, “[s]ensible needs for food, love, sex, and shelter…The 
postmodern body is thus constituted by a radical disavowal of corporeal substance.”473  
 More to the matter at hand, contrary to the many shortcomings we previously 
enumerated, in such instances Levinas does in fact seem to be attempting a repetition of Marx’s 
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critique of idealism, as he had previously claimed. Marx famously begins in 1843 by critiquing 
Hegel’s abstract “Idea” that converts the “actual existent” into nothing more than a “predicate” 
of “universal domination.”474 The “object” is thus “constructed according to a system of thought” 
and is reduced to an “abstract sphere of logic.” A sentiment very close to Levinas’ 
admonishment of Heidegger’s propensity to “subordinate the relation with someone, who is an 
existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents.”475 Just as Marx goes on 
to claim that, when Hegel thinks he is describing the universal mement of Spirit he is unwittingly 
chronicling the spread of market relations, so too is Levinas (although in a far less systematic 
way) attempting to ground Heideggerian ontology within society itself. Thus his earlier comment 
about the “absurd world of Geworfenheit” reifying the “proletarian condition” perfectly mirrors 
Marx’s sentiment that the “dirty trick” pulled on society was not, as Hegel thought, the 
movement of “world spirit” but the workings of the “world market.”476 
 It is thus not a stretch to superimpose Marx’s description of capitalism onto Levinas’ 
account of totality or ontology and, moreover, no coincidence both of these depictions deliver the 
same image of an alienated world, where the value of all existents is mediated through 
instrumental processes of exchange, leaving no remainder and or possible recourse to an 
alternative mode of existence. By way of a metaphor Levinas captures this image succinctly:  
The perception of individual things is the fact that they are not entirely absorbed in their 
form…breaking through, rendering their forms, are not resolved into the relations that 
link them up to the totality. They are always in some respect like those industrial cities 
where everything is adapted to a goal of production, but which, full of smoke, full of 
wastes and sadness, exist for themselves.477 
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That capitalism embodies the very ontological structure that Levinas identifies as the 
pathological sway defining history, is again expressed in another marginal comment from the 
essay “No Identity”:  
It is interesting to note how among the most imperative 'sentiments' of May, 
1968 the dominant one was the refusal of a humanity that would be defined not 
by its vulnerability more passive than all passivity, by its debt toward the other, 
but by its self-satisfaction, its acquisitions and its acquaintances. Over and 
beyond capitalism and exploitation what was contested were their conditions: 
the person understood as an accumulation of being, by merits, titles, 
professional competence - an ontological tumefaction weighing on others and 
crushing them, instituting a hierarchized society maintained beyond the 
necessities of consumption, which no religious breath any longer succeeds in 
rendering egalitarian. Behind the capital of having weighed a capital of 
being.478 
 
 This juxtaposition of Levinas’ description of totality with Marx’s depiction of capitalism, 
can be an important first step in outlining the parameters of a Levinasian politics. Perhaps 
Levinas’ most relevant (and haunting) image of totality is found in his essay “The name of a 
Dog, or Natural Rights.” Recounting his experiences as a prisoner of war, Levinas describes the 
horrific reality of existing as a subject articulated within a chain of referential meaning that seeks 
to eliminates every trace of humanity. In Levinas’ words, they “stripped us of our human 
skin…We were beings entrapped in their species; despite all their vocabulary, beings without 
language.” In this respect Levinas claims that “anti-Semitism is the archetype of all internment” 
replicated in all “social aggression” that “shuts people away in a class, deprives them of 
expression and condemns them to being ‘signifiers without a signified.’” Interestingly, Levinas 
notes, the only exception to this totalizing discourse was found in a dog that wandered into the 
                                                 
478 Emmanuel Levinas, “No Identity,” in Collected Philosophical Papers (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 
150. 
 
 229 
camp. Levinas states that his dog was “the last Kantian in Nazi Germany” because for him alone, 
“there was no doubt that we were men.”479  
 The image of a “signifier without a signified,” to be shut away in a class and deprived of 
all expression, cannot but recall Marx’s depiction of the ontology of capitalism. In Capital Marx 
continues to develop his concern (previously discussed) of the mediating totality that reduces the 
all subjectivity—what he previously referred to as the “human language”—to the “language of 
commodities” at some length. As all “use-values” are transformed into “exchange-values” the 
the value of existents is only intelligible from the perspective of the profit imperative. 
“[C]ommodity-owners,” Marx states, “think like Faust: ‘In the beginning was the deed.’ They 
have therefore already acted before thinking. The natural laws of the commodity have manifested 
themselves in the natural instinct of the owners of commodities.”  
 It might be helpful here to borrow Marx’s backhanded defence of Ricardo, where he 
states that, in accusing Ricardo for “abstracting from morality,” Chevalier is obscuring the fact 
that Ricardo is simply allowing “political economy to speak its own language,” and if “this 
language is not that of morality, it is not the fault of Ricardo.”480 In this vein Marx is 
unequivocally reducing the social bond to the structural relation that mediate the human-to-
human relation, however, we should not blame Marx for allowing capitalism to “speak its own 
language.” The capitalist, from this perspective, is thus aptly described as an empty shell, merely 
a host for the spirit of capital:  
As a capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital. But 
capital has one sole driving force, the drive to valorize itself, to create surplus-
value, to make its constant part, the means of production, absorb the greatest 
possible amount of surplus labour. Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, 
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lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it 
sucks.481  
 
The workers are likewise reduced to their function within the totality. While the capitalist is 
described by Marx in parasitical terms like vampire, werewolf, and a rational miser, the worker 
is reduced to the appendages and organs of “demonic” machines, or similarly referred by the 
workforce to as “hands” and “part-timers,” reduced to signifiers within Being-for-capital. The 
rationality of exchange permeates every dimension of experience, from how we measure time to 
the legal definition of signifiers such as “children.”  
 The most haunting image of this alienated state is the inverted image of the “face,” where 
the ethical stamp of humanity has withdrawn completely behind the facade of signification. No 
longer associated with the social bond, the face of the other is indistinguishable from the 
relations which mediate the interaction. No longer does Paul see, in Peter, the visage of the other 
qua other; nothing is perceived save for those phenomena which personify the inverted relations 
that have predestined their meeting: 
I therefore demand a working day of normal length, and I demand it without 
any appeal to your heart, for money matters sentiment is out of place. You may 
be a model citizen, perhaps a member of the R.S.P.C.A., and you may be in the 
odour of sanctity as well; but the thing you represent when you come face to 
face with me has no heart in its breast. What seems to throb there is my own 
heartbeat.482 
 
This meeting of the “face to face,” is the truth of Levinas’ claim that “as a wage-earner, the 
worker himself may disappear.”483 Thus terms in which Marx and Levinas enumerate their vision 
of totality—at least in the form of totality with which we are presented in our modern epoch—
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are virtually identical. From Spirit to Being and capitalism to the state, we uncover a situation 
where: 
subjects, entities immediately, empirically, encountered, would proceed from this 
universal self-consciousness of the Mind: bits of dust collected by its movement or 
drops of sweat glistening on its forehead because of the labor of the negative it will have 
accomplished. They would be forgettable moments of which what counts is only their 
identities due to their positions in the system, which are reabsorbed into the whole of 
the system.484 
 
 To step back and take stock of the totality of relations that—at every moment—mediate, 
and in many ways predestine, the face to face relation, is an essential first step in establishing the 
parameters of a Levinasian politics. What is often clear in Levinas, and less clear within the 
general philosophical milieu, is that to attempt to think the totality of relations in which we 
create, live, love, suffer, and serve, is not itself to reduce the meaning and significance of the 
world to totality itself. It is nothing other than the for-the-other of subjectivity that implores us to 
interrogate the horizons in which we are situated, to be restless, critical and ruthless in our 
assessment of the structures and imperatives that structure the world and be less than satisfied 
with any politics that is not up to the task.  
 Philosophers have long expressed the death of the “meta-subject,” however, as the 
continued onslaught of neoliberalism has shown us, the meta-subject is very much alive and 
well. If we seek to transcend subjectivity as either the expression of pure egoism or a movement 
of abstract universality (“meta-narratives,” “totalizing movements” etc.), one of the most 
important tasks is to transcend the universal egoism of exchange relations (which is not to say 
the it is the only important task). Thus these two strands of subjectivity must be thought together, 
even if they are not reducible to one another. To translate it back into Levinas’ ambiguous terms: 
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it is important to know the instances when “clarity” has not occurred, when “thoughts” have not 
aimed at their themes, when the “saying” does not indeed lead back to the said, when it is neither 
the “hour” or “time” for essence, and when the “scaffoldings” in fact need to be “destroyed.” As 
the young Marx wrote in a letter to Arnold Ruge, to bear witness to the “despotism” of a society 
is already a form of “revolution”: 
It is a truth which at the very least teaches us to see the hollowness of our patriotism, the 
perverted nature of our state and to hide our faces in shame. I can see you smile and say: 
what good will that do? Revolutions are not made by shame. And my answer is that 
shame is a revolution in itself; it really is the victory of the French Revolution over that 
German patriotism which defeated it in 1813. Shame is a kind of anger turned in on 
itself. And if a whole nation were to feel ashamed it would be like a lion recoiling in 
order to spring.485 
 
Towards a Rootless Universality: Concluding Thoughts on Liberation 
 The question we are left with is, can we now re-think totality from the very standpoint of 
its (continual) interruption. “What can this relationship be,” Levinas himself ponders, “since no 
conceptual bond preexists this multiplicity?” While Levinas does not provide many substantial 
answers, he does repeatedly testify to the theoretical possibility of a positive relationship 
between the two that does not seek to establish itself as a “conceptual bond” that would precede 
the “multiplicity.” As Abensour notes, the “an-archy” that Levinas speaks of “disturbs politics to 
the point where we can speak of the disturbance of politics.”486 This negativity, which is more 
than just interruption (what both Abensour and Horowitz compare favourably to Adorno’s 
“negative dialectic”487), is what Levinas already indicates when he states that it: “[i]t is important 
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to recover all these forms beginning with proximity, in which being, totality, the State, politics, 
techniques, work are at every moment on the point of having their center of gravitation in 
themselves, and weighing on their own account.”488 It is extremely telling that, for Levinas, to 
resist the illusion that politics and collective struggle can contain their own “center of 
gravitation” is not to abandon the terrain of politics and struggle. On the contrary, it is to engage 
in “a struggle against violence which…could avoid the institution of violence out of this very 
struggle,”489 which is the exact sentiment that Levinas attributes elsewhere to Marxism, which he 
claims represents a form of “messianism” because it strove to utilize political power in order to 
“make political power useless.”490  
 Is it thus possible to think Marx and Levinas together, as thinkers that express a 
compatible image of utopia (as Levinas himself seems to suggest)? Can we trace a thread in 
Marx’s thought that intersects with Levinas notion of a “utopian community,” to again quote 
Abensour, that “keeps alive its quality of non-place which outreaches every place and anticipates 
simultaneously every attempt which intends to get settled over there, by melting into one the 
place of nowhere and the place where everything is fine.”491  
 We can begin such a task with Levinas’ essay “Heidegger, Gagarin and Us,” that 
establishes a very pertinent connection between this “non-place” and universality. Taking aim, 
once, at Heidegger, Levinas suggests that the emancipatory potential of technology lies in the 
very thing that caused Heidegger to hold it in such disdain; technology has the potential to 
relativize one’s position with respect to the other vis-a-vis their “Place.” “Technology,” Levinas 
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argues, “wrenches us out of the Heideggerian world and the superstitions surrounding Place. 
From this point on, an opportunity appears to us: to perceive men outside the situation in which 
they are placed, and let the human face shine in all its nudity.” Throwing one last passing shot at 
Heidegger, Levinas adds, “Socrates preferred the town, in which one meets people, to the 
countryside and trees.”492 The Russian cosmonaut uprooted from all roots proves to be a 
fascinating figure for Levinas. Over and above the “new forms of knowledge” and “new 
technological possibilities,” for Levinas, what “counts most of all is that he left the Place.” As 
Levinas continues: “For one hour, man existed beyond any horizon - everything around him was 
sky or, more exactly, everything was geometrical space. A man existed in the absolute of 
homogeneous space.”493 It is from this non-place or non-site that one can, as he put is see “the 
nudity of [the] face.”494  
 Levinas takes this even further in his essay “A Religion for Adults,” where he states that, 
because the human is “not a tree, and humanity is not a forest” we must promote “more human 
forms…freer forms” that “allow us to glimpse a human society and horizons vaster than those of 
the village where we were born.” Affirming his position that responsibility aspires to a certain 
kind of universality, he states that: 
At the moment when the political temptations of the light ‘of others’ is overcome, my 
responsibility is the more irreplaceable. The real light can shine. At this point the real 
universality, which is non-catholic, can affirm itself. It consists in serving the universe. 
It is called messianism.495 
Universality, in this sense, is not depicted as a totality capable of comprehending every one of its 
moments. To the contrary, universality represents a breach, or break from the horizons in which 
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we are situated; it cuts across, at a new angle, the borders, walls, fences, bars, gates, themes, 
traditions, signifiers, titles and differences that confine the interaction of humans to those 
expressions that are “appropriate” to their country, region, class, gender, race, sexual orientation, 
occupation, etc. Perhaps akin to a political expression of the phenomenological reduction, 
Levinas finds universality within the ability to see the world, and those in the world, free from 
the hermeneutic and political baggage contained within the “natural attitude.”  
 Again, a word of caution that this should not be read as an inherently developmental 
process (and this is as much a reminder for Levinas as it is for Marx). Rootlessness, in this sense, 
is an orientation, one that can, and has, existed in many places and at many times, and is thus not 
synonymous with leaving one’s home, town, or country. As the long history of colonization and 
imperialism have demonstrated, just because one finds themselves in a foreign land does not 
mean that they have left their Place. To colonize, occupy or conquer is to remain within the 
domain of the same, is not to leave one’s home. At the same time, Levinas is also correct to note 
that to live, share and create, devoid of a conceptual bond that precedes the multiplicity, is to 
engage in a self-critical movement that strives toward founding newer and freer “human forms.” 
 Does not this conception of universality, as a form of non-identity emerging from within 
the non-place, share the same spirit animating Marx’s utopianism (with all of our previous 
reservations notwithstanding)? Within Marx do we not find—as was patently clear in Excerpts—
this same utopian impulse of overcoming the barriers that insulate one from another? Is this not 
what Marx already expressed when he proclaimed that a true revolution must “let the dead bury 
their dead” so that it can create a new form of life where the “content goes beyond the words?”496 
Or, when freed from its leading role on the meta-subjective drama, is this not the essence of the 
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International Publishers), p. 106. 
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proletariat—where its “universality” is not derived from a “particular right” but from its very 
exclusion. Where universality therefore expresses itself not as an identity proper (that would 
again separate the human from the human) but as the “negative result of society” and thus only 
finds its expression in the “dissolution” of “all classes.” Without a Place to return to, the 
proletariat does not “lay claim to a historical title, but merely a human one.”497 And does not 
Levinas himself articulate this vision of solidarity and collectivity in “Useless Suffering,”498 
where he speaks about how the “intrinsically useless” phenomena of suffering can, in solidarity 
and overcoming, be given a new meaning (one that is thus utterly opposed to the meaning it may 
achieve as a theodicy)? And finally, can we thus not find within Marx a fidelity to a that politics 
preserves the “non-place” between “nowhere” and “everything is fine”? This, it would seem, is 
the yearning Marx expresses in his desire to rid the world of “the muck of ages” and “found 
society anew,”499 as well as his distinction between the inherent dogmatism of the bourgeois 
revolutions and the proletarian ones, who  
criticise themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, 
come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with 
unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltrinesses of their first 
attempts, seem to throw down their adversary only in order that he may draw new 
strength from the earth and rise again, more gigantic, before them, and recoil again and 
again from the indefinite prodigiousness of their own aims, until a situation has been 
created which makes all turning back impossible…500 
 
Above all, this fidelity with Levinas would seem most obvious in Marx’s desire to transcend the 
“horizon of bourgeois right,” where, in a world defined by the asymmetry of the exchange 
relation (where the M-C-M’ always produces a surplus for the capitalist) Marx does not simply 
                                                 
497 Marx, Critique, p. 256. 
498 Emmanuel Levinas, “Useless Suffering,” The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other (London and New 
York, 1988), p. 156,  
499 Marx, German, p. 60. 
500 Marx, Eighteenth, p. 106-7. 
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respond with a demand for reciprocity, a vision of the world where each would get what they 
rightfully deserve. Instead, Marx surprisingly inverts the asymmetry of market exchange and, in 
true Levinasian fashion, proclaims a new ethic fit for a new world: “From each according to his 
ability, to each according to his needs!”501 While it is certainly not everything, it is a good place 
to start by realizing that, even if you have a long way to go—perhaps not unlike Hegel’s 
“unhappy consciousness”—you at least have an idea of challenges that lie ahead and an “ought” 
with which you can begin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
501 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program (Dodo Press, 2009), p. 10. 
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